The potential of the G20 - A view from Oxfam

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Outcome Documents from G20 Development Working Group Meeting in Cape Town, June 30 - July 1

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G20 Agriculture Ministers Meet in Paris with Little Result

Sophia Murphy discusses the importance of the first ever meeting of the G20 Agriculture ministers, while criticizing the policy measures taken.

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Introduction

by Nancy Alexander

Harvard Professor Dani Rodrik uses the graph (below) to illustrate the “great divergence” between Western economies which struggle with crushing debt burdens and political paralyses, on the one hand, and the economic dynamism of developing nations.

Emerging market countries want their economic dynamism to translate into political muscle, including at the IMF. In May, when Dominique Strauss-Kahn resigned his post as Managing Director of the IMF after being arrested in New York City for sex-related charges, developing countries had an opportunity to overturn the convention of reserving that job for Europeans.

On 24 May 2011, the Executive Directors of the IMF for the five BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) declared that “The convention that the selection of the Managing Director is made, in practice, on the basis of nationality undermines the legitimacy of the Fund.” They called for “abandoning the obsolete unwritten convention that requires that the head of the IMF be necessarily from Europe.”

In his article, “L’affaire Lagarde,” Daniel Bradlow, Professor at both the University of Pretoria (South Africa) and American University (U.S.), describes how the selection of French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde as Managing Director undercuts the hard work of officials from emerging market countries and civil society activists to promote governance reform in the IFIs. In light of the Lagarde appointment, Bradlow reassesses the prospects, and tactics for achieving IMF reform in a two-step process: first, by identifying the five ideal elements of global economic governance and, then, since the reality falls short of the ideal, showing where tactical victories (e.g., enhancing financial inclusion; establishing an independent IMF accountability mechanism) can open up the space for later and larger victories. Barbara Unmüßig and Rainer Falk mirror Bradlow’s arguments in a recent article, criticizing the selection procedure while outlining a to-do list that Lagarde now has to tackle.

In “The Potential of the G20: A view from Oxfam,” Steve Price-Thomas, G20/BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa and Mexico) Strategy Manager, describes the view of Oxfam International (OI) that the G20 is unlikely to be a committed champion on key development issues. But, even though the G20’s Development Action Plan is almost exclusively focused on growth, OI sees scope for movement on some key development issues, for example: innovative financing and food price volatility. OI is also responding to the reality that the majority of poor people are no longer in low-income countries, but rather middle-income countries (MICs) where inequality has become the ‘ugly underbelly of global prosperity.’ Therefore, Oxfam’s programming in middle-income G20 countries will increasingly address the root causes of political, economic and social marginalization of particular groups. Its program agenda will place as much - if not more - emphasis on empowerment and political voice as it does on the transfer of resources.
In his article, “Infrastructure for What Type of Growth?” Jochen Luckscheiter recounts his observations of the G20’s June 29 Conference in Cape Town, South Africa where he is the programme manager of the International Politics & Dialogue Programme in the Southern Africa office of the Heinrich Boell Foundation. The public conference, entitled “Infrastructure for Inclusive Growth” was held under the auspices of the South African government, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the French Development Agency. It provided an opportunity for the G20’s Development Working Group (DWG) to consult with the public before meeting in closed session on June 30 and July 1. However, the article describes that this consultation process is limited because the agenda is controlled by the G20 itself and only a few hand-picked international CSOs were able to attend. Moreover, the actual documents that were produced by the closed meeting of the DWG were not shared with the attendees of the public conference. As a result, the fact that they are now available (see links on the front page) is - unfortunately - “breaking news” for most of the civil society community.

Luckscheiter critiques not only the DWG’s approach to infrastructure, but also the DWG membership and process. There is only one low-income country (LIC), Ethiopia, on the 35-member Development Working Group (DWG), despite the fact that the focus of the Development Action Plan is on the LICs. The conference focused on large-scale infrastructure with only weak attention to the question of what kind of infrastructure is needed to put the continent on a growth path that will reduce inequality and poverty (e.g., feeder road networks to help smallholder farmers get their crops to markets). While there was a session on “The Greening of Infrastructure,” it did not take sufficiently into account the medium- to long-term consequences of failing to employ green technologies.

In preparation for the next Development Working Group meeting in mid-September, the French presidency is proposing consolidation of the nine pillars of the Development Action Plan into three work streams related to: inclusive growth (e.g., infrastructure for trade facilitation and food security), risks and resilience (e.g., social protection); and international cooperation.

In her article, “G20 Agriculture Ministers Meet in Paris with Little Result,” Sophia Murphy of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) notes the significance of the first ever Summit of the Ministers on June 23-24 in Paris. President Sarkozy built up expectations for the event saying, “In adopting this plan you will change not only the lives of a billion farmers but the course of capitalism itself so capitalism once again contributes to the development and well-being of people.”

The primary purpose of the meeting was to deal with price volatility which is occurring at higher prices and more persistently than ever before. Due to such factors and the reality that increasing numbers of developing countries are net importers of food, the impacts of volatility are lethal. Excessive speculation in commodity markets is a main culprit as set forth by an UNCTAD report and suggested by a document written by ten international organizations at the behest of the G20, Price Volatility in Food and Agriculture Markets: Policy Responses. The final Action Plan kicked the decision about regulating speculation over to the Finance Ministers and adopted a plan to boost market transparency - the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which could be useful if key countries, such as China, and the four multinationals which control most of the global grain trade go along with it (See also Clapp and Martin, “Spotlight G20: The G20 Agricultural Action Plan: Changing the Course of Capitalism?”). Murphy cites a range of disappointing outcomes: the Ministers rejected calls to establish buffer food stocks and to stop subsidizing biofuels and, instead, promoted financial risk management approaches to food insecurity.

G20 Meetings Calendar (in France unless otherwise noted)

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<td>G20 Development Working Group</td>
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<td>23 September</td>
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<td>14-15 October</td>
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<td>G20 Summit Cannes</td>
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Lessons from “L’Affaire Lagarde”

By Daniel D. Bradlow (University of Pretoria & American University, Washington)

When Dominique Strauss-Kahn became the IMF Managing Director, European leaders acknowledged that the “gentlemen’s agreement” that ensured that the IMF is always led by a European and the Bank by an American was an anachronism and should end. Soon afterwards, they solemnly promised in a G20 summit communiqué that future heads of the IMF and World Bank would be selected through transparent procedures and on the basis of merit.

Of course, that was before the Europeans decided they needed IMF assistance. Unsurprisingly, they concluded that they “needed” another European IMF Managing Director. The result is that the new IMF Managing Director, like all her predecessors, is a European and that her first Deputy, like all his predecessors, is an American.

International civil society has still not achieved sufficient influence to make their own governments live up to their commitments about IFI governance reform.

The Europeans’ action substantially undercuts all the hard work that officials from the developing country members of the G20 and activists from international civil society had done to promote governance reform in the IFIs. This forces us to critically reassess the prospects, and tactics, for achieving such reform. This paper attempts such a reassessment.

The Current Prospects of Substantial Governance Reform

The fact that the G20 developing countries, and particularly the BRICS, could not rally around one candidate to oppose Christine Lagarde and the relative ease with which she was appointed IMF Managing Director highlights two unpleasant realities. First, it demonstrates the limited success these countries and their non-G20 developing country allies have had in remaking the arrangements for global economic governance. They are not yet sufficiently organized to stop the G7 from enforcing their will on international economic matters of most interest to them, even if it contradicts their own previously made commitments.

This suggests that the leading developing countries will only be able to use their influence in the G20 to substantially change the governance of the IMF and the World Bank, if they develop mechanisms for quickly reaching and implementing agreements on global economic governance matters. The importance of such cooperation is highlighted by the story of the creation of the Special Drawing Right, the reserve currency that the IMF creates. When the SDR was created, the participating developing countries all agreed it should have a developmental purpose. But could not agree on that purpose. As a result, the rich countries got what they wanted: an SDR without any specific developmental purpose.

Second, it shows that, despite their progress in building global networks, international civil society, particularly in the North, has still not achieved sufficient influence to make their own governments live up to their commitments about IFI governance reform.

These two developments suggest that, at least on some global governance issues, there is scope for a tactical bargain between the G20 developing countries and international civil society focused on their mutual interest in governance reform. This bargain will require both the developing countries and international civil society to acknowledge their limitations and be realistic in their assessment of the prospects for change. Such an alliance requires each party to have a long term strategic vision of global financial governance to guide its actions and help it identify both a set of mutually acceptable and achievable short term reform measures and the tactics for actually achieve them.

Their long term visions of global economic governance should be based on the following five factors.

I - A Holistic Vision of Development

All states are developing states in the sense that they are striving to create better lives for their citizens. While states may differ in defining their responsibilities in this regard, they all acknowledge that development is a comprehensive and holistic process in which the economic, social, political, environmental and cultural aspects are all integrated into one dynamic process. The extent to which the IFIs and the other global governance arrangements incorporate this holistic vision of development will influence how effectively they help all states achieve their developmental objectives.

II - Comprehensive Coverage

Comprehensive coverage means that the mechanisms and institutions of international economic governance should be applicable to and serve the interests of all stakeholders in the international economy. There are three important corollaries that follow from this principle. First, the mechanisms of international economic governance must be sufficiently flexible and dynamic that they can adapt to the changing needs and activities of their diverse stakeholders.
Second, the totality of international economic governance arrangements must ensure that the international community receives all the services it requires from a well-functioning global economic system. Third, is the principle of subsidiarity. This principle holds that, in order to ensure that governance arrangements are flexible, efficient, and not unduly centralized, all decisions should be taken at the lowest level in the system compatible with effective decision making. It is difficult to implement because it must apply both in standard operating conditions and in crisis situations, which may require that decisions are made at a different level than is the case during standard conditions.

III - Respect for Applicable International Law

The institutional arrangements for international economic governance should comply with applicable customary and treaty-based international legal principles. There are at least three sets of such principles.

The first is respect for national sovereignty. While it is inevitable that in an integrated global system states forego some level of sovereignty, the principle of national sovereignty allows them to preserve as much independence and policy space as is practicable and consistent with the demands of effective global financial governance.

The second is the principle of non-discrimination. This means that the institutions of international economic governance should treat all similarly-situated states and individuals in the same way but allow for disparate treatment for differently situated states and individuals. The key question thus becomes what standards can be used to ensure that all stakeholders receive treatment that is fair, reasonable, and responsive to their particular situation.

This can be achieved in regard to sovereigns by applying the general principle of special and differential treatment to international economic governance. This could result in special mechanisms of communication and accountability being established to ensure that weak and poor states are able to enjoy a meaningful level of participation in international economic decision making structures, even when these structures are based on principles like weighted voting.

In the case of non-state stakeholders, the relevant principles should be derived from documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which many now consider to be part of customary international law.

The third set of applicable international legal principles is derived from international environmental law. At a minimum these principles should require all international governance institutions to fully understand the environmental and social impacts of their operations and practices.

IV - Co-ordinated Specialization

The principle of co-ordinated specialization acknowledges that, even though development is holistic and all aspects of international governance are inter-connected, international economic governance requires institutions with limited and specialised mandates. The principle of co-ordinated specialization has two requirements. First, the mandate of the mechanisms and institutions of international economic governance must be clearly defined and limited to international economic affairs. Second, these institutions must have transparent and predictable mechanisms for coordinating with other global governance organizations and arrangements.

V - Good Administrative Practice

The arrangements for global governance should be guided by the same principles - transparency, predictability, participation, reasoned and timely decision making, and accountability - as are applicable to any public institution. This means that they must conduct their operations pursuant to transparent procedures that result in decisions and actions that are predictable and understandable to all stakeholders. They must also offer these stakeholders some meaningful way of raising their concerns and having them addressed by the institutions. Finally, the stakeholders should be able to hold the institutions accountable for their decisions and actions.

Tactical Considerations

It is clear that there is neither general agreement among G20 developing countries and international civil society on the details of this long term vision nor on how to implement it. Moreover, it is clear that, in the current phase of the transition in global power, it is not possible to create global governance arrangements that are fully consistent with this vision. This suggests that during the current phase, these two groups should adopt a pragmatic approach to global economic governance reform, including forming tactical alliances with other developing countries. In brief, they should concentrate on reform issues that both result in immediate real gains for their
countries and their citizens and that open up further opportunities for reform that are consistent with their long term vision. In addition, they should concentrate on deepening their contacts with each other and on understanding each other’s perspective.

There are several areas in which such gains could be achievable. First, the two groups can cooperate in the G20 and other global governance forums on broadening the scope of the financial regulatory reform agenda, particularly around the concept of financial inclusion. They can advocate for regulations that encourage financial institutions to develop new products that are specifically targeted at this problem. In this regard, they should remind the major financial institutions and the rich countries of Paul Volcker’s contention that the most important recent financial innovation is the ATM because of its capacity to enhance easy access to financial services. Africa could also remind the world that the next significant innovation could be cell phone banking, in which Africa is a leader.

A second possible area of collaboration would involve joint advocacy for regulations requiring international financial institutions to recycle at least a proportion of the capital flight that they attract from African and other developing countries back into these countries. A good example in this regard is the US Community Reinvestment Act, which requires US banks to invest a portion of the deposits they raise from their depositors into the communities in which these depositors live. They are expected to report on these investments and regulatory approval for new bank operations can be dependent on satisfactory performance in this regard.

The third issue that they can prioritize is realistic reform of the institutions of global economic governance. It is becoming increasingly clear that, regardless of the rhetoric, substantial structural reform of these institutions’ governance, which requires treaty amendments and member state ratification, is unlikely to take place soon. Consequently, the most realistic reforms are those that are possible within the existing legal framework and that do not require overt rich country consent. One reform that can easily be achieved within this constraint is increasing the IMF’s public accountability. Unlike the World Bank and all the other multilateral development banks, it does not have an independent accountability mechanism. These mechanisms allow non-state actors who claim that they have been harmed by the failure of these organisations to comply with their own policies and procedures to have their claims investigated and reported to the Boards of these organizations. Such a mechanism could enhance the IMF’s responsiveness to these stakeholders. In addition, it will improve IMF operations by allowing it to obtain more detailed empirical knowledge about the actual impact of its policies and operations.

Another final action that would improve global financial governance is increased transparency in and accountability of the international standard-setting authorities: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which sets standards for the banking industry; the International Organization of Securities Commissions, which focuses on the securities industry; and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, which deals with the insurance industry. These reforms should ensure that these bodies developing standards and decision-making procedures that are responsive to the needs of all their stakeholders, thereby enhancing the ability of financial institutions to contribute to efforts to address the global problems of poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation.

One reform that can easily be achieved within this constraint is increasing the IMF’s public accountability

Conclusion

“L’affaire Lagarde” shows that the G20 developing countries and international civil society cannot achieve all their global economic governance reform objectives in the current environment. Therefore they should concentrate on winning small tactical victories that open up space for later additional victories. They can do this by basing their actions on the set of principles suggested in this paper, which should both inform their long term vision of international economic governance and help them identify the tactical alliances and actions that can slowly build to their long term vision.

Daniel D. Bradlow is SARCHI Professor of International Development Law and African Economic Relations at the University of Pretoria and Law Professor at the American University Washington College of Law.
Since the global financial crisis caused by speculative capital exploded in 2008 there has not been a clear consensus or idea about how to define it, much less how to confront it. In contrast to previous crises, such as those in emerging countries, including Brazil, Mexico or Thailand, this one broke out in the main international financial centers of Wall Street and the City of London.

Today, the worst consequences of the simultaneous withdrawal of large sums of money from the stock exchanges and banks are being felt in some European countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, contemptuously known as the PIGS. There, the dramatic budget cuts are similar to the structural adjustments that international financial institutions (e.g., the IMF and World Bank) have dictated to emerging and poor countries for the last three decades. Governments argue that these cuts are required given the “economic crisis”, without accepting that this is a financial crisis caused by the world’s financial casino.

The word “crisis” implies a “turning point or decisive situation” in which there is an opportunity for a change. People all over the world saw a great opportunity for fundamental change prompted by the crisis of the global capitalist system, particularly those people living in countries with imploding economies due to massive withdrawals of capital. These crises should become opportunities for national governments to put real alternatives into practice, many of which have been put forward for decades by civil society organizations from all around the world, which claim that “another world is possible.”

However, the centers of capitalism have never taken seriously any real alternative which limits or meaningfully regulates financial speculation. For instance, while the timid attempts by the U.S. president, Barack Obama, to bail out not only Wall Street but also Main Street (the people’s economy) have largely failed, countries, such as Mexico, which are dependent on world financial centers, are still ruled by the Washington Consensus and market fundamentalism. Meanwhile, financial plutocracies and speculators responsible for the financial crisis that threw millions of people into poverty, are intact thanks to their national governments that used public money to bail out their financial industries, particularly those firm considered “too big to fail”.

In this context, the rhetoric of the G20 has changed from the need for a new financial architecture to one restricted to international monetary policy and how to deal with high and volatile commodity prices. Commodity producers, such as Brazil, and exporters, such as China, resist attempts to fix commodity prices that limit their benefits or international trade. They will win that battle. The outcome of another battle - one to limit excessive speculation in commodity markets - is uncertain.

The French are gaining allies to limit such speculation which creates tremendous price volatility in food and oil prices and, ultimately, contributes to inflation, hunger and poverty, and political unrest.

On the other hand, the financial reform adopted in 2010 in the U.S. and the measures adopted by the European Union have shown limited
scope and impact and are weak in relation to banks and financial groups, which are still imposing their rules.

Crisis as Opportunity for Change

In order to deal with urgent social needs, while discouraging excessive speculation, a new model that includes measures such as those proposed by civil society organizations is essential. Some are also supported by some governments. For example:

- taxes on financial transactions (as little as 0.05%) commonly known as financial transaction taxes (FTT),
- taxes on currency transactions,
- right of developing countries to use IMF funds to finance a "green fund" (NOT managed by the World Bank) for the prevention and mitigation of climate change,
- the redirection of subsidies given to fossil fuel industries to social programs and elimination of tax exemptions for big industries, including oil,
- new taxes on aviation and shipping cargo,
- taxes and fees for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted, and
- the curbing of illicit capital flight from developing countries to rich countries and vice versa, through regulation and greater transparency.

The G20 adheres to a myth or an almost theological belief that tinkering with macroeconomic measures will foster recovery and rebalancing of the global economy

However, despite indicators that the recovery of the world economy is far from certain, G20 finance ministers and central bank governors publicly declared that the global crisis has passed. This judgment was based largely upon the fact that consumer demand has been restored to previous levels. According to G20 experts, appropriate measures to "strengthen the recovery and reduce the risks" will be taken. In their opinion, such initiatives are aimed at enhancing the package of adjustment measures and restrictive policies in order to correct imbalances, as well as continuing to promote market deregulation through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), including the WTO Financial Services Agreement.

The Argentinean organization, FOCO, has stated that "while the G20 statements are not binding commitments of faith, the WTO imposes trade sanctions on countries that do not fit their national policies to their limits and regulations". Sarah Anderson of the Institute for Policy Studies also addresses the issue of how international rules on trade and investment (both in the WTO and in bilateral treaties on free trade and investment) severely limit the ability of governments to promote public policies for job creation and the provision of public goods.

Faith and Hope

At the G20 London Summit in 2009 world leaders talked about the challenge of restoring confidence, noting that “the only sure foundation for sustainable globalization and rising prosperity for all is an open world economy.” Meanwhile, because of an open, deregulated economy, trillions of dollars were needed to bail out private institutions and assist with the global economic recovery. Today, the G20 adheres to a myth or an almost theological belief that tinkering with macroeconomic measures such as "indicative guidelines to evaluate the persistence of large imbalances" will foster recovery and rebalancing of the global economy.

These “indicative guidelines,” which were released at the April 2011 meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers in Washington, D.C., are part of a package of recommendations intended (among other things) to promote budget austerity in countries with fiscal deficits. Because the capitalist system has no way of forgiving or cancelling sovereign debt, debt-laden countries must continue paying their creditors while cutting basic services and pensions of their citizens.

According to economist Paul Krugman, the bureaucracy of central banks, finance ministers and politicians is “acting as priests of an ancient cult, demanding that we engage in human sacrifice to appease the wrath of invisible gods.” Earlier, another economist based in Costa Rica, Franz Hinkelammert, denounced the idolatry and sacrificial nature of capitalism in his book “The Faith of Abraham”. He predicts the growth of coercive and authoritarian capitalist markets.

Authoritarianism is on the rise, and the war efforts of the rich North and its allies being scaled up; indeed, the G8 Summit in Deauville, France focused on this goal. Provision of huge amounts of money to support the “Arab spring”, the war in Libya and the threat of intervention in Syria are clear examples of that. In Latin America, the excuse is the war against drugs, in which the Plan Colombia is a model to follow. In Mexico, where the Bush-led model (continued by Obama) of promoting prosperity (with further deregulation of markets), while scaling up security by means of militarization has cost some 40,000 lives since Calderon took office in 2006. Mexico’s experience makes it urgent to find alternatives to this failed model. The G20 should encourage a serious debate about the radical changes necessary, starting with curbing financial speculation.
One Region, Two Speeds?
by Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) March 2011

The rapid growth in emerging markets that is shifting the global economic order has left its mark on Latin America. The days of Mexico’s economic leadership in the region are numbered, while Brazil continues to show resilience to external shocks and at the same time benefits from surging demand for its commodities at high prices. This, at least, is the picture that the IDB draws in their latest report.

In essence, it argues that there are two “clusters” of countries in Latin America that show differentiated patterns and paces of growth:
- a high growth “Brazil” cluster of net commodity exporters, defined by high international trade exposure and low dependence on remittances from industrial countries
- a low growth “Mexico” cluster of commodity importers, that are dependent upon cheap manufactures and possess strong commercial ties with industrialized countries.

In other words, it has become clear that the global economy has favored those Latin American countries that have developed ties with leading Asian and other BRIC emerging markets. However, while the Mexican cluster is being hurt by depressed demand in the United States, it is also questionable whether growth dependent on expensive commodity exports is a sustainable strategy in the long run.

Many questions are not answered by the report. How can Brazil’s position be harnessed in ways that benefit the region as a whole? How can trade within the region be fostered? How can the successful Brazil cluster move towards a low-carbon development path?

Brazil’s Contribution to G20 and Global Governance
by John Kirton (G20 Research Group, University of Toronto) May 2011
Link: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/kirton-eneri-110518.html

The economic success of Brazil over the last years has, according to John Kirton, ushered in a new age in G20 governance - the era of Brazil’s leadership. As a matter of fact, he sees a pivotal role for Brazil in strengthening G20 governance through initiatives in democratization, human rights, civil society involvement, and in clean energy and the environment especially in the lead-up to Rio+20.

As an example of this newfound role the G20 meeting in Sao Paulo in 2008 is mentioned and heralded as “one of the most successful ever held”. It endorsed the G7’s approach to financial regulatory reform and in return the G20 agreed to expand the membership of the Financial Stability Board to emerging economies. Moreover, the meeting concluded that “emerging and developing economies should have greater voice and representation” in Bretton Woods bodies. Brazil also hosted the first-ever formal meeting of the finance ministers of the BRICs, demanding reforms of IFIs to reflect the increasing weight of emerging countries.

It becomes clear that Brazil is well positioned to take the lead in strengthening G20 governance. Especially on energy and climate change the opportunity of the historic Rio+20 conference in 2012 could be used as a catalyst to finally include a climate dimension into the G20 debates that has so far been absent. It remains to be seen, however, whether Brazil will use its increased economic weight to turn the G20 into a more transparent, democratic and legitimate body in the future.

UN Security Council Reform Could Alter Global Relevance of G20
by Gordon Smith (CIGI) July 2011

In this thought experiment, Gordon Smith analyzes the impact of a potential UNSC reform that would provide new permanent seats to the so-called “G4” countries (India, Germany, Japan and Brazil). He argues, that a Security Council with nine permanent members would significantly alter the role of the G20.

Smith recalls the fact that meetings at the G20 level - while providing more “input legitimacy” due to its larger membership - provide far less time for discussion then was the case of the G8 in its heyday. Hence, could a new Permanent (P) 9 (China, India, Brazil, Japan, Russia, France, Germany, UK, United States) turn into a G9 that would essentially drop Italy and Canada for China, India and Brazil?

Brazil has indeed flexed its muscles within the BRIC coalition, has secured a place in the G20, shaped global climate and trade negotiations, is going to host the Rio+20 conference in 2012, and has successfully demanded greater clout within the IMF and the World Bank. Hence, a permanent seat at the UNSC would be the crown jewel for the Itamaraty, the country’s sophisticated diplomatic corps, who speak with pride of Brazil’s “diplomatic GDP”.

- For more information on why Security Council reform may finally be in sight read the post by Stewart M. Patrick from the Council on Foreign Relations.
- A brand new report by the Council on Foreign Relations describes Brazil as an actor whose influence on the defining global issues is only likely to increase.
The Potential of the G20: A view from Oxfam

By Steve Price-Thomas (Oxfam International)

If the changes in the fortunes of any one institution are symbolic of the rapid shift to a multi-polar world, it is the G20 that commands attention. For ten years a relatively obscure meeting of finance ministers, the global economic crisis thrust the G20 into the limelight and upgraded it to a summit-level meeting of world leaders. Then, the G20 declared itself to be the world’s premier economic forum. The G-20 countries represent around 90 per cent of global gross national product, 80 per cent of world trade (including intra-EU trade) as well as two thirds of the world population.

While Oxfam believes the G-20 is an improvement over the G-8, we are concerned that the poorest countries are left out. Not a single Low-Income Country is formal member of the G-20. In a small step in the right direction, at the Seoul Summit in November 2010 G20 members agreed that at least two African states (in addition to South Africa) would be invited to future summits.

Presently, it is not clear to what extent the G20 will really tackle the most important issues of development facing the world today. Oxfam sees three possible scenarios, set out below.

Oxfam believes that in the end the UN is the only legitimate body of global governance – as such it should at the very least be present at the table where solutions to the global economic crisis are being discussed.

Meanwhile the global poverty picture is also changing. It is likely that the coming years will be characterised by increasing scarcity of land, water, minerals and new carbon space; an increase in volatility; and an increase in vulnerability. Furthermore, Andy Sumner of the UK’s Institute for Development Studies states that:

“In 1990, we estimate that 93 per cent of the world’s poor people lived in low income countries (LICs). In contrast, in 2007-8 we estimate that three-quarters of the world’s approximately 1.3bn poor people now live in middle-income countries (MICs) and only about a quarter of the world’s poor – about 370m people – live in the remaining 39 low-income countries, which are largely in sub-Saharan Africa.”

The MICs which are home for such a huge proportion of the world’s poor are – by and large – the same countries which are gaining rapidly in influence as the multi-polar world emerges. The challenge of how they address poverty within their borders, and the influence they wield on poverty reduction issues on the world stage, are inextricably linked.

Implications for Oxfam and our partners

All this is relevant for Oxfam and our partners because our mission of working with others to overcome poverty, suffering and injustice is global, and we aim to bring about the most effective pro-poor change by working at national, regional and global levels.

Presently, it is not clear to what extent the G20 will really tackle the most important issues of development facing the world today

With 75% of the world’s poorest one billion people living in middle income countries in 2007, there is growing evidence that inequality has become the ‘ugly underbelly of global prosperity’.

It follows that, at a national level, Oxfam’s programming in MIC G20 countries will increasingly need to...
address the root causes of political, economic and social marginalisation of particular groups. It will invoke a program agenda which will place as much - if not more - emphasis on empowerment and political voice as it does on the transfer of resources. Such an approach will likely require a need for greater policy dialogue with governments and support for civil society in middle income countries to hold governments to account through increasing the confidence, resources and skills of communities, as well as their ability to lobby governments, contribute to policy decisions and engage in debates with key stakeholders.

It also follows that at regional and global levels power is shifting to the BRICSAM countries so Oxfam's resources must follow our model of change and shift too: Oxfam will not achieve our objectives without influencing the right targets. So we are embarking on an ambitious drive to enhance our capacity in BRICSAM capitals to work with partners to ensure the G20 delivers real positive change for poor people throughout the world.

Steve Price-Thomas is G20 / BRICSAM Strategy Manager at Oxfam International.

To learn more about the G20 related work of Oxfam click here.

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**Possible Future Scenarios for the G20 and Development**

**High Impact - G20 a committed champion on key development issues**

Under the high impact scenario, the Seoul Consensus would form the basis for substantive action on many key development issues. Under this scenario the G20 would:

- Agree on a progressive new development agenda
- Focus on issues of importance, e.g., the food crisis
- Open its doors to low-income countries by offering at a minimum, full and permanent seats to the AU, and to Latin American and Asian regional bodies
- Improve on the practices of the G8 by reporting annually on progress toward objectives using specific indicators and timetables
- Reflect the ongoing necessity for the G20’s constituent members to meet their obligations on aid
- Commit to exploring and implementing a range of financial transactions tax proposals with a portion of the revenues dedicated to fighting poverty and climate change in developing countries
- Agree on a tax on the financial sector in the major financial centres of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Persuade the European members of the IMF’s Board of Executive Directors to implement a further consolidation of their seats and voting shares and the U.S. to relinquish its veto power on the Board.

Some aspects of this scenario appear unlikely in the short to medium term.

**Medium impact - G20 considers development but from a growth / infrastructure perspective**

Under a medium impact scenario, development would stay on the agenda but largely confined to the terms of the official Seoul Development Consensus, which calls for an almost exclusive focus on economic growth. The Action Plan would remain short on specifics and largely unfunded. In this scenario there is still scope for movement on some key development issues, for example on innovative financing or food price volatility, but this will depend largely on the degree to which the Chair of the particular G20 Summit takes on the issues and expends capital to address them.

This scenario appears the most likely in the short to medium term.

**Low impact - G20 rules out development as an issue and / or the institution withers**

Under this scenario, the G20 either explicitly decides development is outside its remit, or consistently fails to pay anything other than lip-service to development. There is little to no scope for to make progress on issues of concern to NGOs, as the G20 does not put them on the agenda.

This scenario appears unlikely in the short to medium term.
At their Seoul, South Korea Summit in November 2010, the G20 adopted a Multi-Year Action Plan on Development which aims to promote economic growth in about 80 low-income countries (LICs).

The development action plan, however, has been criticized on a number of points, including the lack of representation and opportunities for participation for low-income countries, their parliaments and civil society; the focus on economic growth to the detriment of inclusiveness and the natural environment; and its emphasis on large scale public-private partnerships projects, particularly in infrastructure and agriculture, in order to promote economic growth and regional integration. (For a detailed analysis see: The G20: “Maestro” of the Development Finance World? by Nancy Alexander.)

The conference “Infrastructure for Inclusive Growth” that took place on June 29, opening the second G20 Development Working Group meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, was in many ways characteristic of these criticisms.

**Form of Consultation Needs Change**

One of the objectives of the event was to provide an opportunity for deliberation between G20 and non-G20 members, including the private sector and civil society, on issues relating to infrastructure, G20’s top priority within its Development Action Plan.

Opportunities for civil society to directly engage with the G20 on its action plan have been rare and therefore the event was welcomed. However, the consultation process, convened by the South African government, in partnership with the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the French Development Agency, was an exercise very much controlled by the G20. The programme clearly set the parameters of the discussions and attendance was limited to a few hand-picked (mostly internationally based) civil society actors, since there was no broad notification of the event.

According to the current list of Development Working Group members, there is only one low-income country – Ethiopia – with membership on the Group. This is despite the fact that the focus of the Development Action Plan is on the LICs.

If the G20 Development Working Group has a genuine interest in the views and proposals of stakeholders from outside the group and in democratizing development, the form of consultation needs to be changed. Only a process that is equally owned and driven by actors that are representative of the various constituencies in LICs can enjoy legitimacy and produce inputs into the Development Action Plan that are inclusive and mindful of the local realities in these countries.

**Focus Remains on Growth not Inclusiveness**

There is no doubt that, in order to unlock the region’s full economic potential, sub-Saharan Africa’s need for increased investments in its infrastructure and agricultural sector is enormous. A staggering 69.5 percent of its total population does not have access to electricity, while 40 percent does not have access to clean water. Similar statistics exist for, among other things, access to: all weather roads; sanitation; and information and communications technology. The World Bank estimates Africa’s investment needs at $93 billion, of which only about half is mobilized.

However, to close these gaps and improve the quality of people’s lives on the continent, an exclusive concentration on the rate of economic growth is not enough, as demonstrated by emerging market countries such as India whose social indicators are lagging even with growth rates of over eight percent.
Despite the promising title “Infrastructure for Inclusive Growth” most of the presentations and deliberations at the conference focused on “procedural” issues: the lack of project preparation facilities, political and institutional challenges for cross-border infrastructure projects to reach economies of scale, or the question of how to close the infrastructure financing gap in Africa. Only weak attention was given to the question of what kind of infrastructure is needed to put the continent on a growth path that will help to reduce inequality and poverty.

Similarly, the conference put great emphasis on large scale infrastructure projects. However, whether or how such projects (e.g., the Inga hydroelectric power complex in the Democratic Republic of Congo; the North-South infrastructure development corridor that would connect the Cape to Cairo; and the Kenya-Ethiopia transmission link) would ensure better access and benefits for the (rural) poor, were challenges hardly discussed.

Large scale projects are important. But if the vision is to transform the economic foundation of continent from a system that is narrowly based on the export of minerals and other commodities, into a system that is broad-based and poverty-reducing, the focus within the G20 needs to shift so that the development of small-scale infrastructure becomes a priority.

For example, about 60 percent of Africa’s active labor force is employed in the agricultural sector, the majority of which are small-scale farmers. Given the neglect of smallholder farming over the last decades, this sector offers huge potential for inclusive growth. However, farming activities are taking place mostly far off the main routes that, for instance, connect Africa’s economic centers to the sea. Therefore, to tap into this potential, the same attention has to be given to the development of feeder road networks into farming communities as to the improvement of the existing trunk routes.

Environmental Sustainability (Not) Just an Add-On

In 2010 energy-related carbon emissions reached their highest level in history, putting the international target to limit global increase in temperature to two degrees Celsius under serious threat. An increase over and above this critical threshold implies significant negative impacts on nature and humanity. Africa’s poor are predicted to suffer the gravenst consequences of these climate impacts.

Despite this urgent situation the G20 Development Action Plan does not address climate change nor does the G20 have a programme to encourage a low-carbon development path.

Much of the “The Greening of Infrastructure” session of the conference narrowly focused on the immediate risks and financial costs of employing “green” technologies. On the whole, the conference failed to contextualise infrastructure development (especially in energy and transport) and agriculture relative to the profound climate changes the world is facing. Nor did it take sufficiently into account the medium- to long-term risks and costs of failing to employ such technologies.

If the G20 has a genuine interest in the views and proposals of stakeholders from outside the group the form of consultation needs to be changed

The G20 needs to recognize that today’s decisions on infrastructure will lock countries onto a particular development path for decades and ensure that the greening of infrastructure is part of a holistic approach to development rather than a niche activity within the G20, as it is today.

A paradigm shift towards a sustainable future that emphasises quality over quantity of investment and growth is possible if the political will exists. South Korea - which actively pursued a green growth path in response to the global economic crisis of 2008/09 - offered the conference an inspiring example of that.
On June 23, 2011, the G20 marked a new phase in its evolution as a political entity with its first summit of Agricultural Ministers. Held in Paris, with a significant investment of French political energy in the process and the outcome, the meeting was nonetheless profoundly disappointing.

The one positive outcome was that the meeting happened. On agriculture, as on few other topics of global policy importance, the G20 have urgent work to do—collectively and at home. The G20 account for the world’s largest food producers, consumers, importers and exporters, and on all these fronts, existing food systems are failing. Of course, the G20 excludes the vast majority of countries, and by definition, all the poorest countries, where the failings of the system are felt most acutely. Nonetheless, the G20 could dramatically improve the working of international food systems if they chose to, and the broader benefits would be significant. Yet the final communiqué showed just how much work is still to be done to get the most influential G20 members—particularly the United States, Brazil and China—to agree to much needed reforms.

What were they discussing? Food price volatility: the sharp price rises and falls in international agricultural commodity prices after several decades of relatively flat prices. Agricultural prices always fluctuate of course. The prices of agricultural commodities fluctuate more than most prices because of the uncertainties that even 21st century technology cannot control, from rainfall to pest infestations. But four things have brought volatility to the fore of governments’ minds for the first time over thirty years. First, volatility is higher than at any time since the period of instability in the early 1970s and it is affecting all commodities, though not all equally. Second, the volatility is associated with persistently higher food prices. The welfare effects of volatility depend on the level around which prices are fluctuating: at higher prices, the effect of volatility on poor consumers is much more deadly than when it occurs around lower prices. Third, volatility is proving persistent: earlier periods of agricultural commodity price volatility were at least as marked as today’s but they were relatively short-lived. Prices returned to previous levels after two years in the 1970s, for example. This time, although prices fell during the second half of 2008 and 2009 after the massive recession triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis, prices then started to rise again and have continued to rise since. Fourth, volatility on international markets has never affected so many people. Developing countries (especially the poorest among them) depend on cereal imports as a component of their food security. Until the 1990s, developing countries were net agricultural exporters. Since then, they have become net importers. Volatility on international commodity markets today affects billions of people around the world.
So commodity price volatility is a real issue. And it has real consequences, too. The uncertainty price volatility brings in its wake is not only bad for consumers and producers, but for economic development as a whole, because it discourages investment and encourages conservative risk-taking, diminishing the potential for innovation. Coupled with sharp upward food price spikes, the issue becomes politically charged—to the point of riots and even revolution.

Given the importance of the issues, what did G20 achieve in Paris? They touched on a number of the central issues. Some were developed in some detail, including the need for greater transparency and market information; and, the need to invest in greater agricultural productivity. Other issues, as important and more directly touching G20 domestic politics, did not fare so well. These issues included ending minimum use mandates and subsidies for biofuel production in industrial countries; disciplines on export restrictions; tougher regulations on commodities futures markets; and the potential of public stockholding to mitigate volatility and price spikes.

Commodity speculation was of particular interest to the French host government, and the final declaration mentions the need to tighten regulations governing commodity futures exchanges, including the need to determine position limits for some traders in advance. But the Finance Ministers are jealous of what they see as their preserve and the Agriculture Ministers bowed to the traditional hierarchies and pushed actual binding decisions back to the next G20 Finance Ministers’ meeting in September. An organization called the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is due to report at that time on some of the issues. The chance was largely missed to insist that financial actors are both too powerful and too disruptive on agricultural commodity markets and that the rules need to be reformed.

The Agriculture Ministers did agree to establish something they are calling the Agricultural Marketing Information System (AMIS). The idea has merit: the free flow of information is an essential precondition for markets to work correctly. Yet the proposal is a funny mix. On the one hand, it is a somewhat limited ambition—information is necessary yet certainly not sufficient for markets to work. On the other hand, and surely inadvertently, AMIS is a potentially subversive agenda because the need for AMIS highlights some uncomfortable facts for the governments that insist international markets are working and need to be left unregulated. The four largest grain multinationals are estimated to control anywhere from 75 to 90 percent of the global grain trade (importantly, no one actually knows how much they control, either individually or collectively). In practice, if just these four companies were willing to cooperate, it might be enough to transform the information available on international markets. Yet the four (known collectively as ABCD: Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) are notoriously secretive and have given no indication whatsoever that they will cooperate with the proposed AMIS. Without them, what can AMIS achieve? Meanwhile, China continues to hold important levels of domestic stocks—important, but no one knows how big, and the government is not about to say.

On biofuels, the governments of Brazil and the United States are said to have acted in concert to block any meaningful outcome. Whatever the actual negotiating that went on, the
G20 agreed to do nothing on this issue. The declaration commits the G20 to study the problems, with a note to remember how helpful biofuels can be. Biofuels policies are one of the contributors that virtually all experts agree has played a significant part in causing higher and more volatile agricultural commodity prices. The analysis is already exhaustive and widely published, in more than one language. But the governments responsible for the problem continue to deny the evidence.

Another issue that is widely condemned but politically untouchable is the use of export restrictions. Paragraph 40 reads: “We recognize that the first responsibility of each member state is to ensure the food security of its own population. We also recognize that food export barriers restricting humanitarian aid penalize the most needy. We agree to remove food export restrictions or extraordinary taxes for food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Program (WFP) and agree not to impose them in the future. We will seek support within the United Nations agencies and will also recommend consideration of the adoption of a specific resolution by the WTO for the Ministerial Conference in December 2011.”

The exception carved out for purchases by the WFP is important, but it is trivial in comparison to the market as a whole. Export restrictions disrupted markets, raised prices and added to uncertainty, and thus volatility, in 2007/08. The note that food security is a “first responsibility” is welcome. But in this context, the statement sits awkwardly with the fact that the G20 includes all the major grain exporters (except for the rice exporters Thailand and Viet Nam). The use of trade restrictions in 2007/08 severely undermined importers’ confidence in international markets. Many poorer countries are less inclined to rely on international markets for their food supply than they were before the crisis. The failure of the G20 to agree that export restrictions should be governed by multilateral agreement begs the question of why they object to governments who insist their responsibility to ensure the food security of their population includes the need to use import restrictions. The answer is not in prohibiting all export restrictions. Rather, paragraph 40 of the declaration encapsulates the failure of the Doha Round and should be a harbinger of a new premise for global trade agreements—one that starts with the first and over-riding obligation of governments to ensure trade rules respect the universal human right to food.

One final area deserves mention: public stocks. The G20 includes a number of governments that use stocks on a significant scale, including India and China. These governments successfully mitigated the worst of the price spikes in part because their domestic markets are not fully integrated into world markets. Price spikes and periods of excessive price volatility are both associated with low levels of stocks. Indeed, if stocks are sufficient, neither price spikes nor excessive volatility will occur. Yet the G20 refused to reconsider policy in this area, finally dismissing the option to use stocks to stabilize prices and thus curb excessive speculation while at the same time ensuring a physical grain supply that privileges food for human consumption over other uses. The G20 chose instead to emphasize various risk management tools, all of them based on finance, including public subsidies to financiers such as J.P. Morgan to encourage developing countries to hedge their food import needs on commodity exchanges.

The one mention of reserves was for a WFP programme to pre-position food aid with the creation of small emergency stocks in regions that are prone to food emergencies. Even this, very modest, proposal, was watered down by the U.S., who insisted that a feasibility study was needed before even a pilot project could be launched. The final declaration goes a little further, calling for both the feasibility study and the establishment of the pilot. But the proposal as a whole, while very worthwhile, hardly touches on the potential of strategic grain reserves to reduce the likelihood of excessive price volatility.

What comes next? It will be for the Finance Ministers in September and the Heads of State in November to see. There is still time to push for meaningful and coordinated reform on commodity speculation, though it will be a hard-won fight to get governments to agree to meaningful change. But on some of the major agricultural issues, including biofuels, stocks and trade rules that support food security, the G20 Ministerial can only be judged a failure. The governments have promised to keep meeting and discussing the issues. Perhaps Mexico, host of the 10-11 June 2012 G20 Summit, can produce something more significant from the next encounter.
G20 Database & E-mail Group

Stay informed

Database

If you would like to read more on the G20, recent changes in Global Governance and what it means for specific regions or issues, the G20 Database of the Heinrich Böll Foundation is the right place to go. It is subdivided into the following folders, so you can easily access the analysis and information that is of interest to you.

G20 Database Structure

1 - Background
   1.1 - G20 Info & History
   1.2 - Global Governance
   1.3 - G7 & G8
2 - Summits
   2.1 - G20
   2.2 - Finance Ministers
3 - Issues
   3.1 - Finance
   3.2 - Climate Change
   3.3 - Development
   3.4 - Energy
   3.5 - Trade
   3.6 - Food Security
4 - Country Specific
   4.1 - Africa
   4.2 - Canada & US
   4.3 - South America
   4.4 - Asia
   4.5 - Middle East
   4.6 - Europe
5 - Power Dynamics
   5.1 - Within the G20
   5.2 - G20 to non-members
6 - Civil Society

In addition, every folder contains both a Word and PDF document with annotations of the documents included in the folder. The database is designed in a way that every member can add documents himself, which are then instantly synchronized so that everyone can access it. This is a great way to share information and build up institutional capacity.

If you would like to know more about the Database or sign up for access please send an Email to g20-newsletter@boell.de. To get started right away, here are the 3 easy steps to install the Database on your computer:

1. Install the Programm "Dropbox" from [https://www.dropbox.com/install](https://www.dropbox.com/install)

2. Write to g20-newsletter@boell.de, you will then receive an Email invite to share the G20 Database folder.

3. Accept the invite and you should be able to access the database through a Dropbox icon on your Desktop.

E-mail Group

In addition, the Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of an international network of NGOs and policy-analysts, which have set up a G20-related E-mail Group.

To subscribe, send email to: alternative-g20+subscribe@googlegroups.com

To unsubscribe, send email to: alternative-g20+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com

To customize your subscription, go to [http://groups.google.com/group/alternative-g20](http://groups.google.com/group/alternative-g20) (but you need to create a Google account, if you do not have one)

Replies automatically go the whole group. To minimize email traffic, please do only reply to the whole group if necessary. There is no moderation.

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