African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation

Edited by
Makumi Mwagiru

HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION  Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa, Nairobi
Contents

Abbreviations vii
Foreword ix
Preface xv

1 Introduction, Makumi Mwagiru
   Emerging Consensus 2
   Multiplicity of Themes 3
   Tying it Together 4

2 Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, Hiteng Ofuho
   Introduction 7
   Conceptual Analysis of Security Framework 7
   Past-Security Concerns 9
   Present Security Concerns 12
   Responses to Security Issues in the Horn 14
   Conclusion 17

3 Globalisation Intellectuals and Security in Africa, Eric Aseka
   The New Global Order 20
   The Information Revolution 21
   Intellectual Globalisation and Geopolitics of Security 22
   Neo-Liberalism and the Vagaries of the Market 25
   Threats to National Security 27
   Conclusion 29

4 Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region, Ludeki Chweya
   Re-Defining of Security 31
   The Practice of Regional Security 35
   New Forms of Insecurity 37
   From Border Disputes to Shared Resources 38
   From Inter-state to International Security Threats 40
   From Cold-War Conflicts to Mercenarism and Terrorism 42
   Shift from State to Neo-Liberalism 45
   Conclusion 48
### Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the Era of Globalisation, Godfrey Okoth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approaches of Sub-regional Institutions</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Globalisation</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions and Organs of the EAC</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for a Security Organ</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Security Issues</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC Security Issues</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD security Issues</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EAC and the IGAD Under NEPAD</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NEPAD and Security in the IGAD Region, Peter Wanyande

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Security</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD and Development</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Concerns in the IGAD Region</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges to NEPAD</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Gender, Conflict and Regional Security, Patricia Mbote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender, Security and Public Good</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Security</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Public Good</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interface of Gender and Regional Security</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality and Equity</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality, Stability and Conflict</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of Insecurity</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Insecurity</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Sudan Peace Process, From Machakos to Naivasha, Samson Kwaje

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search for Peace</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Five: The Machakos Process</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of Self-Determination</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of State and Religion</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOS Withdrawal from Machakos II</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naivasha Process</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 9 The Somali Peace Process, Ochieng Kamudhayi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Decision–Making</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Peace Process</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arta Conference</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteenth Somalia Peace Conference</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase One of the Conference</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Two of the Conference</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors, Interests and Issues</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Djibouti</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Ethiopia</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Kenya</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan Interests</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrean Interests</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Libya and Arab League</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Partners Forum</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Map for Somalia</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10 Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD, John Koech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geo–Strategic Survey</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Sub–Region</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The End of Globalisation</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalization of Conflicts</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for Regionalism</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU and Conflict Management</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD and Regional Security</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emerging Reality</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11 Towards A Security Architecture in the IGAD Region, Makumi Mwagiru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Regional Security</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a Conceptual Consensus</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualising Borders and Borderlessness</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixity of Borders to the Regulatory Landscape</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re–Inventing Security in IGAD</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlarging the Insecurity Dilemma</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contributors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bibliography**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APER</td>
<td>African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Marker for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lords Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBI</td>
<td>Nile Basin Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Petroleum Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Oromo National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPI</td>
<td>Sudan Peace Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMT</td>
<td>Verification and Monitoring Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword

P. Anyang' Nyong'o

NEPAD: A Timely and Useful Institution for Africa

During the recent discussions on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that were held at the Kenyatta International Conference Center, Nairobi, some observations were made by some critics that need to be clarified. Some key ones are:

• That nothing is new about NEPAD: African leaders have come up with such lofty ideas before;
• That NEPAD was really the initiative of the OECD countries wanting to impose their own version of globalisation on Africa;
• That NEPAD is the cowardly acceptance of neo–liberal economics by African leaders in a world in which the powerful countries are strengthening their states while aggressively using neo–liberalism to search for and penetrate foreign markets;
• That in Africa the Republic of South Africa is the client state for this creeping neo–liberalism, hence President Thabo Mbeki's strong championing of NEPAD;
• That, therefore, as a top-down approach to African development, civil society was duty bound to reject it and look for more people–based approaches to African economic integration and exit from poverty.

There could have been many other derivatives of the above arguments, but they could all fit in neatly within the above arguments.

In our book, NEPAD: A NEW PATH? , various contributors, while discussing the grounds on which these arguments emerged, sought to respond to them and to give a more “internal reading” of NEPAD than some of these critiques had been prepared to have.

The weakest argument, of course, was that NEPAD was a top–down idea. While accepting that it was, indeed, a top–down idea, this we saw as inherently useful, if not essentially necessary. Few good ideas ever come from crowds, committees or commissions. If anything, most ideas that have inspired mass movements and changed societies—for the better or for the worse—have come from individual persons.

The Christian movement was born out of the missionary work and the theology of one man: Jesus Christ. Saint Paul carried this further, and at great personal risk to his own reputation and life, toured the whole of the Middle East writing and preaching to both the converted as well as the diabolical cynics. Likewise, the Islamic faith was inspired by the theology and ideas of Prophet Mohammed. Much later, the political, philosophical and economic analyses and treatises of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels changed the history of many countries in the world.
None of these prophets, theologians and political economists convened “stake-holders” discussions first before they espoused their theologies, theories and philosophies that they then sought to influence minds and hearts so as to change the world.

Hence there was nothing inherently wrong in Thabo Mbeki, Abdoulaye Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo and Bouteflika coming up with the NEPAD agenda and seeking to influence the course of Africa’s history, hopefully for the better. A much more interesting discourse should, therefore, be carried more on the message than the bearers of the message, hence the usefulness of an “internal reading” of NEPAD.

Scholars and civil society activists have extensively discussed the key issues raised above since our book was published, thereby raising the level of participation in the process of internal reading. Of greater importance has been the issue of the relevance and usefulness of “neo-liberalism” as a viable framework for shaping African economic and social policies in the context of globalisation.

NEPAD accepts globalisation as a reality but, unlike Francis Fukuyama, does not see it as the end of history. If anything, globalisation is something to engage and challenge with innovative ideas and processes that will reshape the flows of world trade, undo global inequalities, democratise political and social systems and institutionalise global social democracy. It is not socialism that is on the political agenda of the oppressed and exploited of the third world; it is the building of a democratic developmental state at the national level while pursuing global social democracy at the international level.

The collapse of the Cancun WTO talks has revealed quite clearly this contradiction between the pursuit of global social democracy by the developing countries regarding trade and development (the Doha Agenda) and global trade hegemony of the OECD-led economies (the Singapore Agenda). NEPAD cannot therefore be simplified and reduced as a mere agenda of the west; it would be difficult thereby to explain a phenomenon like that which occurred in Cancun. Even the issue of being a cowardly acceptance of a western agenda also falls on its face at this juncture, and we must therefore proceed to an internal reading that will get us beyond this populist discourse.

In calling upon the need for a developmental national state that promotes pan-African economic relations in the context of globalisation, NEPAD puts emphasis on private-public partnership in filling the “resource gaps” and “resource needs” in investing for economic growth. These “gaps” and “needs” were estimated to amount to at least US $ 64 billion annually if Africa is to achieve a rate of economic growth that will drastically eradicate poverty and set the continent on the highway towards modernity in the next two decades.

Cynics interpreted this to mean that Africa was going on a begging spree to the G8 to look for this money as aid to finance development. There is a big difference between holding
a discourse with the G8 on how they will support private sector investment flows from the developed countries to Africa and begging them to give “free money” to Africa to finance development, whatever form of development one is talking about.

It is to be noted that in the area of infrastructure—roads, railways, telecommunications, airways transport, maritime transport, energy—the public sector, alone or in partnership with the private sector (local and foreign), will be vital in Africa’s economic recovery and development. Whichever form the investment takes, good corporate governance is important for successful operations. NEPAD has more than emphasized this, hence the proposal for the PEER REVIEW MECHANISM meant to compel the state to set good examples of governance and best practices so as to percolate in the rest of society. It ought to be remembered that the private sector is not, by its very nature, prone to probity and integrity; laws, values and regulations, enforced by the state and other public, corporate and professional bodies will make the private sector observe probity and integrity.

At the recent meeting of the Eastern African region member states of NEPAD, private–public partnership was emphasized in fast–tracking projects that enhance regional integration, increase connectivity, stimulate cross–border trade, lead to greater national harmony, create wealth and thereby reduce poverty. A dozen key projects in the area of infrastructure and agriculture were approved, a good number of them already underway with substantial private sector input. For example, the Indian Ocean Submarine Fiber Optic Cable network that will increase telecommunications connectivity with the island states and the inland landlocked states with the rest of the region already has substantial private sector investment.

It was further agreed that an office be set up in Nairobi for coordination and networking. This office is thus coming into being as a demand–driven initiative and not a supply–side NGO. Its first item on the agenda, in line with the nature of the NEPAD Steering Committee in Kenya, will be to concretise the private–public partnership at the regional level. In all this, increased connectivity is the key factor, for on connectivity comes economic integration and the growth of the home market.

Nonetheless, without peace and security everything else comes to naught. Thus it was emphasized, at the same summit that primacy must be given to establishing permanent peace and security in the region if development is to be given a chance. The rapprochement between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Khartoum Government is well advanced at the Naivasha Peace Talks here in Kenya. The Peace Agreement was supposed to have been signed before Christmas last year, and then the development and reconstruction work was to start in earnest in Southern Sudan this year. It would be a complete disappointment to the people of South Sudan, and to Africa as a whole, were that Peace Process to remain protracted longer than it has already been. Likewise, the Somalia Peace process must not be left to the dictates of the privileged, and
quite often handpicked warlords. Member states within the region need to give a strict
timetable for the peace process. The Somalia leaders need to realize that negotiations do
not necessarily get better the longer they take, especially when objectives are not clearly
appreciated and when private agenda take the place of national goals.

The African Peer Review Mechanism recognizes the political problems that will, of
necessity, make the process of peace building problematic, especially when internal
conflicts within states have gone on for a long time. It is therefore necessary that peace
and security be taken as paramount in establishing the environment for development.

One can already see that, in the developed world, the Peer Review process is not that
easy. When Chancellor Schroeder of Germany and President Jacque Chirac of France
recently tried to “peer review” President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair over the Iraq
war, they did not go very far. If anything, the relationship among these four NATO
partners soured considerably. The difficulties in using the peer review process in creating
a continent safe for democracy and development must not be allowed to provide a vote
of no confidence in the viability of the process.

Priority must also be given to infrastructure connectivity between Southern Sudan and
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the rest of the region. Thus the roads, railways and
telecommunications construction already approved at the recent Nairobi summit must be
fast-tracked. A special Sudan Reconstruction Conference is therefore a priority, and the
Nairobi-based African Research and Resource Forum has been making proposals to this
effect and has had extensive discussions with the New Sudan Council of Churches as a
working partner.

Discussions aimed at a Somali Peace Agreement have been bogged down by demands at
the peace talks that are, to say the least, uncompromising. It is even doubtful whether
the majority of those at the talks represent bona fide social forces in the Somalia conflict.
It would be necessary for Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to establish a modus operandi for
the negotiations cognizant of the real conflicting forces prior to accepting the individuals
in Nairobi at the moment as the real negotiators.

In the final analysis, NEPAD’s usefulness is that it brings together African governments
to discuss development matters without the excessive bureaucracy that often bogged
down discussions at the OAU as well as the ECA. Whereas the latter had reasonably
good technocrats that proposed good programs, it rarely had substantial political power
to implement its proposals. While the former had political legitimacy, its political power
was dispersed among its members none of whom was prepared to sacrifice sovereignty
for the common good.

NEPAD has come at a time when the African elite as well as people are anxious for
results rather than mere palaver if concrete change is to be realized.
It is therefore time to urge for action rather than celebrate cynicism. In the corridors that civil society activists exchange ideas, it is quite often easier to sit on the comfort zone of cynicism and not to plunge into the deep end of trying to change Africa through concrete political action by engaging political power. Unfortunately, under authoritarian regimes, political power is so badly misused that its destruction becomes, in itself, a necessary action to lay the ground for development discourse and praxis.

When a society enters the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, civil society activists may take long to engage political power in the transition, themselves not quite clear whether the transition is real or is a chimera. This period of uncertainty and procrastinating can undermine the synergy that needs to be built between progressive forces in government as well as civil society.

It would look as if in South Africa the building of this synergy is much more advanced than in Kenya and other African countries where the NEPAD idea is taking root. The challenge is therefore for more discourse to take place so that time is not wasted in the urgent task of giving development a chance in Africa after so many years of authoritarian misrule.
Preface

This book is the result of collaboration between the Heinrich Boll Foundation (HBF), the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi, and the National Defence College Nairobi. The collaboration between HBF and IDIS had resulted in two earlier symposia on international terrorism, and on the foreign relations of African states.

The book is based on a regional conference on Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalisation, which was held at the Nairobi Safari Club from 16–18 March 2004. The conference brought together participants from the IGAD region, and representatives from government ministries, civil society, and universities. The conference explored various themes related to regional security in the IGAD region. In particular, the conference explored the problem of regional security in the IGAD region, and how it can be shaped and conceptualized in order to meet the aspirations of African states and peoples. The themes discussed during the conference included the emerging challenges of regional security, issues of coordination in regional security, the institutions and mechanisms for regional security in the IGAD region, the role of NEPAD in enhancing security in the region; and eventually the conference attempted to define the emerging architecture for security in that region.

Thematically, the conference was inspired by the fact that, in a globalising and globalised world, there are many challenges that are posed for Africa. In particular, as the unfolding globalisation takes root, structural weaknesses such as the rate and magnitude of poverty in some parts of the world, and prominently in Africa have been revealed; this in turn has raised the challenge of the proper responses for that structural problem.

While Africa has responded to some of the challenges posed by globalisation through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), it still has to confront the hurdle of insecurity, broadly defined. Security, as understood now, encompassed a variety of concerns such as poverty, environmental, social, economic and gender concerns. In its contemporary context, security refers to the totality of the human experience, and it is this totality of experience on which proper security can be nested.

The conference was an important pioneering effort in the drive to come to terms with issues of security and insecurity. It identified the major threats to security in the IGAD region, and various areas that need to be prioritized as debates on security in the region take shape.
We thank all those who helped to make the conference a success. While many people contributed in many ways, the staff at the Heinrich Boll Foundation, and the M.A. students, and administrative staff of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies made participation at the conference a pleasure and a pleasant experience. We salute them all.

Asegedech Ghirmazion
Heinrich Boll Foundation

Makumi Mwagiru
Institute of Diplomacy & International Studies
Chapter 1

Introduction

*Makumi Mwagiru*

One of the major themes that have emerged in international relations generally, and security studies in particular at the turn of the twenty first century, is that not only is the term ‘security’ essentially contested, but that it needs to be redefined. This redefinition of the term is intended to capture two issues: the broadened concerns of the concept and content of security; and the special security perspectives of third world—and African—states. This latter concern is prompted by the fact that the traditional (western) understanding of what constitute security threats to states are not wholly applicable in the African setting where threats to security are conditioned by its different operating environment.

The beginning of the twenty first century has also been surrounded by the realities of globalisation in all its multiple aspects. The realities of a globalised and globalising world have shaped emerging discourses in a wide variety of fields, including International Relations, security studies, and their relationship to the international political economy. In particular, the issue of how the process of globalisation intersects with, and influences security, has emerged as one of the mainstream debates spawned by the process of globalisation. Globalisation, and its processes, has also introduced new dimensions of national security which are IT and computer based.

The largest contribution that the interaction of globalisation and security has created has been the enlarging of the targets of security. Traditionally, security issues were considered to be purely the domain and concern of states. However, that state centric perspective has been changed drastically; it is now not contested that security is not just concerned with states and regimes, but also with individuals—and peoples. This emerging dimension of human and societal security has been a central emerging thread in contemporary discourses about security.

The movement away from the traditional concerns and understandings about security has further encouraged security analysis to move beyond the state, and to encompass the wider environments in which the state operates. This enlarging of analysis has encouraged security to be seen within larger, regional contexts. The rationale for this is supplied by the processes of internationalization (of national affairs, conflicts and politics), and those of interdependence, including contemporary complex interdependence. And both these have provided the case for systems analysis if ever such a justification was needed.
Introduction

The regional perspective to security issues raises fundamental questions about security and foreign policy. It raises issues to do with the security and foreign policy of individual states in the region; and it also raises questions about the emergence of a regional security and foreign policy, and the content of such a policy. And this in turn focuses attention on the regional institutions that can—or should—spearhead the emergence of a regional security and policy. It raises fundamental questions about whether the existing regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa are prepared to spearhead such a debate, and to provide the engines that will drive the emerging regional security and foreign policy.

Emerging Consensus

This book is about these, and other issues. It tries to come to grips with the interaction between globalisation and its processes, and regional security in the IGAD region. The IGAD region is identified as the venue for the analyses contained in the book because it has some special characteristics. Firstly, the IGAD region contains states that belong to three different conflict systems: the Horn of Africa, the East African, and the Great Lakes systems. Secondly, the region contains two important sub-regional organizations: IGAD itself, and the East African Community; and it also hosts the headquarters of the continental organization, the African Union. Thirdly, the IGAD region contains seven states which are characterized by sharp differences in political, economic and social systems; and the states of the region also have different forms of systems of government. And lastly, the region is characterized both by relations of conflict and cooperation, and hence forms an interesting basis for the analysis of regional security issues.

The analyses contained in this book point to some emerging consensus on security relations generally, and in the IGAD region in particular. The authors of the different chapters agree that the concept of security has changed profoundly, and that in its application for the IGAD region it encompasses the insecurity dilemma, which recognizes the dominance of internal threats to national and regional security. Similarly, there is equally a consensus on the idea that there are now many emerging notions of security. These emerging notions have become evident particularly in the post–Cold War period, and include gender, environmental, social, health and similar dimensions.

The chapters also contain a fairly general consensus about the sources of insecurity in the IGAD region. There is, in addition to this, a fine balance between internal sources of insecurity (i.e. within individual states in the region), and internal sources in the context of the region as a whole. It is this balance of the sources of insecurity that helps to underline both the internationalization of internal insecurity, and the need for a regional—or systemic—analysis of security issues in the IGAD area. The need for the rationalisation of security analysis for IGAD indeed emerges as one of the uncontested understandings in the book.

The chapters that analyse the role of regional institutions such as IGAD and the East
African Community also point to another (at least intellectual) consensus: namely that there is an important role to be played by these institutions, but that they need to re-invent, or re-interpret their functions and mandates if they are to emerge as engines for regional security in the age of globalisation. What does not emerge clearly however is how the two sub-regional institutions in the IGAD region can enhance each other’s role in the area of regional security, and the institutional changes and accommodations that need to be done to achieve that kind of collaboration. Given the increasingly important role that these organizations are likely to play in the future however, thus is clearly an area that is ripe for further research and analysis.

The Multiplicity of Themes

The various chapters of the book deal with a multiplicity of themes and issues as they explore the different aspects of the interaction of regional security and the processes of globalisation. While there are different analytical approaches used, and some sharp paradigmatic differences in the different contributions, there is nevertheless a unity in terms of the conclusions that each of the chapters reach. In terms of the conceptual frameworks that are used to analyse regional security issues in the IGAD region, the realist framework, with its state-centric symmetry is preferred by Chweya (chapter 4) Okoth (chapter 5), and Koech (chapter 10) although Okoth also notes the shortcomings of realism especially in the analysis of international organizations. Hiteng’s (chapter 2) conceptual approach is more pluralist, whereas Aseka (chapter 3) rejects traditional western paradigms, and poses a challenge for intellectuals to re-think security from more African and nationalist perspectives. Mbote (chapter 7) makes an important and refreshing contribution in examining issues of regional security from a gender perspective.

The chapters by Chweya (chapter 4), Okoth (chapter 5) and Mwagiru (chapter 11) focus their attention on regional perspectives and institutions in the context of security. Okoth examines both institutions in the region (i.e. IGAD and EAC), and points out their strengths, about also their shortcomings in regional security context. Mwagiru makes the point that IGAD can be a premier location for the redefinition of a regional security and foreign policy, but argues that IGAD needs to change its outlook if it is effectively to play that role. Chweya looks more at the role of the continental organization, the African Union, and points out to the various provisions of its Constitutive Act that hold the promise of a more active and focused role in regional security issues that its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was never able to play.

The contributions of Wanyande (chapter 6) and Mbote (chapter 7) engage different and refreshing dimensions of security issues in the IGAD region. Wanyande’s chapter addresses the role of NEPAD in security issues in the region, although his analysis is also more broadly continental. He points out that NEPAD is one in a long line of similar developmental efforts by Africa. In particular, he points out the possible shortcomings of NEPAD that may make it unable to fulfil its promise of the reinvention of Africa in the
twenty first century. Mbote provides elements of gender analysis, and brings them to bear on security analysis for the region. Her main contribution is to suggest ways in which an important consumer and constituency of security, namely women, can be brought to the centre of planning and of security policy in the states of the region.

Kwaje (chapter 8) and Ochieng Kamudhayi (chapter 9) approach the issue of regional security from the perspective of regional conflict management, especially by IGAD in the Sudan and Somalia conflicts respectively. Kwaje gives a straight narrative of the Sudan peace process that is heading towards its conclusion in Naivasha, Kenya. In doing so, he also points out the high and low points of the process, and of issues that could have, but eventually did not, derail the process. Ochieng, while writing about the Somalia peace process at Eldoret and Mbagathi, in Nairobi, adopts a quite different approach to that of Kwaje. He examines the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference as a process, identifies the actors involved and their interests, and in an analysis rich in detail, examines the different players involved, and their contribution to the peace process.

All the different chapters of the book examine different aspects of the problem of security in the IGAD region. But there is no cognitive dissonance created, in part because of the general conceptual consensus on the fundamental concepts and concerns of regional security. Indeed the variety of analyses helps to provide important searchlights that all unerringly point at where we are now in terms of security in the IGAD region, and where we are heading to. It is in this context that Koech (chapter 10) and Mwagiru (chapter 11) contain a bird’s eye view of the content of a security architecture for the IGAD region.

**Tying it Together**

This book does not cover all the aspects of security in the IGAD region. Its task was more modest: to begin, and hopefully shape the emerging debate on issues of regional security especially as those issues have interacted with the emerging processes of globalisation. The chapters of this book have however touched on, and analysed the main actors, themes and issues; and in doing so they have engaged both the theory and practice of regional security.

The diversity of the chapters in this book, and the different theoretical approaches to them suggest the vast complexities and dimensions of the theme of regional security. These complexities are in turn reflected in the history and operating environment of the IGAD region itself. The common threads articulated in the different chapters of the book lead to an appreciation of the need, now more evident than ever, to start the task of defining and designing a security policy for the region. And in order for this task to get underway, the various security and foreign policies of the states of the region need to be addressed anew, and in some cases thoroughly revamped.

The regional scope of the book is one of its great strengths. The regional analysis of issues of security in this, as in other regions is an important conceptual shift away from
traditional analyses of security issues. This sort of shift is not entirely new; in the field of foreign policy, a similar shift was recorded in the move from first generation foreign policy (or comparative foreign policy) to second generation foreign policy (or foreign policy analysis). In the field of foreign policy, that shift did much to revamp the discipline and open up new analytical possibilities for it. So too for security studies generally, and regional security studies in particular.

The debate about security issues in the IGAD region in the age of globalisation that has been started in this book is long overdue. It is a debate that has however been ignored in the existing literature on the IGAD region. But although that debate has been deferred, it will not go away, and it should not be let to go away, because the price of a dream deferred can be costly. What clearly emerges from the chapters of the book is that there is a certain trend and a clear architecture for security in the region that is emerging. That architecture is inspired by various processes, amongst them the reality of interdependence in security matters, and also the reality of the emerging processes of globalisation.

For a long time, analysts examining the politics and international relations of the region (and of Africa at large) made it their trademark to see only the conflict relations, and rarely ever those of cooperation. The failed institutions of the region did not help much, and neither did the propensity of the peoples of the region to engage in endless and mindless cycles of conflict. However the age of globalisation and responses to globalisation such as the NEPAD and the philosophical idea of the African renaissance have suggested new possibilities for Africa and the region. The challenge that these have posed for academics and practitioners alike is to get underway the business of taming the savageness of man, and to make gentle the life of our region.
Chapter 2

Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa

Cirino Hiteng Ofuho

Introduction

For years, the Horn of Africa has not only been defined by its geographic location and also by its conflicts which are historically exacerbated by a continuous struggle for regional hegemony among its constituent states. There are five states that are often referred to as constituting the Horn namely, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. However, due to the spillover of conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, the Horn of Africa has extended to include Kenya and Uganda. Even though these countries vary in terms of strengths, capabilities and size, the pattern of conflicts and problems affecting them are similar. For example, the 'security complex' of the Horn of Africa is represented by an enduring pattern of conflict between incumbent regimes and opponents operating from neighboring countries. This has in turn become the defining pattern of politics and foreign policies in the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, discussions of 'Regional Security in the Age of Globalization' must not only reflect these patterns but also what Iyob has correctly identified as 'the historical narratives, ideological streams, socio-political constructions, communal perceptions and identities created by the people of the region in the process of interaction with each other over the centuries'. These have had an impact on the security of the region until very recently when the concerns with terrorism have made the situation worse. This chapter attempts to conceptualize contemporary security concerns in the Horn of Africa, and to come up with reflections on the various responses that both governments and non-governmental organizations have exerted.

Conceptual Analysis of Security Frameworks

In attempting to discuss priority security concerns in the Horn of Africa, it is important to come to terms with new security frameworks of analysis that have diverged from the traditional views of security. Traditionally, scholars in International Relations (IR) often associated security with the issues of war and peace. From the Treaty of Westphalia in

1 See John Markakis, Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: Sage, 1998), p. 5; John Prendergast, “Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy and Beyond”, Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace (June 28, 1999), p. 2; and Jeffrey Lefebvre, 'Middle East Conflicts and Middle-Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa' Middle East Journal 50, no. 3 (September 1996).

2 One of the pioneering work that has adequately attempted to define foreign policies in the Horn of Africa is Ruth Iyob, “The Foreign Policies of the Horn: The Clash Between the Old and the New,” in African Foreign Policies: Power and Processes, edited by Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 107-129.


1648 to date, the realist view of IR has regarded states as the most powerful actors in the international system for the simple reason that states have been 'the universal standard of political legitimacy' with no higher authority to regulate the relations between them. Thus, for a long time the overriding interest of states has been national security, defined largely in terms of military capability.

This understanding of security has persuaded both academics and practitioners to be interested in military capabilities and often advised their own states to develop the capability of defending themselves against perceived threats from their neighbours. That frame of mind became even more vivid in the period after the Second World War, influenced mainly by the prevalence of the realist school over other approaches in IR. Realism views the relations between sovereign states in terms of 'a balance of power', in which states pursue their individual national interests in an anarchic international system. It is also assumed that such interests frequently conflict, thus, constituting the very reasons for war.

For many commentators, this trend of thought was strengthened even further as the Cold War intensified. Moreover, as the threat of the use of nuclear weapons also intensified, the more extreme idea of "strategy" became co-terminous with that of security. Security, therefore, became viewed through the looking-glass of nuclear deterrence theory. Strategic analysts went further to define security as "the absence of attack, espionage, surprise or sabotage". However, by the mid-1950s, there emerged a relatively changed pattern of literature in IR whereby security was redefined in broader terms. For example, the "Palme Commission", despite its focus on nuclear issues, signalled this development by targeting "poverty, unemployment, inflation, and the threat to world recession". It implied that each of these phenomena could threaten the security of all. More particularly, it argued that economic development in the third world should be seen as integral to any long-term scheme for global security. A major concern was "growing economic and social disparities between North and South" which could lead to worldwide chaos and international conflict.

According to Andrew Butfoy, the placing of broad development issues in the "third world" on to the common security agenda was a frequent practice during the 1980s. This interest in development was often catalogued together with concerns over the arms race. One statement on 'global problems and common security' called for:

"A nuclear weapon–free world: the creation of a framework for international economic, technological, and humanitarian interaction and cooperation by which the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction becomes unthinkable: The full demilitarization of international relations; the closing of the

6 Ibid. p. 5
8 One such document is on the subject is: Common Security: A Blue print for Survival Usually referred to as the "Palme Commission: 1982".
9 Ibid p. 7
Having this conceptual framework, the current security concerns in the Horn of Africa need not be totally unique in form and content as compared to the rest of Africa say the Great Lakes Region or the greater Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, there are historical and socio-economic local, regional and international factors causing insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the broader Sub-Saharan African region, all of which are often interrelated.

This chapter argues that things have changed today. New frameworks have been advanced for security studies. Barry Buzan et al., for example, have questioned the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security. This query has led to the emergence of a debate on "wide" versus "narrow" security studies. Those who propound the widening of the security agenda have convincingly argued that there are other non-military sources of threats to humanity. These include environmental, economic, societal and political aspects of security. In fact after September 11, the debate contains a new flavor where Islamic fundamentalism is seen as one of the major sources of terrorism in the world. There is a need to respond to the questions as to what would be considered to be the major security requirements not only today but also for the future. It is now clear that the security rules of the past—absolute victory and unconditional surrender—have unequivocally altered. Thus, in our contemporary world, complete victory is no longer an issue, especially as events in the Middle East show.

Past Security Concerns

The importance of understanding contemporary security concerns in the Horn of Africa emerges from the fact that the nature, dynamics and impact of insecurity in the region are manifest in many ways. In order to comprehensively articulate the present, past security concerns must also be revisited. Since the 1960s, Africa has been the site of many of the world's most deadly conflicts. Most of them have been internal conflicts but with profound effects on neighboring sub-regions and the continent as a whole. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia have since independence been major destabilizing entities to the neighborhood. The total collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s and the raging civil war in Sudan have had direct effects on Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, the political situations in Uganda and Eritrea have added into the instability in the region.

There are many factors that explain the state of affairs in the region. First, like other newly independent states in the continent, the countries of the Horn of Africa have been
faced with several dilemmas of consolidating the state. The extent to which the state in contemporary Africa has become a source of conflict has been subject of debate for a long time both continentally and globally. In IR today, there is a more immediate recognition that in contemporary Africa, the primary challenge to state sovereignty comes from particular models of exercising social power, particularly its modes of governance and style of leadership. From colonial intrusions and African responses, for example, emerged the unique linkage under colonialism between bureaucratic authoritarian, patronage and clientelism, and ethnic fragmentation and competition. Thus, some scholars argue that the crises in the continent have emerged over time because of ‘patterns of political practice that led to the growing dysfunction of the state as an instrument for organising and exercising power, counterproductive efforts to “squeeze the peasantry” and the unproductive build-up of wealth in the hands of ruling strata’. Berman adds that the continuity of these institutions, power relations and identities in post-colonial states has shaped the particular character of state-society relations in Africa and the ‘politics of the belly’. The African post-colonial state, however, is much more vulnerable and the ruling elite can no longer exploit superpower rivalry to shore up their governments.

After the collapse of the bipolar world order, the question of the type of social forces that will join the bandwagon and who will dominate the regime are critical for the identity of public space and institutions and, ultimately, society and state relations. This undermines the legitimacy of the state, inhibits the formation of broader trans-ethnic national identities, and determines the prospects of current efforts at democratisation and institutional reforms. Although the very process of colonial state creation accounted, in part, for the prevalence of ethno-political conflicts in post-colonial states, it also gave rise to a shared nationalist, multi-ethnic aspiration for self-determination and self-rule. Nations, according to Taylor, have become states in order to rule themselves. The unity of the nation, however, has often been assumed to be the pre-condition of sovereign statehood and the basis of political legitimacy. It is a major source of strength and effectiveness of the central political unit or sovereign state which has, since the advent of modernity, been perceived as necessary for civilised progress and social development. One of the aims of this chapter is to show that the challenges to state sovereignty in the Horn of Africa have constituted a major source of insecurity in the region. The responses to state-created insecurity have been, among other things, the demand for more representative forms of government, power sharing, electoral pluralism, the re-invention of the post-colonial “social contract”, cultural autonomy for minority groups and the devolution of power as central ingredients in any efforts at promoting national unity and supporting civic identity in the region and in Africa in general.

Apart from the nature of the state as a destabilizing element, the other important source of insecurity in the Horn of Africa has been contested borders. As early as 1969,

17 Ibid., p. 309
Somalia claimed parts of the territory of the Kenyan North Eastern frontier (Northern Frontier District) and of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. This led to the ‘Shifta war’—tension between Kenya and Somalia since none of the two countries had formally declared war on the other.\(^2\) In 1975, the late Idi Amin Dada, then President of Uganda supposedly discovered that part of what makes up present day Kenya was formally part of Uganda. This again caused tensions between Kenya and Uganda. The cutting across boundaries of ethnic groups will remain a security concern particularly when communities on either side are dissatisfied with the management of state power and resources.\(^2\) Thus, cross-border conflicts are an insecurity phenomenon in the Horn of Africa that have often triggered bloody wars between countries and have continued to be a source for irredentism.

Another important security factor in the Horn of Africa has been the military, particularly during the Cold War. Superpower interests in the region fuelled the emergence of military Juntas and regimes to take over power through unconstitutional means. This further plunged countries in the region into an unending state of civil wars.\(^\) According to Ojo et al. the interstate armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa appear to correspond to the level of growth in military strength. Immediately after independence, Africa’s armies were very small and their weapons unsophisticated. The military skirmishes in the Horn of Africa between 1963 and 1967 involved small and poorly equipped armies and had never grown out of proportion.

However, with increased Cold War tensions, the picture changed significantly during the second half of the 1960s.\(^\) The change followed a combination of internal and external factors. In Uganda, Milton Obote's government had faced formidable opposition from the Buganda Kingdom. The government became increasingly dependent on the military to maintain itself. Internal opposition also created fear of external intervention. Under Obote, the Ugandan army increased from 5,000 and in 1969 to over 10,000 by 1970. Following the overthrow of Obote's regime by Idi Amin, the army was increased to about 23,000 men. Amin also followed the trend already set by Obote of acquiring more advanced Soviet made military equipment such as MIG 19s and MiG21 combat aircraft, battle tanks and armoured vehicles.\(^\)

But the most rapid military growth occurred in Somalia. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Somali army increased from about 2,000–3,000 men in 1969 to about 23,000 in the early 1970s out of a population of 4 million. Kenya had, until after 1976, maintained an army of less than 20,000 men, and Ethiopia had an army of about 43,000 men, but these were in line with their relatively large populations.\(^\)

---

\(^{21}\) See also, Ojo. O. Orwa D, K and Utete C.B.M. *African International Relations* (London: Longman, 1985) p. 131


\(^{24}\) See Ojo. Orwa and Utete, eds., *African International Relations*, op. cit, p. 137.

\(^{25}\) Ibid

\(^{26}\) Ibid
Another important security concern in the Horn of Africa has been orchestrated by civil wars, caused mainly by military coups and counter-coups, struggle for power, and ethnic nationalism. This, in some instances, led to the formation of military regimes that further institutionalized the militarization of politics in the region. Since the overthrowal of President Obote in 1971 by Idi Amin, Uganda was never at ease. The small state was faced by internal strife right into the mid-1980s. Up to then, there had always been insurgent formations and liberation movements trying to topple the incumbent governments in Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan.  However, the Sudanese conflict has been a source of influx of refugees in the region that has in turn become a regional security concern.

However, Sudan is not the only source of refugees. It is estimated that there are about 8 million refugees in Africa. This figure represents over 36% of the world's total refugee population. Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia have been prominent competitors in the production of refugees in the region. Thus, the Horn of Africa has been turned into one of the mega refugee centers in the continent, where the movement of people has not only been external but also internal (IDPs). In short, even though the refugee problem is international in nature and scope, it remains a destabilizing and retrogressive factor in the Horn of Africa region.

Present Security Concerns

Security-related problems, as discussed earlier, have had an impact on the outlook of socio-political matters as far as the present situation in the Horn of Africa is concerned. The proliferation of conflicts in the region has generated another problem, that of the proliferation of light weapons. Moreover the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement of people from one country to another has also made the trafficking of illegal arms much easier, thus increasing security vulnerability within and between communities. Today, one of the major security concerns is that it is the individual rather than the state, which has become a soft target for attackers.

Looking at the same problem differently, war or conflict—whether internal or external—has negative effects on the socio-political and economic development of a state. Hence, there is a direct correlation between a war situation and the prevalence of poverty. Poverty in itself is a security concern. Poor people with no basic needs, living in a state of near or pure anarchy, will pose a threat to the security of the state and its neighbours. This is typical of Uganda in the 1950s, and Somalia and Kenya in the 1990s.

Taking another line of argument, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a new tempo in the nature and dynamics of international security matters and in international
Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa

politics. The end of the Cold War apart from being marked by the fall of communism and the emergence of U.S hegemony, was the beginning of a new era that brought with it new security concerns, which have been felt the world over.30

Two of these can be singled out as being important to security matters in the Horn of Africa region. One, the growing tension between the Arab world and the west—as well as the Arab–Israeli conflict—and secondly, new (ethnic) conflicts in Africa especially the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, which has led to the disintegration and collapse of Somalia as a state. This was also paralleled by the ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe that saw the disintegration of Yugoslavia.31 Similarly, the tension between the Arab World and the west, associated mainly with the war in the Middle East has also affected the Horn of Africa, thus adding to contemporary security concerns in the region.

The current security concerns came to the fore after the Gulf War of 1991. Not only did this period mark the end of the old order, but it also ushered the world into a new era in international politics. Following the humiliation of Iraq and the subsequent economic sanctions by the UN and the west in general, tension has been building up between the west and the Arab world. Moreover, the continued isolation of Israel by its Arab neighbors has also worked as the vivid expression of this tension.32 Such tensions have led to the rise of extreme military and fundamentalist politics. Analysts have drawn a line cutting across the Arab world passing through several countries in the Horn of Africa with links of militant groups backed by some religious ideology—Islamic fundamentalism—launching specific attacks on western targets. Suicide bombings in Israel and parts of the west have been employed to fulfill the mission of Islamists. This is what has been notably termed global terror.

Investigations by the CIA have claimed that Islamic fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden and his accomplices have been harbored for many years in the Horn of Africa region, particularly northern Sudan. In other words, the Republic of Sudan has colluded with terrorists from the Arab world which in itself is a threat to world peace. Other countries accused having such links include Libya and most recently Somalia and by extension, operatives in Kenya. This state of affairs, which is international in nature and stature, is one of the key security concerns in the Horn of Africa today.33 Indeed the strong argument is that the absence of a government in Somalia creates a safe haven for terrorist activists in the region. This in itself poses a security risk since it can be a breeding ground for clandestine activities and for the formation and consolidation of terrorist cells.34

In addition to Somalia, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel movement in Uganda is another security risk in the region. There have been reports of massive killings, massacres, abductions and ambushes of civilians in the northern region of Uganda and

31 Ibid
32 See also Richard Beffs, Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994)
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
some parts of Southern Sudan. Not only is the accusation by Uganda that the Khartoum government is a major donor to the LRA correct, but the U.S. government has long listed Sudan as a terrorist country. Hence, this has often fuelled a degree of tension between the two neighboring Horn of Africa countries. In return, Sudan has also accused the Museveni government of supporting the SPLM/SPLA.

Lastly, another security concern in the Horn of Africa is cross-border banditry and cattle rustling. Active banditry and cattle rustling have become prolific along the Kenya–Uganda, Kenya–Somali, Kenya–Ethiopia, Kenya–Sudan and Sudan–Uganda borders and vice versa. Even though such practices have been linked to indigenous cultural practices, the introduction of modern weapons has made them become costly both in terms of human life and resources. Historically, various pastoralist groups in the region would occasionally steal livestock from one another but with far less inflicted human loss of lives. However, today the instability in the region coupled with weak administration in the region, cattle rustling has emerged as one of bigger security problems affairs in the Horn of Africa. For example, it is no surprise to come across a young Karamojong, Toposa, Turkana girl or boy herding their flocks with an A–K 47 rifle on their backs. A lot of arms are in the wrong hands and this in itself is a security risk within and among countries in the Horn of Africa region.

Responses to Security Issues in the Horn

Given this typology of the major security concerns in the Horn of Africa, various efforts have been exerted by both governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in an attempt to address their impact on society. Both regional and international efforts have been made towards dealing with security matters in the region. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) made several efforts with the aim of resolving conflict situations in the region. However, the performance of the OAU in the management and general responses to conflicts in the region were largely inadequate. It had limited success in ending civil wars that have created poverty, mass displacements and deaths not only in the Horn of Africa but in the continent as a whole. Even though it is often claimed that the OAU played a key role in efforts to end Sudan’s first civil war in 1972, it did very little to prevent divisions and overt conflict among the countries in the Horn of Africa region.

According to Amate, even though the OAU’s founding fathers had established the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration specifically for the purpose of helping resolve conflicts between OAU member states, they failed to end the continental issues that often fuelled conflicts. Even though most of the mediations by heads of state produced positive results by achieving a truce, this was mainly due to the fact that conflicting parties were worn out and were ready for mediation but not to eradicate the problems.

Therefore, Amate concludes that in effect the main role the OAU has played is that of a fire-extinguisher to a fire that would otherwise have gotten out of hand. It can be

---

36 Ibid.
37 This is well discussed by Amate COC. Inside the OAU/Fan Africanism in Practice (London: Macmillan, 1986)
concluded that the OAU failed to design responsive mechanisms to key security issues in the region that would have solved the problems facing countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea.  

It is premature to speculate whether the African Union will address continental conflicts successfully. However, there are positive indicators in that when the new African Union was formally established in September 2001, among its main objectives was to harmonize the economic and political policies of African states in order to improve pan-African welfare, and provide Africans with a solid voice in international affairs. Supporters of the African Union believe it has a stronger Charter than the OAU, will be better funded, and will have the "teeth" that the OAU lacked, including the power to create a common African parliament, a central bank, a common currency and a continental Court of Justice. Prominent among the objectives is the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The objectives of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union will be to promote peace, security and stability in Africa in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well being of the African people and an environment conducive to sustainable development. Secondly, the Security Council is aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it shall be responsible for peace–making and peace-building. Thirdly, the Security Council is also charged with the promotion and implementation of peace–building and post–conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence.

As far as the UN’s responses to security issues in the Horn of Africa are concerned, these have been mainly in the area of humanitarian intervention whether in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, the failure of the UN in Somalia had to do more with the failure of security operations and of efforts to contain the violence on the ground. For a long time, not much attention was paid by the organisation to stopping the carnage in the country. Ironically, this was at a time when the UN was expending a great deal of energy on the Bosnia crisis, prompting allegations about the UN’s preoccupation with the "rich man's war", while neglecting the "poor man's war" in Somalia. The warring factions in Somalia placed so many obstacles that the UN missions there found it difficult to operate. These included among others attacks on international aid workers, looting of warehouses containing relief supplies and the selling of ships bringing food. By the end of November that year, chaos reigned in Somalia, yet it was clear that more foreign action was necessary.

Similarly, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as a sub-regional body has also exerted efforts to address instability in the Horn of Africa region. IGAD is composed of the seven states that form the greater Horn of Africa Region. Apart from being formed with the aim of combating drought and desertification in the 1980s, IGAD

---

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid pp. 17–69

Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation 15
Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa

widened its scope and mandate to include ensuring peace, stability and security which form the central prerequisites for progress and integration and general development in the sub-region.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, IGAD has in the past two or three years taken several serious steps forward in addressing the major security concerns in the region namely the Sudan conflict, the Somalia conflict, the insurgencies in Uganda, the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, cross border crime and banditry, terrorism, and poverty.

Apart from such regional efforts, the international community has drawn attention to the security predicament in the Horn of Africa. The United States, for example, has been a major financier of both AU and IGAD responses to insecurity in the Horn of Africa region. More recently, the US has been active in ensuring that African states can have the capacity to tackle conflict situations and combat international terrorism. In the mid 1990s the US was instrumental in funding the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which has since changed to African contingency operations training assistance. This training programme is designed to enhance the ability of African forces to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, not only in Africa but elsewhere in the world if called upon to do so. Since 1996, troops from Kenya and Uganda have been trained through the programme.\textsuperscript{42}

Similarly, the U.S has zeroed in strongly on international terrorism in the Horn of Africa region. It has its troops and war ships off the coast of Somalia and Kenya. It has recently held joint military exercises with the Kenyan military with the aim of combating terrorism. Hence, the establishment of a liaison centre in Nairobi which is a joint effort between the military police and intelligence to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{43} However, the US has been criticized for neglecting other areas that are important if insecurity in the region is to be ensured. These include poverty eradication, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the refugee problem and poor infrastructure. The criticism is that the U.S. has leaned too much in the fight towards terrorism to the extent of coercing governments to adopt anti-terrorism legislation.

As far as responses by civil society organizations are concerned, NGOs and civil society bodies and groups have been active in tackling the various security concerns in the Horn of Africa region. They have done this mainly in collaboration with governments and government agencies in the region. Committee based organizations have been active in educating the people at the grassroots on the importance of peace and negotiations. In Kenya, for example, several NGOs have been active in ensuring government support in the curtailment of small arms seized from armed criminals, bandits and cattle rustlers. The NGOs and the Kenya government have held joint conferences where many issues concerning security in the region have been discussed. However, the NGO world has been criticized for failing to provide lasting solutions to the problem of insecurity since they only meet in conference rooms where they exchange notes and earn hefty allowances.

\textsuperscript{41} Well elaborated in IGAD website: www.idagad.org
\textsuperscript{43} See http://www.nation.com/ for a short discussion of the launching of the International Anti Terrorism Liaison Centre.
Conclusion

Contemporary security concerns are not only a phenomenon of the Horn of Africa but are also a preoccupation of both academics and practitioners globally. For example, Mohamed Ayoob contends that the nature of the third world state is responsible for its security predicament. He argues that there is a specific link between the processes of state building and the security problems of the third world. This is equally true for the Horn of Africa where an overemphasis on the importance of national security in state building has become a main feature. For a long time, the roots of the security problems in the region included the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions and regimes; inadequate societal cohesion; and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of socio–economic and political organization. Unfortunately, such problems emerged during the early stages of state building when the founding fathers of Africa attempted to impose order by preaching nation–building, monopolized instruments of violence, and demanded the exclusive loyalties of their populations. This phenomenon has been true of states in the Horn of Africa like Somalia and Sudan where the struggle for restructuring has been on for over forty years. In Europe similar problems were overcome by statesmen through the extraction and fair distribution of resources, institution building, entrenched political legitimacy and broadened and deepened penetration of state by society. There is a need to have such frameworks in mind while researching and trying to address contemporary security conditions both regionally and globally.

Chapter 3

Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa

Eric Masinde Aseka

Introduction

There is a globalized effort to create a new world order in which humanity is consolidated under one common aegis, a shared philosophy and doctrine. This is a global order with designated roles for different power centres and regional alignments, an overarching technology, and ways of distributing it worldwide. The audacity and arrogance with which this world order is being promulgated leaves little room for alternative strategies of governance and economic development if they are not consonant with the western perceived notion and model of globalization and integration into the world market. The ideology driving this new market fundamentalism is neo-liberalism with its logic of global power as defined by Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises whose ideas entrenched the notions of liberal marketism. It is an ideology that has enjoyed increasing popularity from the mid 1970s following the Thatcherite and Reaganomic rationalizations of reform in Britain and America. The crisis at the beginning of that decade, and the subsequent restructuring of international capitalism, led to the re-definition of the role of the state. This meant that time had come to put an end to Keynesianism and the idea of the welfare state.

The militancy and dissent of those with a different worldview, including their struggles against exploitation, regional struggles for autonomy and self-determination characterized by certain political thrusts of ethnic upsurges, have attracted unpleasant sobriquets including the now often used term “terrorism”. As Rajni Kothari points out in Poverty: Human Consciousness and the Amnesia of Development, all around the world there is emerging a threat from leftist forces which have also aligned with Islamic and other fundamentalist movements giving rise to a serious problem of preserving the security and survival of regimes and ruling elites instead of whole communities. The threat is seen to be working both locally, regionally and internationally. Arjun Appadurai argues that globalization in the contemporary world is characterized by objects in motion. They include ideas and ideologies, people and goods, images and messages, technologies and techniques. It is a world of flows. It is also a world of structures and organization. In a sense, globalization concerns not only a conceptual logic of western cultural domination but also the spatial logics of the spread of capitalism.

Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa

Globalization is a highly controversial concept, but as a process it has generated an intensification of interdependence among countries. It has generated its own fanaticisms of information technology, free marketism, population control and ecologism that have created pervasive pressures on global society. As a fundamental restructuring of the global system has occurred and a new global socio–economic system is unfolding, the debate has become more concerned with the future of capitalism in view of the changes required in technology and production practices. There are also concerns about the form that enterprises ought to assume and the mode of economic regulation that suits these processes within marketist libertarian ideals. Following the end of the Keynesian welfare state, there has occurred a reconfiguration of the distribution of global power following the end of the Cold War. Indeed there is a new world order spawned by globalization; and with economic globalization there comes the violence of the market and its insensitivity to human beings.

The New Global Order

The new global order is characterized by firstly, a surge of the power of global capital. What began as a neo–monetarist vision on the problem of hyperinflation in many third world countries grew into a new development ideology.\(^3\) The flow of capital has been made easy with advances in communication technology. This is a policy framework that has equally made capital obtain an unprecedented power of exit in forms that leave national economies vulnerable. Secondly, there was a rise to prominence of a hegemonic discourse of neo–liberalism that has fundamentally transformed market-state relations. This ideology enforces a market fundamentalism and advocates a significant reduction of state involvement in economic activity. Reinforcing the neo-liberal interpretations of economic activity, modernity is being interpreted in terms of a discourse termed as “postmodernism”.\(^4\) Thirdly, the new global order is characterized by a marked reorganization of production inspired by the Japanese model dubbed as Toyotism and the westernization of this model.

This has brought about the emergence of an integrated and knowledge based system of production in which capital, labour, raw materials and management were to be organized on a global scale, and linked through information networks. This shift was necessitated by the crisis of the 1970s that left the people of Africa with devastated geographies characterized by the internationalization of capital, decrease in the importance of the state, and a relative decrease of the traditional core of the working class. It brought about a marked increase in the service class through the increased role of management. A devastated geography, driven by external forces to undermine societal coherence, merely leaves people devastated. The shift elicited activities and financial transactions in which Africa’s share remained dismal. Other features of this shift are the generation of unemployment and a growing distinction between skilled labourers apart from the generation of an increasing difference in consumer patterns and a large role of mass media in the process of socialization.\(^5\)

---

3 Schuurman, 1993; p1
4 Schuurman, 1993; p23
5 Schuurman, 1993; p24, Pieterse, 1997: 398-369
Fourthly, there was a convergence of national economies into a single global economy that is defined by forces of the world market that continues to devastate people’s geographies through its operational logic of profit and self-interest. These social categories bear the brunt of that suffering in marginalized areas of this global order. Globalization is accelerating poverty disparities, exclusion, unemployment, alienation, corruption, violence and conflict. Key policy questions concerning the international integration of markets, free trade and free capital movements particularly as they take shape through the World Trade Organization. This is a global economy in which labour as the principle of modernity is being replaced by information communication technology (ICT) as the principle of post-modernity. Globalization is seen as a consequence of the new information age in which computers and the internet make it possible to send information almost costless and to do business across cultures and continents. Computers have been made to appear productive in the sense in which they serve people, and have improved information processing, storage and retrieval. The United States, Europe, Japan and China represent two thirds of world production in this global political economy in which the total output of goods and services stands at over US $30,000 trillion as compared to Africa’s GDP of no more than $500 billion.

**The Information Revolution**

Today’s information revolution and the type of globalization that accompanies it are transforming and shrinking the world. The United States with 5% of the world’s population has more than half of all internet users. The digital revolution is entrenching itself more and more. Ideas and concepts about computer-assisted means of information dissemination and retrieval are becoming ingrained in people’s minds. The digital era is built on and embedded in existing realities of the geopolitics of the times. The internet cannot be separated from the real world and real people, and its free flows of information pose security threats to states.

The information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cut across national borders. In the global economy, key actors use the new state of the art technologies to transfer huge sums of money electronically while at the same time hackers disrupt internet operations through the dissemination of deleterious viruses with a capacity to destroy national security data. These changes in technology are making national security surveillance systems encounter challenges in tracking down hackers and burglars of security information, website busters spread across groups and cells of social interaction on internet. Technology has been diffusing power away from governments and empowering individuals and groups to play roles in world politics.

We are living in a data and information intensive economy in which businesses need continuous access to critical business information against a background of greater vigilance against fraudsters. In this information age, data is the livelihood of each enterprise. Africa is struggling to bridge the digital gap using satellite technologies.

---

Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa

prospects of e-government pose dangers to national security activities of intelligence gathering, information storage and retrieval. Concerns ought to be expressed about the need for proper and secure means of digital preservation of security information. In confronting the existing huge digital divide, there is a need to devise digital bridging strategies through congenial programmes of technological transfer and training. These strategies must involve the storage, maintenance and accessibility of digital knowledge and material over the long-term, given that storage and retrieval are essential elements in digital computation and design of systems.

The biggest problem for global and regional security is ideological. The ideology of neo–liberalism and its market fundamentalism is a great security issue. In view of the growing hegemony of this neo-liberal order, it appears that the less diversified a country’s economy is the less it can benefit from globalization. Therefore, the economics of this new global order pushes the logic of regional and global integration, apart from reintroducing the multi–national economic agenda in the transnational movement of capital across national boundaries. However, the act of integration is generating interesting geo–politics of insecurity. These politics have elicited a measure of protectionism in countries with less developed economies as the politics of the signing of the Customs Union within the framework of the East African Community have recently shown.

Intellectuals, Globalisation and Geopolitics of Security

Czeslaw Milosz’s highly provocative book The Captive Mind demonstrates how intellectuals in post–war Eastern Europe were tempted to collaborate with the regimes of the Communist systems creating new kinds of cultural authority, which adulterated the socialist ideal and under which these intellectuals lived. European history of the past century is replete with examples of philosophers, writers, and jurists who, whether they lived in democratic, communist, or fascist societies, shamelessly supported and defended the totalitarian principles of regimes instead of advocating for the creation of incorruptible leaders. Given the destruction wrought by politicians supported and legitimized by social thinkers, the role of intellectuals in social transformation of contemporary societies cannot be gainsaid.

The intellectuals from the Horn of Africa need to chart out strategies of survival and the attainment of competitiveness in a world in which ubiquitous globalization has intensified interactions and the rise of trans-national flows that are transforming the whole world into a single space. It has also led to the intensification of worldwide social relations that link distant localities in a manner that has serious consequences for the region. The study of intellectuals in security shall be undertaken not only from a behavioural or empiricist geopolitical sense but also from a materialistic sense that embraces humanistic and ethical principles. Multidisciplinary in its scope, behavioural and empiricist geopolitics includes all aspects of the social sciences with particular emphasis on political geography, international relations, and the territorial aspects of

8 Ibrahim, 2002:3
political science and international law, whose interpretation is made in a liberal tradition that many researchers in the African academy clutch onto.

Certain activities of some intellectuals raise outrage in so far as their discourses legitimize political absurdities and mediocrity. Such intellectuals constitute a major security risk. How can intellectuals, who should be most alert to the evils of imperialist tyranny, betray even their so-called liberal ideals of freedom and independent inquiry in this era of globalization? When they take political positions that, implicitly or not, endorse oppression and violation of social justice, including a wide spectrum of human rights on a vast scale, they have virtually abdicated from their roles of moral agency.

Intellectuals ought to play certain organic roles in their communities. There is need to investigate the construction of security not in the power centres of Washington, London, Paris, Brussels or Tokyo but in the largely overlooked small third world states of Africa, Latin America and Asia. Here social movements galore and intellectuals are reflecting on these countries’ social and economic realities even though these countries are customarily approached as adopters of western notions of security.

The discourse on regional security ought to address these new relations of suzerainty and dependency including the spirit behind the architecture of the so-called bilateral pacts of security that culminate in joint military exercises or the formation of military coalitions to carry out punitive measures against so-called rogue states. Under the previous bipolar system, Africa’s security dilemmas and predicaments and their resolution were understandably closely linked to the nature of the international system. As a result, local security issues and conflicts were usually projected onto the international scene. But since 1990, perceptible changes occurred with the supposed marginalization of the continent. The marginality of Africa in itself is indicative of how the concept of regional security carries with it a geopolitical imperative. The geopolitical perception of security should include wider social concerns as the concept of geopolitical economy suggests.

In view of these concerns, the question of globalization elicits intellectual interest and historical discourse on security and geopolitics. Injustice in the international economic order threatens the future development of mankind including the desire for peace, itself a concept that has been interpreted in extremely narrow and reductionist terms. Peace is freedom from war or conflict yet globalization is intensifying the prospect of conflict. An intolerable human suffering has been caused by an exploitative world economic system. Peace is not just an absence of war, violence and hostilities but rather a situation where all people have equal access to economic and social justice to the entire range of human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is therefore a need for sustainable peace because human beings need a social environment that permits their full development. Globalization does not provide that kind of environment. Peace provides that social environment with prospects of development at the personal, local, regional and global

---


Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa

levels. African scholars must re-evaluate the role of African states in globalization as surrogate accomplices in the violation of human rights in activities that militate against the peace process in an unjust international economic order that undermines sustainable peace in relation to a number of concerns. These concerns include activities of imperial agencies in the creation of adversarial social and political conditions of the so-called African failed states. In Africa, cases of Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo are very instructive. In these countries, the sanctity of human life was violated; and yet as Nyerere says, life is the most basic human right and its protection should be a constant underlying purpose of all social, economic and political activities of governments at all levels. The social questions behind conflict require to be addressed if any prospects of sustainable peace and social stability are to emerge.

There is also a need to understand the structures of globalization and how they undermine communities' sense of identity and social values. Politics has to do with the allocation of values through the resolution of issues, and it is incumbent on scholars to demonstrate how the roles of religion, ideology and culture have been undermined by globalization. Religion is integral to African social consciousness and it should not therefore be ignored in the social reconstruction of Africa. It is part of the essential cultural repertoires of the social capital needed for the construction of all-embracing security systems and regimes. Religion is a key pillar of culture, which guides self-understanding and should be studied in terms of its mythological, doctrinal, ritual, ethical, experimental and social dimensions in relation to the broad question of security in Africa.

The need to develop deterrent military arsenals for self defense or industrial plants for development purposes have been misunderstood by western intelligence agencies. This has necessitated external and punitive invasions by western powers within benchmarks of what appears to be new versions of Pax Americana and Pax Britannica in the name of stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Western national interests have become security nightmares for countries of the third world. The western discourse and preoccupation with the perceived threat of terrorism has legitimized the invasion, and destruction of Third World states' infrastructure, as was the case in Sudan and Iraq, and this should be addressed in terms of its historicity, its epistemology and geographical serendipity.

There should also be concern about the failure of African states adequately to respond to the trans-Atlantic dimension of global dominance in this era of globalization. The geopolitics of security in the hinterlands should be a major subject of interest and inquiry in a quest to realize a framework of Pax Africana in this the era of nuclearization of third world countries.

13 Meyer, 1983:48
14 Mugambi, 1999: p89
Neo–liberalism and the Vagaries of the Market

The role of the state was minimized once it was seen to have less to offer and hence the era of structural adjustment whose conditionalities sought to remove the state from its traditional roles. This in turn provides an anarchic market which will lead to the increasing impoverishment of low-income groups as neo–liberal thought denies Third World states policy tools to intervene actively in favour of those members of their communities without jobs, houses, health care, schooling and food.\(^\text{15}\)

Social security is being undermined by this withdrawal that has led to the decline of job security, shelter security, health security, educational security and food security among others. The result of the global erosion of the Keynesian welfarist system, is an increasing emphasis on security in narrow terms of national policing and defense needs, and the survival of ruling classes as opposed to a transformational agenda of removing poverty, unemployment and disparities within and between societies. The capacity of the state as a mediator between the international system and local communities is sharply being eroded. As Marks argues, if a democratic state is unable to deliver, it will face a crisis of authority and legitimacy. For the state to have authority, it must have public support and consent.\(^\text{16}\) Therefore institutional structures for public order must be bound by principles of accountability, consultation and civility. States require social order to govern effectively, and therefore the enhancement of national security must be undertaken within a social setting of authoritative justice. Authoritative justice is the attempt to restore order without looking at the need and means of resolving the causes of that disorder. Indeed democracy needs a context of social stability.\(^\text{17}\)

The idea of sovereignty in international relations theory is increasingly being subjected to unprecedented challenge by globalization. The world beyond the state is a world of global economic dynamics, intensification of transnational links, international law and institutions which have not been adequately theorized despite a growing corpus of international political theory dominated by realist and neo-realist theories with their preoccupation with processes of globalization. In fact, neo–realism has revived intellectual interest in the state among international relations scholars, although this has not been expressed in any systematic theoretical inquiry. Both realism and neo–realism do not give a convincing account of the enmeshment of states with the wider global order and of the effects of the global order on these states and of the political implications of all this for the democratic state and its security requirements. The discourses on the global interconnectedness of states have their roots in the liberal–idealist tradition in international relations. It is epistemologically limiting and does not provide enough room for a critique of the international system and the violence of the market which globalization spawns and legitimizes.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{15}\) Schuurman, 1993: 11.
\(^{16}\) Marks, 1999: 222
\(^{17}\) Marks, 1999: 256-264
\(^{18}\) Held, 1995: 25

Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation
Market violence has become a causal factor of a neo-liberal order based on inequalities and social marginalization. These are nurtured through market generalization, free enterprise, budget restrictions and control of dominated economies. Indeed economic globalization needs cultural globalization since culture derives from commodities including films, books, documents and strategic information. Violence comes with both economic and cultural globalization since globalization creates social and cultural cleavages that permeate these countries and regions. On the one hand, it suggests exclusion and social discrimination while on the other, it allows for integration. From this point of view, violence and insecurity appear as the outcome of the social differentiation generated by economic globalization. There is a need for the re-theorization of security beyond the national and human security paradigms. This should be within the African view of morality and concept of human rights. It should elicit re-adjustment that will produce a new paradigm of security.

Globalization with its neo-liberal ideology has further made the problematique of the African state, its mission, its functions in international relations and world economy more complex. To understand the dilemmas of the African state in this neo-liberal era, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of this state by conceptualizing historically and philosophically the origins, structures and functions of this state and its relationship to other phenomena within the global economy. This effort requires the identification, classification and definition of the major problems related to the African state. There are methodological problems, conceptual issues and functional aspects that have to be raised and discussed relating to the kind of state in Africa, the threat of neo-liberal marketism to this state and therefore the need to appreciate the full range of its security requirements. The main goals of the national security concept in Africa is to be narrowly conceived in liberal or neo-realist terms. There is a need for a re-theorization of the state and a re-definition of the functions and responsibilities of the state beyond its current liberal conception.

The concept of security needs to include self-determination as a universal human right by which states determine the strategic principles, priorities and measures for protecting their security. This includes the freedom to reject development models which advocate subservience to the vagaries of unmediated marketism. The concept of national security involves seeing the state in terms of all aspects of security, including regional security. Some of these concerns have led to the increasing promotion of human security as a new leitmotif in foreign policy. The term has been defined in terms of progressive human values which became prominent in the 1990s, namely human rights, international humanitarian law and socio-economic development based on equity. Its advocates have extolled the virtues embodied in this concept and used them to support efforts towards the regulation of small arms trade, prohibition of child soldiers, the ban on landmines and the international criminal court.

National security should be based on the understanding that it is influenced not only by political and military factors, but also by social, environmental and economic factors.

19 P. Yengo, (2002) 51
Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa

This entails geopolitical thinking which is neither deterministic or static. Geopolitical realities should reflect regional cultural complexes, diversities and heritages that are part of the social mosaic of peripheral capitalism. A country's geographical position affects its national security. It can enhance economic health or governmental stability although this does not automatically translate into power. The concept of national security should determine the guidelines for the performance of public institutions supporting the general security policy of the state and elaborating plans and programmes of particular sectors in the national political economy. On the basis of the strategy and principles set in the national security concept, the construction of the national security strategy must be designed to prevent threats to state security.

There is a need for a geopolitical economy of national and regional security that cuts through the pretensions of liberal, realist, neo–realist and regime theories of politics. These theories have failed to account for the erosion of state power in the face of globalizing pressures. They have also been unable to diagnose, recognize and account for the relevance and institutional complexities of the modern state in determining the direction of domestic and international politics in a sensible contemporary sense. A new theory is necessary to highlight the peculiarity of the African problem under globalization.

Threats to National Security

Globalization spawns an exogenous model of modernization within an ideology that legitimates the contestable push for modernity. The state is supposed to play a mediating role not only in the confrontation between tradition and modernity but also between external and indigenous structures and values. A state whose autonomy has been undermined cannot carry out this mediatory role. Constitutionalism must define the right to self-determination, including economic determination in a country, and the political elites and intellectuals of that country need to emphasize the need for a sense of nationhood and solidarity on certain social questions.

The endangerment to national security largely depends on the activities directed against the national interests and principal values of citizens. It also depends on cultural, religious, ecological, technical and other factors that unfavourably influence the realization of national interests. These endangerments may arise in political, military, economic, informative, social, ecologic and criminal spheres either individually or acting together. The threats to the national interests result from the international environment and the development processes of the state and the society.

Apart from describing the situation in states, the concept of national security addresses the main factors of social vulnerability. These factors directly affect state security and at the same time characterize the current situations in any state.

There is a need to account for a wide range of factors, be they local or international, or historical, geographical, political, economic, and ideological which have shaped the

21 Guner Crisis (1999):365
challenges of each African state. In the last decade world security systems have undergone fundamental changes that have also influenced states throughout the world. With the end of the bipolar system of global politics defined by the ideological rigidities and easy-to-model situations no longer exist. Local conflicts have also proliferated. These emanate not only from the contradictions of capitalism but also from ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism is about the dynamic relationship between ethnicity and nationalism and their political and economic implications. Ethnicity as nationalism is a socially constructed phenomenon. It is not fixed and hence it should be understood in relational and historical terms. Intellectuals have a duty of identifying and defining the dominant characteristics of ethno-nationalism and its socio-economic manifestations, and how it interacts with global capitalism. They should account for contradictions of global capitalism and the impact of ethno-nationalism on the African state. The threat to security is caused by many factors including ethnicity. It may be debatable to what extent the politicization of ethnicity may threaten national and regional security. Whereas this politicization is quite often undertaken by given ethnically defined interest/pressure groups, it is however true that no national project of social transformation can successfully be built on the basis of a narrow ethnic agenda. The threats of ethno-nationalism to security can be tackled through an ideological approach to civic education by which serious political education is undertaken to demystify cultural difference and de-politicize ethnicity as part of the social re-engineering of the state. The consequences of ethnicity carry profound security concerns as some of Africa's worst genocidal activities and military coups have directly been attributable to it. One of the driving forces of regional solidarities is ethnicity. Regionalism may be defined in geo-physical, ideological and political terms and societies must hedge themselves against the negative influences of ethnicity.

Regions generate different dynamics in their response to global questions. This includes generating a revival of imperialism and especially regional neo-ethnic imperialism that has led to great national insecurity in Africa. This has in turn exacerbated the drainage of human and financial capital. Various ethnic grievances and claims have led to the formation of lobby groups such as the Pastoralist Forum in Kenya comprising the Oromo, Somali, Turkana, Samburu and Maasai among others. Some of these communities straddle existing national borders of the states forming the Greater Horn of African region. These lobby groups contest the marginalization of minority pastoral communities in the management of the state. In view of this and its implications for regional security issues pertaining to regional claims and demands of individuals and groups, the imperatives of morphology and particularism of cultures need to be well conceptualized. Despite the existing system of arms control which is intended to restrict the spread of weapons of mass destruction, due to processes of globalization, these weapons are at the disposal of more and more countries; and some small arms have ended in the hands of marginal communities. They are also at the disposal of non-governmental institutions and terrorists. This has had the overall effect of endangering the international security and stability of states.

22 Mustapha, 2003:28

Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation
Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa

Conclusion

The probability of a global war has decreased, although a large-scale armed conflict may not be completely excluded. Although there is a decreased probability of a global war, the probability of regional and local crises and conflicts has nevertheless increased. A plethora of conflicts seem to arise due to ethnic and religious conflicts and border disputes that arise out of political and economic contestations or perceived welfare recession of the countries or regions concerned leading to a weakening of internal administrative capacity of the countries, and to development of non-democratic processes in those specific countries. In all these cases the probability of uncontrolled migration increases the possibility of local and regional crises, which become especially dangerous if this leads to a humanitarian crisis.

The main goal of a clearly thought out conception of security is to form the conceptual basis for the national policy on developing a country's security system in geopolitical economy terms. An engrossing conception makes all-encompassing consideration of those internal and external conditions that determine main trends of national and regional security system's creation and development bearing in mind a people's cultural and religious heritage. It ought to be done in the light of each country's constitutional conditions of public setting, that enables the formulation of specific policy on national security and the building of its corresponding system of socio-economic management. The conception should be designed to be directly reflected into the separate realms of public life, including policies of security, institutional system and legislative basis regulating main relations of security protection.

The purpose of this conception of security is to present the governmental vision of the problems related to the establishment of the country's human security system in broader geopolitical economy terms. The geopolitical component should enable governments to present governmental consideration of security problems in broader global and regional terms and form the basis for their human security programme development that will inspire developing integrated national security systems. It will help to isolate clearly and explicitly those issues, which should be specifically worked out for the establishment of an integral system of security protection. It forms the basis for systemic integration of states' separate security policies and enable them to form, within the whole system of governance, the basis to stimulate the formation of shared understanding on national security protection and its management after identifying the areas of urgent intervention.
Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region
Ludeki Chweya

Introduction
This chapter argues to show that international relations in Africa has over the past two decades or so increased cooperation among state and non-state actors in the sphere of security, and significantly moved away from the state-centered approach to the liberal alternative. This trend has enabled state and non-state actors such as communities and regional organizations to recast the different aspects of security on the continent in a new light and to attend to some of the salient yet previously obscured security dimensions. These include the forms and sources of insecurity, security-related goals that states, communities and groups pursue, and strategies employed in the search for a remedy for the different forms of insecurity. African academics have also begun to grapple with the rapidly changing regional and international security terrain, in an effort to cope with the compelling need to redefine security, extend the range of issues and phenomena in Africa security studies, integrate the discrete categories of actors, revisit the pre-existing conceptual and paradigmatic schemes, and attempt new interpretative perspectives. The specific African security factors that have changed markedly during the past dozen years and compelled both practical and scholarly readjustments are several. However, three stand out clearly, namely the post-Cold War decline in ideological and superpower conflict that had involved Africa; the rise of the new democratization movement, and the gradual growth of mutual trust and confidence between and among states and peoples in the different sub-regions.

This chapter will draw illustrations from the IGAD sub-region to demonstrate the transition from the old to new dimensions of conflict and security in Africa; it will also assess the prospects for greater peace and security on the continent that that transition has engendered. The adverse internal and external conditions that obtained at independence and which produced conflicts, and the more recent changes that have occurred over the past decade or so can be analyzed under four themes: redefinition of security to include economic and social issues and dimensions; a paradigm shift from a state-centered to a liberal framework in the treatment of security-related issues, and the transition from old to new sources, forms, and remedies for insecurity.

Re-defining of Security
The classical realist definition of security is relatively narrowly conceived. The definition
 Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region

covers explicitly the security interest of the state especially its two core properties, namely territorial integrity and international sovereignty and, to a limited extent, the security of the state leadership (the government), certain fundamental aspects of the way of life (national values) within the state, and values like democracy, freedom, and religion. That definition pays little attention to the living conditions of individual citizens, domestic social groups, and local communities; it also assumes the state to be an abstract entity that is devoid of humanity and is autonomous from the domestic society. Keyman has noted that generally, the realist approach to international relations fails to problematize the state. It downplays the domestic forces that act behind the state, and has therefore become a matter of both theoretical and practical concern. In Keyman's words, "instead of taking the state as an object of theoretical inquiry, international relations theory has uncritically tended to conceive of it as the main actor, as an ontological entity, or as an observable given institutional entity."

In his critique of the failure of realist approaches to recognize domestic variables in the analysis of the foreign policy of states, Katzenstein notes that

"Since the primary constraints on government policy have shifted away from the international and towards the domestic level, foreign and domestic affairs have become closely intertwined. Analysis of contemporary foreign economic policies is inadequate as long as it focuses only on the "internationalization" of international relations; the "externalization" of domestic structures is also of great importance."

The failure to look beyond the limited realist view of the state and to examine matters like composition and constraints of states and the constituency they represent can lead to the erroneous observation that the state is secure, whereas the reality can be different. Individuals, groups, and communities can suffer or die of famine, genocide, banditry, police brutality, ethnic cleansing, spousal assault, child labour, discrimination in state resource allocation, diseases and epidemics, and religious and cultural persecution simultaneously within a secure state from the realist perspective. Furthermore, the realist definition of state security presupposes threats from other states in the unregulated and dangerous anarchical international system. The problem with this definition is that the 'state' can be secure—free from any external military threat or from aggression that other state actors perpetrate—and yet its citizens suffer insecurity in terms of physical attack, genocide that internal, non–state aggressors commit, including state officials.

In addition, a state can be free of aggression of different kinds from other states in the international system, yet face more devastating threats from non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations, cross–border bandit cattle raiders, and drug, gun, and human being traffickers. In addition, a state can have ‘warm and cordial’ relations with another state yet face threats from powerful and dishonest multinational corporations (MNCs) from that same state. A MNC can aim to overthrow the incumbent government of a foreign country and install a puppet regime that is favorable to its own exploitative interests. The importance of threats from such new sources has surpassed...

threats from states as the latter increasingly take a cooperative approach to dealing with matters of mutual interest in the post-Cold War era. For example, the September 11 terrorist attack on New York and Washington was the most devastating assault on the US since the 1941 Japanese strike on Pearl Harbour. Furthermore, the most devastating post-independence external attack on Kenya was the August 7 Nairobi bomb blast followed by the October 28 Mombasa attack, both of which were aimed at foreign—Israeli and US—interests in Kenya.

The US has since September 11 designated the Alqaeda terrorist network as the source of the greatest threat to its security both at home and abroad. Indeed, Alqaeda compelled the US to establish a new department—the Department of Homeland Security—after September 11. In Africa, the realist approach to security has also declined since the August 7 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. The most immediate external threat to security in Kenya today is less from neighbouring states than from terrorist organizations that target Nairobi as the hub of international diplomatic and commercial activity in the Horn, Eastern and Central African sub-regions. For example, while Somalia posed a threat to Kenya in the 1960s, today Kenya faces threats from terrorist organizations believed to operate in Somalia, rather than from the state of Somalia. Furthermore, all IGAD member states are today drawn into the US security regime no longer as possible havens of communism, but of anti-US international terrorist organizations.

The definition of security has acquired a new, broader meaning that involves threats from external non-state actors; threat from internal actors; threats to individuals, groups and communities; and 'civilian' threats to human well-being (health, nutrition, education, fairness, rights and freedoms, dignity). The new conception of security has profound implications for all other aspects of security. It demands a shift from the old realist determination of the possible remedies for insecurity in favor of an increasingly liberal inclination. The present conceptualization demands, for example, a review of previously sacrosanct principles of international relations like sovereignty and non-interference, and a reconsideration of the practice of providing aid to governments (states) to the exclusion of civil society groups. A growing body of literature already exists on what is defined as human security that attempts to recast security within all the dimensions of social life and human living. Another growing body of literature on 'social constructivism' and 'reflexivity' claims that security is a function of social discourse rather than tangible realist shifts in the balance of power. It can be argued from this standpoint that the causes of war and conflict, for example, are not located in human nature, in balance of power, self-regarding characteristics of states, and in the Hobbesian international system, but in the manner in which discourse in international relations is constructed as anarchical.

This chapter takes the term ‘security’ to refer to the condition where individuals, groups, communities and states as a whole are free from armed or unarmed threat to physical, social, psychological, material, and political well being, and possess adequate resources
Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region

to deal with such threats whenever they occur. The definition goes beyond the realist perspective and captures a new scope and meaning of security. The term security can be applied refer to states and non–state actors, including individuals and communities, and to military and non–military aspects of states and societies. Furthermore, the definition suggests that threats to security can have both internal and external sources and solutions. It presupposes the use of strategies that involve cooperation and collaboration by far more than self-regarding state pursuit of power and the continual exploration of military options.

IGAD has, in practice, brought the different dimensions of security under its mandate. It began with the liberal definition of security before broadening its scope to include what are arguably realist dimensions of security. Indeed, IGAD was originally inaugurated in January 1986 as Inter–Governmental Authority on Draught and Development (IGADD). The Authority was concerned with conventional, realist security issues like armed conflict at a secondary level, as a by–product of security in the socio–economic sphere. The Djibouti Declaration in March 1987 stated that IGAD activities would "further contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence and trust which will promote a policy of dialogue, peace and stability in the region." However, the Authority had by the end of the first decade broadened its understanding of security, dropped the 'drought' in its name in early 1996 to become IGAD, and formally brought the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflicts within its mandate. For example, the concept of 'early warning' that IGADD used in the socio–economic sphere, that is, to refer to the monitoring of climatic conditions especially drought in order to predict it and arrange for 'food security' has now been introduced to the sphere of conflict in the Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism.

From the standpoint of the classical realist paradigm, the primary concern of states in their interactions with each other is with national, regional and international security. The paradigm dominated the study of international politics for much of the post-war period arguably due to the Cold War. Indeed hindsight, and as insights from recent critical and reflexive perspectives on international relations theory lead to the observation that realism was the main contribution of Western international relations scholarship to the containment of communism, even though its origins predate the Cold War. The realist paradigm offered a single-track interpretation of international politics: states are the main actors, non-state actors are only appendages devoid of autonomous significance, the international system is anarchical and predisposes states to self–regarding behavior, the main concern of states is insecurity defined as military threat; and states therefore pursue national interest particularly accumulation of power independently, prompt competition for power, and exacerbate conflict and insecurity.

The idealist expectations of international cooperation through international organizations, international law, international morality, and prospects for a world government became the greatest object of realist attack. Indeed, realists particularly E.H.
Carr had already published the earliest discourse on realism before both Second World War and the Cold War. Following Hans Morgenthau’s Power Among Nations realism became the dominant paradigm for the study of international politics. The advent of the neo–realist twist to realism following the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics attempted to overcome the weaknesses of classical realism. The latter attempted to accord primacy to state actors over the international structure (systemic variables), to security concerns over the socio-economic welfare of society, and to military, balance-of-power issues over economic affairs and crises. Although structural realism has dominated international studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, its operational difficulties helped to maintain the attractiveness of classical realism. African international relations scholarship has also considerably adopted realist reasoning.

The rise of realism and even its neo–realist variant in an attempt to challenge idealism did not result in the defeat of idealism which made important adjustments resulting in the liberal institutionalism variant that carried on the idealist logic and influenced the study of international politics as much as realism had done. Indeed, liberal institutionalism discredited realism in fundamental ways. Firstly, the post–war period witnessed the explosion of international organizations particularly the UN and a multitude of its specialized agencies that together covered comprehensively the different aspects of inter–state relations. Prospects for cooperation in the international system were no longer as remote as they appeared to be during the inter–war period. Furthermore, the perception that security meant only the military and balance of power variables was questioned fundamentally by idealism, which assigned a higher premium to socio-economic concerns, including the interpretation of security in socio-economic terms.

The events of September 11 dealt a blow to the realist interpretation of security. The uniqueness of Alqaeda as a non–state threat to US security has thrown the country’s security arrangement—structure, organization, armament, and logistics—into confusion. The US military organization was equipped for Cold War threats from other states, especially the Soviet bloc, whereas Alqaeda was a non–state actor with no territorial location. Secondly, Cold-War threats to US security were mostly indirect and were aimed at US allies and interests abroad more than at US territory. In the aftermath of September 11, has shifted from a sharply realist to an increasingly liberal inclination. Alqaeda demonstrated the salience of threats from non–state actors, enemy use of unconventional, non–military ‘power’ or means (notably commercial aircraft), and the fact that contemporary economies are not attempting to reshape the balance of power (Alqaeda does not seek to strike a balance of power with US).

The Practice of Regional Security

The pursuit of security through multilateral and regional cooperative arrangements like

---

7 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations
8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics
the UN Security Council, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact underscored the importance of cooperation in the presumably realist dominated security sphere during the Cold War. The cooperative approach has continued in the post–Cold War era. The strength of the UN Security Council has not declined. Russia—the strongest member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—swiftly filled the void created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly, NATO did not decline with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, but has expanded its membership from the original nine to fifteen, including some of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet bloc states like Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. In Africa, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) provided for cooperation in "peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration" [Article III (4)]. The charter covered the socio-economic and political aspects of cooperation such as in Article II 2 (a–f) and Article II (b) that pledged a "better life for the people of Africa," although the organization did not explicitly regard the non–military aspects of cooperation in the light of security. The mandate of the African Union (AU), also includes provisions for cooperation in security matters, broadly defined. Specifically, the objectives of the Union as stated in the AU Constitutive Act include pursuit of socio–economic and political integration, and the promotion of "peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states" [Article 4 (e)]. Furthermore, the Union prohibits the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of states, but reserves the right to intervene only for internal security crises like genocide, or at the request of member states, and undertakes to promote gender equality, democracy, social justice, the sanctity of human life and to establish a "common defense policy" (Article 4).

Sub–regional cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security has become a key feature of the current security regime in Africa. The Economic Cooperation of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Coordination (SADC), and IGAD have all included peace and security issues and activities within their mandate. IGAD has in its almost two decades of existence promoted cooperation in the prevention and resolution of varied security issues, broadly defined. The importance of the original IGAD goal of cooperation in development and human security issues has continued to grow. The Charter of the Authority has in Article 13 embraced a wide range of human security activities to be carried jointly among member states. The Authority has acknowledged that peace and security from the standpoint of armed conflict is a prerequisite for socio-economic security (Article 18A). The Authority has therefore expanded its mandate to include security issues.

The cooperative search for peace and security has become a remarkable feature of IGAD. Three recent events attest to this development. First, IGAD established the CEWARN in November 2000 and enshrined of it Article 2 (1) of its Charter. CEWARN involves gathering, processing, and sharing of information in order to enable the Authority to take early actions to address emerging conflicts. Secondly, IGAD has in the last decade engaged in conflict resolution activities. The Sudan and Somalia peace processes are analyzed in more detail in other chapters in this volume.
The third recent element in cooperation within IGAD is the establishment of a framework for cooperation in the military sphere. The need to quickly restore peace and security in the event of armed conflict has resulted in the establishment of joint military formations in all sub-regions to respond to needy situations. The Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) that has received immense US support involves the establishment of military cooperation in each of the five identified sub-regions on the continent to obviate reliance on the less effective extra-continental interventions in conflict situations. This security scheme has advanced further in the establishment of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and an EASBRIG Fund.\(^9\) According to the Jinja Draft Protocol, EASBRIG member-states undertake to place columns of their armed forces at the disposal of the EASBRIG arrangement for peacekeeping action under a unified command whenever required for the restoration of peace and security. The EASBRIG Fund will be based on the subscriptions of member-states and contributions from other sources. The fund is to be utilized not only for peacekeeping, but also for the prevention, and general management of conflicts. The EASBRIG initiative is part of the Africa Standby Force of the African Union (AU) to operate under Article 4(b) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act whereby the AU is the actual authority and in turn derives its mandate from the Chapter IV of the UN Charter. However, the EASBRIG and the EASBRIG Fund are to operate under the immediate responsibility of IGAD.

Besides the increasing intervention of regional institutions in security situations, many countries have increasingly overcome the dogma of sovereignty and meaningfully allowed the external mediation of eminent persons in internal disputes and conflicts. These practical developments in the African regional and sub-regional security are in conformity with the assumptions and predictions of liberal institutionalism.

**New Forms of Insecurity**

The source of insecurity in Africa has changed significantly over the past fifteen or so years. The most notorious sources of insecurity during the statist era. The interstate boundaries were the first source of conflict that led the OAU founding fathers (OAU) to require all member states to respect the inherited boundaries. Border disputes have since declined as many states come to terms with the liberal option of subordinating classical state interests—accumulation of power—to the desire for socio-economic prosperity and political stability. New conflicts are likely to arise in regard to shared natural resources like water and pasture. The second source of conflict was contest over the internal political organization of the post-independence state resulting in secessionism, irredentism, coups d’etat, and civil war. This source of conflict has declined considerably since the end of the Cold War. The struggle to establish democracy and respect for human rights has instead gained momentum and led to the legitimization of political regimes and extension of citizenship rights to all ethno-regional groups even if this entails the freedom to chose to secede. The rise of Eritrea to sovereignty is a case in point. The final source of conflict was the Cold War that spread to Africa and drew otherwise non-aligned African states into the fray on behalf of external big power protagonists. However, the

---

\(^9\) EASBRIG is a thirteen-member arrangement that includes Comoro, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.
Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region

Cold War has since disappeared as a source of externally generated insecurity. Instead, economic conflict between the north and the south has intensified following the rise of the neo–liberal hegemony and resistance to Western political dominance through international terrorist activities.

From Border Disputes to Shared Resources

The post-independence nation states in Africa are gussellschaft political institutions rather than a product of an evolutionary and institutionalizing process similar to the experience of the rise of their counterparts in western Europe. Studies in comparative politics show that African states passed through two stages of creation in quick succession that lasted approximately half a century. The first stage involved the partition of the continent into over fifty relatively large territorial political units as imperial and subsequently colonial possessions of west European imperial powers that scrambled for access to the vast natural resources of the continent hitherto un–exploited on a capitalist scale.10 The imperial powers partitioned the continent based on a topographical, non–social map of the continent, resulting in borders that both transcended and transected pre-existing ethnic and political units and thereby prepared ground for future conflicts within and between states. The second stage in the creation of African states involved the establishment and exercise of centralized colonial political authority over socially, politically and most importantly, ethnically heterogeneous African communities in each colony. The illegitimacy of the colonial state and the perpetual potential and in some cases the actual episodes of native resistance against the colonial state predisposed colonial officials to eschew policies that enhanced a sense of nationalism among the indigenous population. The African nationalism that crystallized in anti-colonial struggle in the post–war period was therefore only a gesselschaft nationalism that generally collapsed into ethnic sub–nationalism. The state framework that was arguably the most important colonial legacy became the greatest source of insecurity between states in the light of the numerous border disputes, irredentism, secessionism, and ethnicity within states that also had implications for inter-state relations.

The IGAD sub–region has witnessed five important border disputes: the Shifta dispute between Kenya and Somalia, the Ogaden dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Elemi Triangle dispute between Kenya and Sudan, the post–secession Ethiopia–Eritrea border dispute, and the Kenya Uganda dispute in 1976. The Shifta border dispute was bound up with irredentism where Somalia supported the separatist groups in the North Eastern Province of Kenya, groups which wanted the province become a part of a Greater Somalia. The conflict involved a brief Shifta War in 1967. Somalia armed and supported Kenyan rebels of Somali origin in the North Eastern Province who sought to break away from Kenya. The scheme for Greater Somalia was also the basis of the Ogaden conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia where Somalia claimed the Ethiopian Ogaden province that had predominantly ethnic Somali inhabitants. The conflict resulted in war in 1977 that also attracted external players: the US on the part of Somalia and the Soviet Union.

10 Belgium, Britain, France, Germany and Portugal were the leading colonial powers in Africa.
on the Ethiopian side. Ethiopia kept the province. The Kenya–Uganda border dispute arose in early 1975 following Idi Amin's claim that the pre–1904 border between the two countries, one according to which the whole of the western half of Kenya constituted the Eastern Province of Uganda, was the bona fide frontier line. Uganda dropped the claim following massive demonstration of force in Kenya. The Elemi Triangle crisis began with Sudanese claim that a triangular territory in the Elami areas of the common border that appeared to be on the Kenyan side, properly belonged to Sudan. The crisis formally ended with Sudanese acquiescence though local communities still engage in armed excursions with support from their respective governments. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a war in 1998 over Ethiopian claim over sections of territory on the Eritrean side of the common border.

However, incidents of border disputes in Africa have become increasingly few and far between. The Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict is the only one that is still active. The traditional concern for territorial mercantilism as a function of preponderant power appears to have given way to concern for socio-economic progress and refinement of the domestic political conditions through democratization and respect for individual rights and freedoms. The more African countries face challenges to deliver on the domestic front and increasingly come under the control of domestic political groups and civil society generally, the less leverage they find for aggressive territorial incursions in neighboring countries. While inter-state conflicts still exist, they are no longer based on border questions, but on claims over access to shared resources. Homer-Dixon has argued that scarcity of resources can arise from three possible conditions: increased demand due to population growth, decreased supply due to environmental degradation, and widespread inaccessibility due to socially inequitable formula for distribution. The three models apply to Africa, including the IGAD sub-region. IGAD was established initially to confront threats from environmental degradation especially drought and desertification and the realization that the causes of the problem transcended national boundaries and had therefore to be dealt with collectively. The spread of the desert and the incidence of draught were clearly a function of land use practices within the region. Bad land use practices in one country could be environmentally hazardous to another, to the region as a whole, and a source of conflict. However, the activities of IGAD have not fully restored environmental equilibrium in the sub-region. Drought is still a major problem for nearly two-thirds of the total population of the sub-region. Communities in most scarcely watered areas invariably engage in nomadic pastoral economic activities rather than crop production because the former type of land use allows for movement in search of water and pasture. Such nomadic economic activities are an important source of conflict over the supply-driven pasture and water resources.

Pastoral communities criss-cross national borders in search of water and pasture and thereby provoke conflicts with each other over claims of ownership of the disputed resources and the tendency to defend the resources from 'external' encroachment. Furthermore, the pastoral communities also engage in cross-border livestock rustling in
order either to replenish numbers decimated during drought or for varied other cultural reasons that are nevertheless tied to scarcity of natural resources and the harshness of the physical environment. While such conflicts are a historical feature of the communities involved rather than an emerging security issue, the infiltration of firearms in the affected pastoral areas and communities mostly from the mid–1980s onward has exacerbated the magnitude—the frequency and scale of atrocity—associated with the conflicts. The increased use of firearms rather than the traditional spears and arrows has elevated the military technology applied in the defense or acquisition of scarce water and pasture and thereby transformed conflicts from the previously occasional mid-night raids to outright and drawn out war. Conflicts between the Karamoja and the Turkana and Pokot on the Kenya–Uganda frontier is a case in point. The problem of the infiltration of firearms in the civilian population within the IGAD region has been a subject of numerous security studies focusing on the causes, impact and remedy. Indeed, the easy accessibility of the civilian population to firearms following the civil wars in nearly all the countries except Kenya has added a new and important dimension to the security problem in the IGAD region. The entire population in the IGAD region—rural or urban, pastoral or agricultural—all face increased threats to life and property as a result of increased presence of firearms in criminal civilian hands. Today, danger to national security looms more from within countries than from without as in previous decades. The high rate of the generation of refugees in Africa has added a new dimension to conflict over the use of shared resources among communities. Armed conflict within IGAD member states, especially the civil wars in Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan has created a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. In either case, the sudden movement of large populations of people exerts pressure on the host communities and countries and produce demand-driven conflicts over local resources. Conflicts between locals and refugees have become a new threat to security within the sub–region. Furthermore, the proliferation of small arms within the IGAD sub–region and the consequent increase in the rate of crime can be attributed to the influx of refugees, in an unregulated cross–border migration.

**From Interstate to Internal Security Threats**

In the early years of independence African countries faced threats interstate disputes that in some cases culminated in war. Countries like Somalia and Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and Uganda and Tanzania actually went to war with each other between the 1960s and 1970s. The greatest security threat for all the countries in the region emanated from neighboring states rather than from internal sources. However, none of the IGAD member states today faces external threats to its territorial integrity or its sovereignty. Ogaden Somali claims to the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia, the North Eastern Province of Kenya, and to Djibouti, and Uganda's claim to parts of Kenya, have arguably been consigned to history. The region faces only a single border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea over unfinished autonomy business. IGAD member states today face new internal rather than external security challenges. The internal security challenges can be
attributed to disputes over the organization of state authority. Kenya has faced challenges in regard to internal democratization struggles that frequently involve violent ethnic clashes that conservative state operatives instigate. Uganda faces an internal rebel movement and demands for multiparty political order. Sudan still faces internal challenge from the secessionist conflict in the south against the SPLA/SPLM and in the northwestern province of Darfour. Somalia is torn with clan-based, warlord conflicts including the secession of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Puntland province. Ethiopia faces internal secessionist challenge from the Oromo Liberation Front in the south of the country.

The IGAD sub-region has experienced three notable cases of secessionism: one successful (Eritrea), one virtually successful (Somaliland), and two ongoing, namely the Oromo under the Oromo National Liberation Front (Ethiopia) and the SPLM (Sudan). The sub-region has also witnessed one failed case of irredentism—the Shitsa effort in Kenya. While both irredentism and secessionism have ethnic connotations, the forces of ethnicity that act short of separatism also generate considerable conflicts within IGAD member-states. In Kenya, for example, the advent of the multiparty electoral system and the resistance of the KANU government to the arrangement involved ethnic clashes especially in three provinces—Coast, Rift Valley and Western—during the 1992 and 1997 general elections and resulted in loss of life, social dislocation, loss of property, and an influx of internally displaced persons. In Uganda, the civil war between the NRM that precipitated the overthrow of President Obote a northerner and later another northern army strongman Tito Okelo Lutwa was composed mostly of Bantu southerners. The NRM government has since taking office in 1986 enjoyed legitimacy in the south but faced resistance in the north and east of the country. Thus the present civil war in Uganda between the NRM government and the Lords Resistance Army has ethnic undercurrents. Clan conflicts come to the fore mostly in intra-ethnic conflicts because clans are segments of ethnic groups. The conflict in Somalia since 1991 especially the elusiveness of a compromise on the establishment of a national government is a direct consequence of clan and sub-clan rivalry among groups like the Darood, Digil Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye. The three types of conflicts—ethnicity and clanism, irredentism, and secessionism—can be attributed to faults in the nation-state framework for the organization of public affairs.

The Eritrea War of secession from Ethiopia from 1956–1994 has continued even after the formal referendum and secession. Ethiopia itself continues to fight another secessionist war between the government in Addis Ababa and the Oromo Liberation Front in the south of the country, although the conflict often spills into neighboring Kenya. In Sudan, the non-Arab, non-Muslim population of southern Sudan began its sub-nationalist secessionist agitation against claimed economic and political domination from the Arab, Muslim northerners in control of the central government in Khartoum. Sudan has therefore witnessed civil war waged between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) on the one hand and the
Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region

Khartoum government on the other for most of the period since 1956. In Somalia, the Somaliland territory that had amalgamated with the rest of the Republic of Somalia at independence in 1960 has seceded and established itself as the independent Republic of Somaliland based at Hargeisa. The province of Puntland has also increasingly taken an autonomous disposition from the emerging central government in Mogadishu. The conflict in Somalia proper also continues to rage, although IGAD is making efforts to mediate in the conflict.

The present internal conflicts in the IGAD region are latter day variants of the earlier irredentist or secession conflicts that characterized the IGAD countries in the immediate post–colonial period. Three cases of irredentism can be identified in the IGAD sub–region. In Kenya the Somali people of the North Eastern Province contested their inclusion within the Kenyan state during the transition to independence, formed sub–nationalist organizations in 1960 and incessantly petitioned the British government though unsuccessfully for the right to break away to join the Republic of Somalia. The Ten–mile Coastal Strip in Kenya, a territorial possession of the Sultan of Zanzibar but for over half a century a British Protectorate against which the colonial state paid rent to the Sultan also attempted to secede during the transition to independence. While the Mwambao sub–nationalism conceded defeat, Somali sub–nationalism declined only initially before it reactivated towards the end of the 1960 culminating in the Shifta War between the Kenya government and the movements for irredentism.

From Cold War conflicts, to mercenarism and terrorism

Most countries on the continent achieved independence under Cold War conditions and although many joined the non-alignment parade, the sway to either the East or the West consistently or interchangeably appeared to be inevitable. The East–West Cold War rivalry and conflict was also played out in Africa in the south with important ramifications for peace and security on the continent. The Cold War had begun to make an impact on Africa right from the moment of the nationalist struggle for independence. Africa’s colonial overlords were European capitalist powers—Britain, Belgium, France, Portugal, Italy and initially Germany—that together with the US formed the core of the western bloc. The Soviet Union was quick to recognize that one of the greatest challenge against the west lay in attacking its colonial empire through support for the nationalist revolt and agitation for independence. The logic of the strategy was straightforward: African countries that achieved independence through Soviet support were more likely to establish communist government after independence. Thus the Soviet Union offered diplomatic support especially in the UN General Assembly and military and logistical support for the military wing of the nationalist movements. Cuba and China were also important communist countries that lent substantial support including training facilities to African anti–colonial liberation movements throughout the continent and as recently

---

11 The Somali movements of irredentism sent a delegation to the Lancaster House Constitutional conference in 1962 to secure their exclusion from Kenya to page way for inclusion with the Republic of Somalia.

12 The Mwambao United Front also sent a delegation to the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Kenya to make the secession claim. The British government including KANU (Kenya African National Union) and KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) nationalists objected to claims of irredentism and included the both regions within the post-independence Kenyan nation-state.
as the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Indeed, the west perceived all nationalist movements in the light communism if only because they challenged western colonial hegemony, to be terrorists. The nationalists were therefore no lesser foes than were their communist adversaries in the Cold War. It is not surprising that the African nationalist movement and the communist countries in the eastern bloc both had something in common: antagonism against western capitalist powers. While it is correct to observe that the African nationalist struggle had contributed to the state of insecurity in Africa, the cause of the struggle was legitimate and the colonial and apartheid powers had left the native population with little option.

The colonial powers invariably began to prepare the transition to independence in most countries once the victory of the African liberation struggle became imminent or inevitable. The powers were apprehensive that unless they presided over the independence transition, the communists would triumph and thus preclude Western influence on the ideological orientation of the post-independence states. Many of the newly installed post-independence governments maintained the capitalist, liberal orientation (Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria), a few adopted the communist or Marxist style leadership (Angola and Mozambique), and a handful adopted socialist orientations (Ghana, Tanzania and Senegal). Nevertheless, the choice of ideology was not an easy affair. Whichever ideology the victorious political party adopted elicited in many cases formidable challenge and opposition from groups with opposite ideological inclinations either on their own accord or with prompting from the appropriate side in the global ideological blocs. Consequently, the Cold War filtered into the domestic political arena of many countries resulting in outright civil wars (Angola and Mozambique), coups d’etat (Ghana, Congo DR and Liberia [1980]) or political instability arising from rivalry between governments and dissenting political forces, either right or left wing.

The Cold War also played out in interstate relations involving a few states. Countries with opposing ideological persuasions became mutually antagonistic either on their own accord or upon instigation from the superpowers. The bone of contention was in most cases the fear that one would either instigate or inadvertently influence the progressive forces within its borders to challenge the ideological status quo at home. The conflict between Mengistu’s Ethiopia and Somalia, between Kenya and Tanzania in the mid–1970s, and between Samora Machel’s Mozambique and the apartheid regime in South Africa are notable cases. The Cold War had in summary created conditions of insecurity within and between African countries that lasted until its end.

While the Cold War has come to an end and the erstwhile East–West conflict is no longer a problem for Africa, a new global conflict is emerging with potential for opening a new vista for insecurity in Africa—international terrorism. International terrorism does not have its origins in Africa nor is Africa in any way party to the disputed issues that form the background to international terrorism, but a convenient theatre for the external protagonists, notably the US and its allies on one hand and social groups that believe are victims of the superpower aggression, directly or indirectly. This raises the issue, can one
Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region

agree with Samuel Huntington's thesis that the era of ideological conflict in the international system will be replaced with an era of a clash of civilizations? Africa must now adjust from having to deal with the insecurity that the Cold War posed to one that is a product of conflicting interpretations of freedom and democracy by parties outside of Africa. The conflict between the west and the Arab, largely Islamic civilization has implications for Africa, indeed Sub-Saharan Africa, as did the Cold War before it. That is, Africa has become the battleground for undue conflicts in which they—the countries and people of the continent—are not among the protagonists. African countries fall in the firing line insofar as they host numerous western diplomatic and commercial interests. Moreover, the continent's non-controversial posture in international affairs and the unlikelihood of making external enemies for a long time obviated the need to invest in elaborate anti-terrorist security measures. Consequently, African countries are today easy targets of international terrorist organizations on the hunt for their Western and other adversaries.

Today, the control of international terrorism is the US's forefront national interest. The anti-terrorism crusade has been extended to all corners of the world including Africa using strategies that are in many ways reminiscent of the Cold War, anti-communist campaign. The US has positioned troops and spies in many African countries suspected to be havens of terrorist activity including Kenya and Somalia. The US also makes financial grant to African countries for the anti-terrorism campaign, and compels African countries to introduce harsh anti-terrorist legislation and has thereby pitted many governments against their citizens on grounds of violation of human rights and freedoms. African countries have on their part initiated anti-terrorism mechanisms and, most importantly, entered into cooperation against the new source of insecurity. The OAU introduced an anti-terrorism Convention in 2000—the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Section 4 of the convention calls on members states to cooperate through refusal to organize or support mercenaries, enhance border monitoring systems, enhance the security of foreign missions, exchange of information and the establishment of a collective database on terrorism.

The state was a source of war and insecurity for many Africa countries in the post-independence period mostly due to disputed borders between neighboring states. States therefore faced security threats mostly from other states and prepared to counter such threats through balance of military power relative to neighboring states. However, the period since the 1980s has witnessed a new source of threats to state security in Africa besides international terrorism—mercenaries. Gerry Cleaver has observed that the use of mercenaries (hired soldiers) to perform military assignments on behalf of client-contractors "is by no means a modern phenomenon and is nearly as old as organized warfare itself."

For example, foreigners were employed in the British army to fight the country's imperial wars and today they are part of the British Gurkhas and the French Foreign Legion. Mercenary activity in Africa began in the form of operations of criminal individuals, mostly South Africans and were on hire to "prop up" regimes and to

overthrow them. They were employed in civil wars and struggles for liberation and earned a reputation for brutality that led to their being nicknamed ‘les affreux’—the terrible ones. Cleaver suggests that mercenaries were used in many countries in Africa like Congo, Comoros, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Benin, and Angola. Mercenaries have been employed also by companies interested to keep their mines operational during conflicts in African countries. Executive Outcomes is depicted to be a case of a formally established company for the purpose of conducting mercenary work—a company incorporated in both Britain and South Africa.

The most recent mercenary threat in Africa was in March 2004 following the arrest of a planeload of 67 men at Harare airport, who were believed to be mercenaries en route to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea in west central Africa. Equatorial Guinea also arrested 15 men in connection with the mercenary threat. African countries consider mercenaries to be a new form of serious insecurity on the continent. The AU in 2003 established the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa as an instrument for cooperation in combating mercenarism. The Convention chastises any AU member state that "shelters, organizes, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner employs armed forces partially or wholly consisting of persons who are not nationals of the country where they are going to act, for personal gain, material or otherwise" (Article 1). Article 9 requires member states to extradite any person in their territory who is wanted on mercenary charges in another country.

**Shift from State System to Neo–Liberalism**

The post-war international economic and political regime was constructed on the foundations of the liberal ideology even though this regime faced formidable challenge from the communist, state planning ideology that the Soviet Union spearheaded resulting in the four–decade long Cold War. The Cold War divided the international system between the communist and the liberal blocs with a false third wing of non–aligned countries that was essentially a caricature of either of the two blocs or both. Apprehension about the hazards of a liberal system, especially its potential to exclude the weaker social classes at the national level and the weaker state and non–state actors at the national level resulted in the formulation of the Keynesian variant of liberalism. Gerard Ruggie refers to Keynesian modification of classical liberalism as ‘embedded liberalism.’ The Keynesian state system essentially involved bringing the state into the economy to regulate and control the otherwise liberal free market system in order to ameliorate the excesses of that system, forestall internal challenges from the disadvantaged classes, and allow for its reproduction. At the international level, liberalism was embedded through the establishment of multilateral regulatory institutions in socio–economic and political fields of interaction in order to forestall challenges to international liberalism. Such challenge was expected mostly from states that were unable to cope with the hazards of free market competition brought upon the state itself and upon its citizens. Such states were therefore likely to opt for protectionism

---

14 Ibid. 268

**Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation**

45
and thereby undermine the primary feature of liberalism. Embedded international liberalism became the basis for the formulation of the liberal institutional paradigm in International Relations.

Be that as it may, African countries attained independence during the prime time of the welfare state orthodoxy and nearly all governments intervened in the economy in a variety of ways. The welfare state system was more crucial for African countries than for, say, the developed countries especially because the population in the former countries was poor due to the vagaries of colonial capitalism and looked upon the state to satisfy most socio-economic needs of individuals, groups and communities. Indeed, the legitimacy of the post–independence state subsequently hinged firmly on the provision of required social and economic services to the citizens—education, healthcare, supply of clean water, housing, sporting and recreational facilities, and protection of the socially dislocated. In the economic sphere, the state provided credit, production inputs, extension services, and market outlets and took part as an entrepreneur for a variety of reasons. Critically, the population in African countries obtained most of the state provided services either without any charge or at subsidized, largely comfortable fees that were by far lower than what could be obtained in the free market. At the same time, the state controlled consumer prices of strategic commodities at the same time as it guaranteed producer prices, controlled interest rates in lending institutions, stipulated minimum wage levels, and employed both tariff and non–tariff methods to protect national producers.

Arguably therefore, the welfare state system that was applied in African countries between independence and the turn of the 1990s was a milestone in human security. The system freed many individuals, families, groups and communities from threats of diseases and ill health, illiteracy and ignorance, hunger and malnutrition, unemployment, exploitative employers and producers, destitution and neglect, and the indignity of poverty and deprivation to the extent that state intervention made a difference. Furthermore, the fulfillment of socio-economic needs freed the population of African countries from threats of armed conflict that is often a function of poverty, dislocation, and deprivation and pressure on limited resources and opportunities. A positive correlation exists, for example, between armed robbery in cities, livestock rustling in the countryside, and spousal and child-parental assault in families to socio–economic hardship. This correlation can be seen from the rise in crime and social conflict since the beginning of the transition from the welfare to the neo–liberal state system. The welfare state system came under heavy criticism from corporate interests in western countries ostensibly because it had initiated a chain reaction that was ultimately injurious to the overall economic growth: massive government involvement in the provision of welfare programmes, astronomical increase in government expenditure due to service provision, drastic increase in demands for more revenue to match the expenditure needs, increased taxation especially corporate tax to meet the high welfare demanded revenue needs and targets, diminution of profit margin and capacity to save
due to high taxation including a high wage bill due to government minimum wage legislation, limited ability to expand investment and production due to the limited savings, and ultimately, economic stagnation, crisis, and decline. The west also blamed Africa and other developing countries for the economic imbroglio: developing countries had become dependent on heavy bilateral and multilateral borrowing from the west in order to meet the demands of the welfare state system. Such heavy borrowing was a boon for the western financial market and financial investors, but only for as long as repayment was on schedule. However, many third world countries defaulted prompting a debt crisis that began at the end of the 1970s that compounded the already growing economic crisis in the west.

The African welfare state system was therefore partly to blame for the crisis in the west and the solution to the crisis partly lay in internal economic adjustments in African countries in order to raise their capacity to service external debt and help to overcome the debt crisis. The solution appeared to lie with modifications to the African welfare state system: the ability to repay external debt required African countries to cut on welfare programs including employment in public service, cut ‘excess’ expenditure, obtain extra revenue through imposition of service user fees, cut domestic borrowing, deregulate and liberalize the economy in order to give way to the free market system that would stimulate economic growth through export-oriented private sector-initiated production, and ultimately secure a balanced budget with surplus for debt repayment. Western donors compelled African countries to introduce such changes in their economies through the World Bank–formulated Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) from the early 1980s, but mostly from the turn of the 1990s onwards. The advent of the neo-liberal state system and the transition from the previous welfare system has profoundly affected the security situation in Africa.

The terms of the SAPs involved liberalization and deregulation of the economy, privatization of public enterprises, reductions or elimination of government subsidy in the provision of public goods and services, and reduction of governments’ wage bill through massive staff layoffs. Implementation of the reform programmes had adverse effects on the human security situation in Africa, regardless of the justification of the policy changes. Specifically, liberalization of external trade opened the door to external competition that squeezed local agricultural and industrial producers, pushed many out of the market, and drastically reduced employment opportunities, incomes, and food supply for a multitude of families. For example, all textile-manufacturing establishments in Kenya have closed down and the sector is now a "rust belt", while many farmers have hanged their ploughs due to the inability to compete against cheap imports. Staff retrenchment in the public services has resulted in loss of employment and income for the affected families. Deregulation of the domestic market has resulted in high consumer prices of essential goods especially foodstuffs and oil products, high interest rates, and the rise of exploitative middlemen especially in the agricultural sector. Reduction or elimination of subsidies in the provision of public goods and services has placed
Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region

essential services like healthcare and education beyond the reach of the poor that form the bulk of the population. In short, implementation of the SAPs has aggravated human insecurity in communities already under the burden of poverty and destitution. Poverty is perhaps the greatest source of insecurity in the IGAD region today. Indeed, poverty is a more immediate and daily threat to human security than war, terrorism and mercenarism, put together.

Conclusion

The security situation in Africa has changed drastically in the past two decades or so. The continent has witnessed a marked transition from the realist perspectives both in practice and in scholarship as the Cold War abated and individuals, groups, and countries redirected interest mostly towards socio-economic progress and only minimally towards the search for state power. Furthermore, the definition of security has expanded to include traditionally excluded non–military, non–external, non–state oriented definitions in favor of social and human related issues like employment, healthcare, and education. Old sources of insecurity have also given way to new sources and thereby posed novel challenges to the security of African countries. While ideological conflicts, border conflicts, and threats from state actors that characterized the security arena during the first three or so decades of independence have declined, new types of conflict like international terrorism, mercenarism, internal contests, and externally induced poverty have become hallmarks of insecurity on the continent. Finally, antagonistic approach to peace and security that largely involved the accumulation of state power and employment of military solutions to conflict resolution or to the pursuit of national interests has increasingly given way to a new, cooperative approach depicted in IGAD mediation activities within the region.
Introduction

Subsequent to the end of the Cold War in 1989, there was a triumphalist mood in the west. The premature celebration was orchestrated by the false belief that history had ended. History is, however, a human process that can only end with the annihilation of human–kind, a total situation where there will be nobody to record what would have happened. What, therefore, occurred at the end of the 1980s was a benchmark in international relations: the end of intense ideological rivalry between the United States, the leader of world capitalism and the Soviet Union, the leader of world socialism, culminating in the collapse of the latter. The bipolar superpower rivalry had, as such, ended. The Cold War has been replaced by a new system, more regionally fragmented, multifaceted, plural and varied. In this new system, the perspectives, interests and security needs of sub–regional organizations are playing increasingly significant roles. The very fact that the emerging sub–regional organizations lack a coherent world view suggests that there is a need to establish a system that can create effective diplomatic, economic, political and military strategies. Antipathy and confrontation seem to be on the increase, and this can result in insecurity.

Security in regional cooperation is imperative for the realization of its aims and goals. The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors, namely: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Military security concerns the two–level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and their perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational ability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns sustainability within acceptable conditions for the evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local, regional and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all the other human enterprises depend. These five sectors,
however, do not operate in isolation to ensure that a state, a cooperative body, or a system, has a counter check mechanism against insecurity. The defence mechanism must act beyond the normal physical security. It must ensure that these sectors of security are safeguarded against disruption. It is within this definition of security that this chapter examines the responses of two sub–regional institutions, namely, the new East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to security issues in the era of globalisation.

The Cold War period saw Africa’s place in the Western agenda determined by geopolitical considerations. Interest in Africa ebbed and flowed with shifts in perceptions of the potential impact of African events on the global interests of the west and the Soviet Union. Following the end of the Cold War, it was no longer easy to attach strong geostrategic importance to Africa. As a result of the altered environment, the west is now viewing Africa as one littered with economic stagnation and political instability informed by nationality, racial, class and religious conflicts. African states have also reacted to the end of the Cold War by abandoning the old tactics of playing the superpowers against each other. The majority of states have responded by putting up sub–regional frameworks to ensure economic development and political solidarity. The emergence of a strong desire to have sub–regional cooperation is a clear reaction to the realities of the end of the Cold War.

Sub-regional states' political and economic cooperation has come into fashion, especially after their realization of the necessity to exploit the advantages of interdependence. There is a clear realization that collective regional activities give individual states a greater competitive edge and higher bargaining power than when operating singly. Regional and sub–regional cooperation is essentially part of a strategy for economic transformation in Africa. The strategy is mainly dictated by some peculiar geographical characteristics. Thus states of the same geographical locality come together to pursue integration towards common economic, political and social goals. The desire to have a sub-regional body has been fostered in East Africa by Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. They signed the treaty for the establishment of the new EAC on November 30, 1999. Earlier, in 1986, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), was formed. The forerunner of IGAD, this sub–regional organisation comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

This chapter explores the ways in which the EAC and IGAD have both responded and are responding to the issues of security. It examines their operating frameworks and suggests their shortcomings in this context, and ways in which they can be shaped in
order to fulfill a regional security mandate. In the course of analyzing them, a theoretical framework is adopted to ensure that there is linkage between theory and practice.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Approaches of sub-regional institutions}

The requirement for a peaceful environment in which to fulfill the mandates of the EAC and IGAD cannot be overemphasized. For the casual observer, there is already enough security, that is, each signatory member of the EAC and IGAD has an army, a police force and intelligence apparatus. The issue arises whether these outfits are adequate to ensure that each state and in turn the two sub-regional institutions' functions are carried out peacefully. As Holsti explains, states remain the critical actors of international politics because they command the allegiances of peoples occupying defined territory which possess the capabilities to employ ultimate threat (war). Also, states, unlike most transnational organizations are concerned with the full range of welfare and security issues of a population and enjoy sovereignty.\textsuperscript{11}

A second consideration, however, reveals a need to depart from this statist approach on matters of sub-regional security. There is a need to redefine sub-regional security away from the traditional pre-occupation with state security. In modern sub-regional cooperation there is a need to define interests to be more inclusive than is expressed by traditional realist theorists like Carr\textsuperscript{12} and Morgenthau.\textsuperscript{13} They regard states as the primary actors in international politics. A broader paradigm needs to depart from major thinkers like Kenneth Waltz, who regards international politics as a system with precisely defined structures.\textsuperscript{14} The need for departure from the traditional security paradigm which privileges the state and its security agents provides for a wider perspective of analyzing sub-regional security from an enlarged angle, encapsulating human security in all its dimensions. The alternative paradigm takes care of non-military threats to security such as poverty, disease, environmental degradation, unemployment and bad governance.\textsuperscript{15} Although these elements are mentioned in the literature on sub-regional cooperation, they need emphasis. The paradigm must include the role the people of the EAC and IGAD are playing in developments that affect them.

In spite of the EAC's formal declaration that it would seek to promote political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of development, and that it would encourage popular participation in its decision-making processes,\textsuperscript{16} there is still a need to have a broad-based security paradigm that is capable of accommodating the requirements of the EAC where member-states are increasingly unable to control transitional movements and influences from across borders.

\textsuperscript{10} On the need for theory, see for instance, S. Hoffman, \textit{Theory in International Politics and Foreign Policy} (New York: Free Press, 1969), p33
\textsuperscript{12} E.H. Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis} (London: Macmillan, 1939), pp.11-12.
\textsuperscript{14} K.N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory." \textit{Journal of International Affairs} 44, no.1 (1990): 33.
What emerges is that the EAC and IGAD must embrace a paradigm to serve a civil society that is becoming increasingly sophisticated and competent, and whose loyalties to the state, even when surrounded by iron curtains, can no longer be assumed. The paradigm must accommodate a society armed with modern communications and transportation, regional or worldwide contacts and the ability to learn what is going on outside their community, country, or sub-region. A suggested security organ must cater for the changing themes in the world, the dominant of which is globalisation.

**Impact of Globalisation**

At the very core of this paradigmatic shift in articulating sub-regional security issues is the contemporary form of globalisation. Globalisation has become a catchword associated with all kinds of meanings depending on the ideological perspectives of different scholars. Some see it purely in the realm of economics, a revolution in the process of global production, particularly the technological innovations, which have changed the production system and global financial flows, thus creating the so-called global village. Others emphasise its socio-cultural aspects, the homogenization of cultures, and the Americanisation of global tastes.

The political economy–based definition of globalisation is the most interesting; the march of capital all over the world in search of consumers and markets. In this sense, it is the process of opening up the world market to the powerful global players, a project inevitably driven by the most powerful multinational corporations. To this extent, therefore, from the historical point of view, there is nothing particularly new about globalisation: accumulation on a global scale ever since the British industrial revolution, has been characterized by the march of capital all over the world in search of consumers and markets.

But the contemporary understanding of globalisation is more than that. It is also about a growing structural differentiation. Globalisation should be seen as a process which is propelled by contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, it has unleashed productive forces throughout the world leading to the expansion of markets, insertion of technology in the process of production, and hence, massive improvement of productive capacities. On the other hand, it has also manifested tendencies towards fragmentation, differentiation, and the marginalisation of social forces. Uneven development long associated with capitalist expansion is probably the most manifest trademark of globalisation in its contemporary form.

Precisely because of the specificity of the Third World’s historical integration into the world economy, the unevenness of globalisation has been most intense in the developing countries. Whereas the global restructuring associated with globalisation has had some

---

17 Holsti, *International Politics*, p.66.
positive spin—of including the collapse of undemocratic and repressive regimes, and the acceleration of the democratization process in Africa, the predominant tendency has been the increasing marginalisation of the continent. More importantly, contemporary globalisation has imposed the power of a few overwhelmingly wealthy and powerful countries over the many weaker states in the international system.

Not surprisingly, contemporary globalisation has rendered the classical notion of the state all but meaningless. The traditional understanding of the state, associated with the theories of realists and neo–realist, based on the assumption that the traditional state had comprehensive control over its territory and population, and a capacity to operate as a unitary, autonomous actor in an anarchic international system, can no longer hold true for a majority of African states. These countries have been collectively subordinated to a worldwide market totalitarianism. Furthermore, a majority of these countries have been increasingly rendered "borderless": the development of research and technology has facilitated the free flow of information across international borders on an unprecedented scale. Invariably, African countries have lost sovereignty in a number of areas as a result of these developments.

This process of rolling back the state has been facilitated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The two Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and more recently, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have been crucial in drawing up new rules of global economic engagement. African states have thus been increasingly compelled to abide by the global logic of the market. And the use of aid to impose compliance or punish non-compliance with the market economy has now become the sine qua non of the operations of the institutions of global governance. The consequences of these kinds of intervention have far reaching implications: the dismantling of the institutions of African states, with the concomitant loss of sovereignty; policies which until quite recently were the exclusive reserve of the state, are now largely determined by the IFIs.

These developments are bound to have more impact not only on security issues in Africa, but also on the way Africa generally and sub-regional institutions like the EAC and IGAD respond to them. For this reason, the governance of globalisation must be re–thought. In this regard, it is important to find a common ground, a unifying vision, because currently, globalisation must be re–thought—it is a divisive subject.

**Institutions and Organs of the EAC**

In order to manage its responsibilities, the EAC treaty creates a number of organs. These are contained in article nine of the treaty. There are seven substantive organs. These include the Summit, the Council, the Coordination Committee, the Sectional Committee and the East African Court of Justice. These four organs form the

---

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
fundamental arms of the EAC. The East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat are the other two organs.

A critical examination of each of the organs and its features reveals a number of fissures. For instance, under article 11(5), the Summit is authorized to delegate of its functions subject to any conditions which it may think fit to impose, to a member state, to the Council or to the Secretary General. This article can be interpreted to imply that any member of the Community can take responsibility for some action on getting authority from the Summit. From this article, it would be difficult for one of the member states to authoritatively deal with matters considered to be of sovereign importance to other members. Indeed, states are not comfortable with others that interfere with what they consider to be their internal affairs. Already discernible is the unwillingness of some of the Community members to welcome other states into their "internal affairs." Take, for example, Uganda which has always maintained that the problems of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) are its own "internal affairs." This makes it difficult for another member of the Community to get involved. The inability of partner states to get involved in attempts to resolve such a conflict implies that as long as the conflict in northern Uganda continues, the economic, social and political activities in the sub–region would be negatively affected. The interference would then make it difficult for the EAC to achieve its objectives as articulated in article 5. Indeed, security in the sub–region would be jeopardized.

What is missing in the institutions and organs of the treaty is a mechanism to achieve some of the objectives. One case where it would be difficult to achieve the objectives provided in Article 5 (f). Here the Community has a desire to promote peace, security, stability within, and good neighbourliness among the partner states. But again there is no framework that coordinates the security element. It would have been appropriate if an organ for security was established to ensure that matters of security are taken care of at the institutional and organizational levels.

Matters of defence are only mentioned in passing in Article 125. Here, pursuant to Article 5, the Community vows to cooperate in matters in respect to the promotion of peace, security and stability within and good neighbourliness among partner states. It further provides that this will be achieved in accordance with Article 124. It is the casual treatment of matters of defence that begs for clarification and thorough examination. For instance, a close scrutiny of Article 124 reveals that it basically emphasizes police matters. Article 124 (5) provides that partner states agree to enhance cooperation in the handling of cross–border crime, provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters including the arrest and repatriation of fugitive offenders, and the exchange of information on national mechanisms for combating criminal activities. There is no framework in the treaty stipulating how matters relating, for example, to one of the heads of state being overthrown in a military coup d'etat, or an invasion of any of the members by non–partner states or any mechanism to activate military personnel to deter any injury to security in the region.
The treaty that the majority of pillars that inform matters of cooperation are covered elaborately. The areas of focus for cooperation include immigration, political cooperation, legal and judicial cooperation and security matters. Economic activities form the bulk of the Community's areas of cooperation. Here again in no place are security matters discussed elaborately to implementable levels. The matter of security is only discussed when it is acknowledged that the maintenance of peace and security is essential for the promotion of trade, investment and any other development efforts. It is suggested that an inter-state defence and security committee be formed. It would be charged with addressing issues related to criminal activities, overall safety and security in the sub–region. Here again, the treaty falls short of giving specific instructions for the defence and security of the EAC.

Hence the vexing question still lingers whether the EAC can be viable in economic activities without a security organ. There is a need to raise this question because a majority of economic integration efforts in Africa have raised security concerns.

Need for a Security Organ

It is impossible to develop options for the EAC's defence and security organ which aptly reflects todays situation without taking into account the diplomacy and international relations of the Horn of Africa. The three states in the EAC are part of the Horn of Africa politics that is characterized by unstable, undemocratic and dictatorial regimes.

For instance, relations between Kenya and Uganda can at best be described as characterized by intermittent tensions. This type of relationship shows that as much as there is a wish to cooperate in economic matters, there are always possibilities of conflict. The conflicts may result from accusations made against each other. One of the contending issues is cross-border cattle rustling. Similarly, the relationship between Uganda and Sudan has never been rosy. The two neighbouring states have had no diplomatic ties for the last nine years. Even though there have been frantic attempts to have them renew their diplomatic relations, the skirmishes at their border have made that impossible. Uganda has kept on accusing Sudan of supporting the rebels in Northern Uganda. The rebels have been disrupting economic activities in that part of East Africa. In essence, the effects of civil wars in Uganda affect the economic activities in both Kenya and Tanzania just as in Uganda.

Among the EAC states, Kenya seems to be peaceful but it also has a share of its problems with its neighbours. The relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia has been at best lukewarm. Kenya has often accused Ethiopia of cross-border raids by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The Ethiopian government has always felt that Kenya supports

---

26 Ibid., p.4.
the OLF. In turn, such skirmishes end up interfering with the economic activities that could foster development within the EAC. The relationship between Kenya and Somalia has always been informed by the desire of Somalia to create a Greater Somalia. The irredentist nature of Somalia does not sit well with the Kenyan government. This in effect has always affected the Kenyan approach to security matters. The Kenyan government has to ensure that military and police personnel are at the Somalia border all the time. In essence, the effort and resources targeted towards such operations could be used for other economic purposes. The pre-occupation with matters of border security does not give Kenya the opportunity to concentrate on development activities. Somalia’s relationship with Kenya has also spawned a number of other issues. Since the state of ‘internal conflicts’ started in Somalia, there have been refugee movements into Kenya. Because of the homogeneity of the Somalia clans, the refugees have settled in Kenya to join their kith and kin. This poses serious problems for the EAC. The Community has to deal with matters of the infrastructure to cater for the refugees.

Tanzania too, has had a share of problems with its neighbours. Tanzania had been reluctant to ratify the EAC treaty but that notwithstanding, it has serious problems with some of its western neighbours. The conflicts in the Great Lakes region have seen the ‘influx’ of refugees into Tanzania. According to UNHCR, more than 400 people arrive at camps in Tanzania daily. These in turn overstretch the resources at the refugee camps in Kigoma, Kasulu, Kibondo and Ngara. In addition, Tanzania has major issues to sort out with former genocide propagators from Rwanda. Internally, Tanzania is faced with matters of secession by Zanzibar. The political crisis in Zanzibar and the refugees from the Great Lakes region are issues that occupy centre stage in the way Tanzania projects its security and foreign policies. From this preview of some of the relationships of the East African states and their neighbours, there is evidence that the relationships are interwoven. To understand the relationships, it is necessary to reflect on the complex matrix of intra-state and inter-state relations.

Global Security Issues

Apart from the clearly discernible differences in relationships between the partner states of the EAC and the Community and its neighbours, there are many other factors that in part affect the way the Community should project its foreign policy. There is a need to project on matters that relate to economic activities. These include non-military matters such as nationality, religious and social factors. The effects of these on cooperation are crucial in East Africa as elsewhere. This is because the East African states just like the rest of Africa are informed by adverse backgrounds, socially, culturally, economically, politically and ethnically. Thus a defence and security organ must project and safeguard both individual state interests, as part of the Community and those of the cooperation. The security organ must be able to respond to far reaching changes and must embrace the entire EAC.

32 "Zanzibar’s Political Crisis Precipitates Rights Abuse in Tranquil Tanzania." Ibid., pp.18-19.
Another factor that the EAC must accommodate within a security organ is globalisation. The EAC cannot work in isolation. The advent of globalisation has meant that states cannot control critical issues. It has provided a coalescence of varied transitional processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture and ideology of one state in a sub-region to penetrate another. These imply a number of things for the EAC. First are the uncontrollable transaction networks involving world factories, labour flows, lending facilities, communications, new knowledge and information technologies. These and the transfusion of cultural norms are making national, sub-regional and regional borders increasingly irrelevant. This in turn undermines state or sub-regional power. A framework is, therefore, necessary to ensure that factors of globalisation do not affect the EAC negatively.

The EAC also stands to be challenged by changes in Information Technology (IT) especially communications. The possibility of information being accessed by other organizations other than sovereign states makes it even more important to put up a framework to ensure security. Indeed, developments in IT especially in communication electronics pose far reaching transformation of political, economic and social goals and possible future conflicts such as information warfare. The advent of IT means that there is an opportunity for non-legitimized actors to air their opinions internationally. Thus through the selective use of electronic IT, individual political players in a variety of social roles, institutions or fields of activity have an influence on the EAC. The accessibility through IT means that even law enforcement may become difficult especially in establishing the source of some possible damage to the EAC. It is even harder to pinpoint the intentions, technical means and capabilities of unauthorized assessors to information. This makes a new idea like the EAC particularly vulnerable to threats. A successful security venture should be based on almost each of the EAC’s elements such as the Secretariat, Summit and Council ensuring that information is guarded against those who are not supposed to get it.

EAC Security Issues

Matters of security and the need for a security organ arise from the post Cold War definition of security. A future activity of the EAC to ensure that it provides security in this sub-region is paramount. It calls for an examination of the major factors that inform security. A visionary examination of each of the factors reveals a number of overlapping security issues. Taking the first factor, military security, the East African states presently have individual armies. The armies have different levels of training, professionalism and doctrine. The Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), for instance, is the successor to the National Resistance Army (NRA). This has largely been seen, in many Ugandan quarters, as President Y.K.Museveni’s private army despite the claim of being a national army. The composition of the UPDF is heavily leaned to Museveni’s own nationality, Banyankole and other related Bantu nationalities in central, southern and western Uganda with only a sprinkle of non-Bantu nationalities from northern and eastern parts of the country.
Congo conflict. Kenyan and Tanzanian armies are professional but use an outdated, remote, and rudimentary technology.

A second security issue to be addressed is related to economic development. The issue of economic development in East Africa is far from settled. The economies of Kenya and Tanzania are doing dismally. The Ugandan economy has shown signs growth. But in a society where there is pronounced interdependence, the poor performance of the Kenyan and Tanzanian economies has negative effects on the Ugandan economy.40

The need to have societal and environmental security cannot be overemphasized. The quality of life within the EAC as measured by longevity of life, nutrition and literacy is below average world standards. Environmental issues are just taking centre stage among the many problems that the EAC must plan to deal with. Featuring highest is the utilization of the Lake Victoria water resources. First, the fishing and management of Lake Victoria water resources have never been streamlined. Indeed, ignoring the problems now is a sure sign of possible future causes of conflict and insecurity in the EAC.

Second, and most disturbing is the need to equitably share the river Nile whose source can be traced to Lake Victoria. This is a security issue that the EAC must address jointly with the other stakeholders. Indeed, for ten years now, the ten countries, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda along the Nile Basin have been negotiating a treaty on how to share the river. The Nile basin holds three hundred million people, whose countries are also members of the EAC, IGAD and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).41

The negotiation of a new treaty follows the contestation over the 1929 and 1959 colonial treaties. The 1929 treaty was for the benefit of Egypt and Sudan, and against the Upper Nile riparian countries. The latter group appealed and another treaty was concluded in 1959.42 The 1959 treaty reviewed the quotas of water to be used. It was assumed that the upper riparian countries did not need the waters of the Nile, and the British colonial regime failed to predict that with population expansion, these countries would need more water in future.

When the East African countries became independent, these treaties were nullified. Nyerere’s Tanzania for one declared that all old treaties entered by the British on behalf of Tanzania were null and void, but he stated that Tanzania was ready to renegotiate. The sentiments were the same in Uganda and Kenya. Unfortunately the other two countries did not take Nyerere’s words as a legal statement.43 Despite this, the East African countries, under the umbrella of the EAC, should now focus on the way forward and tackle population pressure and environmental degradation as major security issues.

40 See, for instance, United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report (Oxford University Press [OUP], 1990)
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
The matters concerning the Nile basin have been in a legal limbo. Unfortunately, of all the major rivers in the world, only the riparians of the Nile are not adequately cooperating on the use of its waters. This is what gave rise to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). Currently the NBI is pursuing two tracks. The development track by the NBI and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework.\textsuperscript{44} There is need to design institutional arrangements acceptable to all the concerned countries for a permanent solution through these two approaches.

Because the Nile is not the only river shared internationally—there are the Mekong, Limpopo, Danube and Rhine amongst others—the NBI can learn something from them. The riparian countries are squabbling precisely because they want to share the Nile fairly. These countries need to develop a vision and also understand each other's interests.

When one travels on the Rhine, one hardly notices that it is shared. It is an open channel with no borders. Countries can easily make use of such a shared resource to move towards economic integration. The Rhine is playing an important and catalytic role in bringing European countries together. The Nile can do the same in bringing together the African countries using its waters, especially in terms of development. The EAC member states stand to gain a lot from the Nile, but only if they cooperate and unlock the potential in their part of the river. Cooperation should take place even beyond the river. This is where existing sub-regional institutions like the EAC, IGAD, COMESA and SADC come in. They could help make the Nile waters promote cooperation.

With such cooperation and the negotiations that have been going on, there should be no fear or worry that the Nile waters could bring conflict. Such fear and worry were intense ten years ago. Then, experts in the sub-region never talked about the Nile. Today, all the concerned countries are discussing it, not only talking about technical issues, but also joint projects. Moreover, today, the EAC countries also enjoy considerable support from the donors. Besides, there is a lot of positive talk in the Upper Nile countries about the colonial treaties.\textsuperscript{45}

The way out of the simmering conflict is to continue dialogue and build cooperation through understanding of the resources in the sub–region and coming up with guidelines. Indeed, during the NBI twelveth Nile Basin Council of Ministers Meeting held in Nairobi in March 2004, the riparian states compromised on the usage of the Nile waters. Egypt for one, made an about–turn on its earlier stand by stating that it had no problem with the other countries using the water.\textsuperscript{46} Generally, countries that had adopted hard-line positions were ready to compromise.

The cooperation over the Nile waters should form the basis for other joint ventures among the concerned countries.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, this is already happening through the basin–wide shared programme. There are also two subsidiary programmes being

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} The East African, March 22-28, 2004, 6.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. The East African, March 29-April 4, 2004.
implemented at sub–basin level. They are the Nile equatorial lakes subsidiary action programme and the eastern Nile subsidiary programme. These programmes are implementing joint investment projects. The Nile equatorial projects have already taken the whole Kagera basin, Mara basin, river Malaba–Sio–Malakisi, between Uganda and Kenya. Even before full implementation of some of these projects, the NBI countries are talking about scaling up investment projects so that the expectations of the people are quickly met. These people are some of the poorest in the world today.

Apart from these glaring multilateral problems, there are individual state's security issues that can equally affect relationships of the EAC and hence the calls for a security framework. The most glaring of these is the turbulence that occurs in the internal boundaries of each state. The issues that start as internal security matters easily get internationalized. For instance, in the cattle rustling in north western Kenya, the Pokots always raid their neighbours, the Turkanas and Marakwets. The Pokots in turn drive their loot of cattle across the border to Uganda where they either sell or exchange the cattle for arms. In this process, the Pokots can also encounter the Karamojong warriors from Uganda and skirmishes ensue. In essence what starts as a traditional Pokot cattle raid ends up being internationalized. Such errands bring fear and terror to the people living within the affected borders. Indeed, internationalization of internal security issues must be addressed in an enlarged, active and functioning security organ.

Given this texture there is over riding evidence of many instances of overlapping security matters. A most important responsibility that the EAC must take is to ensure that a framework exists to guarantee security to individuals of the Community. Security to individuals is especially important because it ensures freedom from danger (protection, defence) and freedom from fear and anxiety. A security organ must safeguard against an unpredictable environment. From the survey of the circumstances within the EAC, there is ample evidence that threats to security cannot be overlooked. There is a need to design an approach that would ensure that all economic and social agendas are carried out fully and unhindered. As a sub–regional organisation, the EAC cannot do without a security organ to ensure that the process of cooperation is fruitful, peaceful and rewarding. A security organ would ensure that the EAC is not insensitive to matters of insecurity. A step in the right direction was taken in Arusha, Tanzania, in March 2004, when the three East African presidents signed the Customs Union Protocol. This notwithstanding, the new EAC is a far cry from its predecessor of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, the focus was on the administration of common services. Now, trade occupies the centre stage. Then, the governments did everything. Now, they will gracefully, hopefully, take the back seat, leaving the people, especially the captains of industry, to drive the EAC.

East African countries are caught up in an endless contradiction. On the one hand, each country wants to assert its independence. To put it negatively, each country wants to

49 These can be termed as domestic sources of international conflict and the internationalization of internal conflict.
50 Ibid.
avoid being swallowed by the others. On the other hand, each of them realizes the inevitability of having to deal with the others. This contradiction forms the background to the recently signed sub-regional Customs Union (CU), which goes some way towards forming a security organ for the EAC. The contradiction actually determined the content of the CU protocol. When Tanzania and Uganda insist on levying duties on Kenyan goods for a while, it is a reflection of anxiety. When Kenya agrees to such a demand, it shows that the country realizes it can do better in the long run by making such a sacrifice now.51

According to Article 11 of the Protocol, goods traded between Uganda and Tanzania will be duty free. Similarly, goods from Uganda and Tanzania entering Kenya will be duty free. However, goods coming from Kenya into Uganda and Tanzania will be categorized into two groups (A and B). Kenyan goods in category A which are not controversial, will be eligible for immediate duty free treatment while category B goods will attract a gradual tariff reduction.52

The CU is expected to boost trade in the sub-region and increase competitiveness. The main thrust is the realization of a viable, integrated East African market that will stimulate production, investment and trade both intra-regional and international, thus accelerating the socio-economic transformation of the sub-region. Importers will find it more expensive to bring in their goods, and this will force the development of local trade among the partner states.53

The immediate beneficiary of the CU is expected to be agriculture. The sector is expected to grow very fast. The winners are envisaged to be peasant farmers whose products will now hopefully reach a larger market. However, the industrial sector will be forced to invest more and improve technology in order to produce better quality goods for the region and international markets and adopt more aggressive market strategies under the CU. The CU would also provide opportunities for joint ventures among Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanzanians for speedy integration and in order to intensify trade in the sub-region.54

But a word of caution is necessary. The CU would only boost trade marginally if under COMESA, Kenya gives a concession of up to 90 per cent on its goods while Tanzania, a former member of COMESA, gave 80 per cent concession to Kenyan goods. Thus, what should be done is to remove non-tariff barriers, which will have a better impact on the CU.55 The EAC needs to strive for the free movement of goods, since non-tariff barriers to trade still remain. Governments now need to adopt a more private-sector-friendly attitude and, together with the bigger corporations, give special attention to the problems of small and medium enterprises, which form the bulk of businesses in the sub-region.56 The asymmetry principle on which the customs treaty was based is supposed to help Uganda and Tanzania to "catch up" with Kenya in five years. And it is in this

51 Ibid
52 Ibid
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Ibid
expectation that there lies a danger. There could be a backlash if in five years the balance of trade is still heavily skewed in favour of Kenya. This is because while disparities in levels of industrial development are issues all common market regimes have had to deal with, East Africa might have been better off using compensation schemes, not "affirmative action" tariffs. They did not take this route probably because compensation schemes are expensive, and would be near impossible to administer in the sub–region. They should, therefore, have done the only sensible thing: have a fully fledged open market from the outset. Despite the problems that the CU is likely to face, it is a step towards creating a sub–regional working peace system. It is a mechanism which has the potential to respond well to security issues and globalisation. The unit forms an important pillar of the EAC secretariat; it will, in a significant way, supplement the work of IGAD in the greater Horn of Africa security system.

IGAD Security Issues

IGAD was formed to respond to the emerging challenges that the founder members experienced. There was a need for the Horn of Africa countries to combat desertification and drought which they faced. According to the realists, each state has its own interests which it seeks to achieve either by peace or force. When these interests are shared, the processes of interdependence and integration are realized. African boundaries were largely drawn as the result of the Berlin Conference of 1884/85. In the process, people and resources were also divided. On realization that development could not take place unless there was peace, IGAD was formed to embrace these new issues. IGAD has concerned itself with intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The role of its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is important. This is anchored within the member states units, called Conflict Early Warning and Response units (CEWERU'S). The broad aim of the CEWERU is to collect information from the grassroot in the member states that would help in detecting the causes of conflict early and preventing conflict from erupting. The implementation of this mechanism could be a step in the right direction, but there is doubt about whether member states have the political will to achieve it.

There has been conflict between Uganda and Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Internal conflicts include the state collapse in Somalia, civil war in Sudan and the LRA rebellion in northern Uganda. IGAD has been the mediator of most of these conflicts. Kenya has taken a predominant role in these mediations.

Currently, IGAD is negotiating an end to the longest civil war in Africa in the Sudan. No development can be achieved with the presence of such security concerns. IGAD is in a good position to help solve such security concerns but it has limitations. First, conflicts that occur are within its own territory. Sudan is part of IGAD yet Sudan's government has

58 Ibid., p.24
Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the Era of Globalisation

to negotiate with the SPLA under IGAD. In this case, it is not as neutral as an outside mediator can appear to be. Nevertheless IGAD has more knowledge of the conflict situation on the ground than an outside mediator. Second, IGAD has been dominated by Kenya and especially during ex-president Moi’s era. The danger here lies in the over dependence on the hegemonic power in the sub-region to mediate and sponsor the negotiations. The personal ability of IGAD presidents and officials matters. Lastly, is the issue whether IGAD has the required resources, both human and physical, to achieve peace. It depends on foreigners to sponsor such peace negotiations, thereby giving other parties the chance to influence them.

There are many conflicts in the region but IGAD seems to be unable to settle them. Hence, new approaches and resources should be acquired to revamp the IGAD secretariat and other key players in IGAD negotiations. Security issues that concern IGAD include environmental conditions, sustainable agriculture, poverty alleviation and globalisation. There continues to be environmental degradation through the destruction of natural resources and ecosystems. In Uganda about 90 per cent of land has been degraded. The need to preserve the environment through the use of renewable resources is a serious concern. Soil erosion control and aforestation are important in drought and desertification management. IGAD should take the leading role to provide sufficient information to member countries to be implemented to save the Horn of Africa’s degradation. Funds can be solicited from donors through IGAD for the implementation of viable projects. Research should also be undertaken also to provide relevant information to help curb desertification. Water sources should be discussed in order to maximize underground water through digging wells and building dams. A comprehensive plan should be made to avail the residents with water for farming and domestic use. IGAD should encourage sustainable agriculture to provide employment and food supplies to the members. This is a sub-region that lacks technology yet it is rich in agricultural products that can sustain its people. IGAD should liaise with other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to provide guidelines for the way forward. The co-ordination of agricultural activities can be achieved through such organizations.

Another area of interest to the members is physical infrastructure. Roads within the sub-region and other forms of transport like railway and air transport should be encouraged. These are the necessary prerequisites for any region to develop. The transportation of goods and services should be improved to ease trade. Communications (post, broadcasting, telecommunication and computer information networks) can stimulate other activities under IGAD. Energy provision aimed at tapping geothermal, hydro-electric, solar and wind should be stressed to lower power costs and offer alternatives to firewood fuel. Sanitation and irrigation infrastructure should be coordinated to provide food and safe sewage disposal. Infrastructure is one of the keys to reduce poverty as it encourages trade.

62 Ibid.
Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the Era of Globalisation

To be forward looking, IGAD members should start thinking about how to improve their human resources through training. The idea should be to reduce all possible barriers in all spheres of life. The exchange of students can encourage social cohesion among member countries and establish mutual understanding which is important for development to occur.

The EAC and IGAD under NEPAD

Having examined some of the key security issues in EAC and IGAD, this section links them to the NEPAD and the globalisation process as a whole. NEPAD offers an ideal forum for the discussion of African security issues. Africa faces serious challenges in its course of development. In the era of globalisation, states are losing value to the advantage of multinational companies which cut across borders. The main aim is the search for goods and services to satisfy the human needs of the industrial north at the expense of the underdeveloped south. This is happening following the triumph of capitalism over socialism at the end of the Cold War hence turning the world into one global village under the aegis of one super power, the United States of America. NEPAD represents a political and economic body. The EAC countries felt isolated and the Senegalese President Wade had to visit Uganda to try to incorporate the EAC members during his tenure as AU Chairman.

It was argued that only the strong powers in Africa had been selected for the pioneer work of NEPAD. Within Africa itself, NEPAD faces threats because not all are treated equally. Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal are some of the key players. The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) had already seen the need to bring together different members and regional organizations. IOC brought together SADC, COMESA, EAC and IGAD under a memorandum of agreement. In this view, NEPAD should take the initiative to bring together regional organizations in Africa with the aim of unifying their policies into a common African outlook.

NEPAD also faces the problem of different ideologies. The north African countries are linked to the Arab League with Islamic orientations. Some African countries fight within themselves and with others. Border conflicts also prevail including the involvement of South Africa and Nigeria in such conflicts. During the Cold War, African countries belonged to either the western or eastern blocs. Its effects are still felt today as it takes time to recover. A common ideology is required if Africa is to remain united. If Africa does not have anything to stand for, then it will be prey to any foreign ideologies. Some members take the view that NEPAD can fail. The EAC and IGAD should maintain their regional ties so as to survive should NEPAD collapse. Regional blocs are the building blocks of NEPAD and their success will be its success. The broader role of NEPAD should be to unite these groups and eventually form one trading block. The Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa are optimistic that NEPAD will survive. NEPAD has helped African countries in the discussions with the G–8 members and other international organizations. In so doing, it links Africa to the entire world. This has both negative and
positive impacts on the continent. Some of the positive impacts are that the negotiations on various issues can be brought up with some authority and NEPAD can easily formulate policies and seek for funding. Conversely, the forces of globalisation can destroy Africa’s infant industries thereby retarding the continent.

NEPAD can also integrate environmental and economic issues addressing poverty and other problems. Land degradation desertification, combating biodiversity and global warming are all issues of concern to NEPAD. The coordination of a development course can be achieved through this body. For instance, trade can be encouraged between ECOWAS and SADC, thereby increasing the market scope. The ultimate end that NEPAD should look forward to is an African free trade zone. NEPAD aims at a growth of 7 per cent in fifteen years. If this can be achieved, Africa will have started to move. The idea of NEPAD then is to bring the whole world and link it up to Africa for development purposes. NEPAD then is to formulate common policies for solution to Africa’s problems by providing a conducive environment for members to discuss the course of their action. It is however feared that AU members are giving NEPAD more weight than AU. In this sense, the AU is seen as a body that will in the near future lack relevance as NEPAD has taken the centre stage. It is argued that in the same way NATO has taken preeminence in the European Union, so will NEPAD do to the AU. Members are interested in a working or functional body. In this case, the competition between the two should be used to sharpen both rather than derail each another.

The major challenge Africa is facing today is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The role of NEPAD is to have a continental approach on how to reduce HIV/AIDS effects in Africa. EAC and IGAD should also have policies in relation to human development. The role of NEPAD should be to negotiate for lower prices since the majority of Africans live below the poverty line. The activities of EAC and IGAD can help to improve human resources in Africa by reaching at a stage of food security and hygiene. The importance of empowering women in social and economic development should also go hand in hand with other forms of development. Women should be empowered through education and training, developing revenue-generating activities through facilitating access to credit, and by ensuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries. This should be done in collaboration with other civil society organizations. The role of the EAC and IGAD in this case is to provide the proper foundation for the adoption of gender policies.

**Conclusion**

Both EAC and IGAD have tried to improve the quality of life of their members. Security concerns include all sectors of development which the two sub-regional institutions try to address. They could have achieved much more had they had clearer objectives right
Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the Era of Globalisation

from the start. Nevertheless, these institutions need to be rethought with the view to making them more effective in responding to security issues.

The two sub-regional institutions were a response to the problems their people faced, and what is required is a commitment to the course of action they have taken. NEPAD should link them with other sub-regional bodies such as SADC, ECOWAS and COMESA to have a harmonious vision for Africa. Similarly, NEPAD should be used as a forum for uniting Africans and their initiatives. EAC and IGAD should work within the confines of the globalised and globalising world by taking full advantage of the merits of globalisation and discarding its demerits.
NEPAD and Security in the IGAD Region

Peter Wanyande

Introduction

This chapter provides insights into some of the security issues that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has to grapple with as it attempts to make its impact felt. In particular, the chapter discusses the major security concerns in the IGAD region and their implications for the viability of NEPAD. This discourse is necessary especially in view of Africa’s disappointing experiences with previous development initiatives. In this regard the chapter proceeds from the premise that there is a close connection between the prevailing security situation in the IGAD region and the viability of NEPAD as a strategy for enhancing Africa's ability to realize self-reliant and sustainable development.

Secondly it is argued that NEPAD must contend with the socio-political and economic reality in the continent as a whole. Africa has relied heavily on foreign assistance for its previous development, a situation that has led to what is now known as donor fatigue. NEPAD must take this into account especially in view of the central role that external development partners are envisaged to play in NEPAD. The continent is also known more for its internal conflicts and poverty than anything else. The operationalization of NEPAD must also be attentive to the global realities, such as globalization and the collapse of communism. The collapse of communism led to an unchecked hegemony of the west. Both of these developments pose new opportunities and challenges for Africa. While NEPAD should focus on the opportunities offered by these recent global developments and should be supported, it must not ignore the challenges that might act as constraints to its success. Finally the chapter posits that security in the IGAD region is a function of the nature of governance, hence the need first to deal with governance issues in the region.

Governance and Security

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as the exercise of political, economic, administrative and legal authority in the management of a country's public affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. Governance is thus inclusive in the sense that all individuals should have the right, and be accorded an opportunity, to participate in the management of those affairs that affect them. For

purposes of this discussion, governance is used to refer to the management of a country's political, economic, legal and administrative affairs.

Broadly speaking, a country can manage its public affairs either democratically or undemocratically. When a country adopts a democratic mode of managing its public affairs, that is referred to as good governance. On the other hand, undemocratic management of public affairs is what many people usually equate with bad or poor governance. The IGAD region has on the whole been characterized more by undemocratic than democratic modes of governance. This is a mode of governance characterized by excessive state intervention in the economy, and the restriction of political and even economic space for non-state actors, including individuals, civil society and the private sector. It is further characterized by corruption, rigged elections leading to the installation of illegitimate and unpopular leaders and governments, personalization of power leading to institutional decay and what one scholar referred to as political decay. Undemocratic governance is also characterized by the suppression and violation of human and individual rights and civil liberties and lack of respect for the rule of law. The emphasis on the role of government in Africa led to the unfortunate development where governance became synonymous with government. This undemocratic nature of governance was also largely responsible for the economic decline and underdevelopment of Africa. This conclusion has generally been accepted in scholarly and development circles and it has led to the exclusion of non-state actors including civil society and the private sector.

The negative impact of this mode of governance was felt both at the individual and national levels. Many people were unable to secure employment and turned to violent crimes in order to survive. Investors, both foreign and local, were discouraged by the risks associated with official corruption and the insecurity generated by criminals. This further aggravated the crisis as lack of investment led to a decline in productivity and economic growth, thus further deepening unemployment. Food production also declined as the state did very little to encourage farmers to produce more. As this happened the individual felt—and became—more and more insecure.

The term ‘security’ is used here broadly to go beyond traditional considerations of a state's military resources, which enhances a state's ability to defend its interests against both external and internal enemies. This state centered approach to security that is popular with realist scholars of International Relations views security mainly in terms of state security involving mainly relations between states. It is, however, now generally accepted that this is a very narrow view of security since it ignores individual security or individual insecurity against all manner of threats and deprivations. While state security is important, it is also argued that state security is difficult to maintain in a situation where an individual or groups of individuals feel deprived of basic needs. In other words without individual security state security becomes precarious, hence the need to include individual security in any discourse on state security. This is especially so in situations

---

where individuals believe or know that undemocratic or poor governance is responsible for their insecurity. In this connection Ibeanu's observations about security are instructive. According to him,

“Security has two related meanings. First, it has a strictly political meaning that refers to the capacity of a ruling group to protect its interest/ values (internally and externally located) from external threats, and to maintain order internally with minimal use of violence... Second, security has to do with relations in the labour process... In this sense, it designates two organically connected relations. The first is a general relation between members of society and the natural environment in which they live. Security here refers to the carrying capacity of the natural environment to sustain the physical needs of man. By this we mean the sustainable exploitation of nature; that is, striking a balance between the exploitation of nature for human kinds immediate physical needs on the one hand and its protection for their future needs on the other. This is what is known widely as sustainable development.

The second relation of production in the labour process to which security pertains is the relation among members of society. Here, security means the capacity of groups (and individuals as their agents) to provide their physical and psychosocial needs and livelihoods. This means a progressive elimination of objective conditions that limit this capacity as well as reduction of fears and anxieties about their abilities to meet these needs. In this sense security has to do with protection from poverty, exploitation, disease injustice and the like... The foregoing points also mean that all groups desire security." 

State security as traditionally conceived has not helped many of the states in the IGAD region very much. The failure by the state security forces and especially the armies of Uganda, former Zaire, and Rwanda and to a large extent Sudan to ensure the security of the state in the wake of peoples’ movements attests to this. Peoples revolutionary movements have overthrown many armies of the counties of the IGAD region. This happened, for example, when Yoweri Museveni organized a rebellion against the government of Uganda. It also happened when Paul Kagame led a rebellion against the government of Rwanda. One major lesson to be drawn from this experience, which many African counties have gone through is that in situations in which citizens are unhappy about the way they are being governed, they are likely to aid forces bent on weakening state security conceived narrowly as the military might of the state. Thus in its broader sense, security must include in addition to state security, individual security from want, poverty, disease, ignorance, enjoyment of human rights and freedom. In short security must also address social, economic, legal and political concerns, and the rights and living conditions of the individual.

In the same vein, it can be argued that security at the regional level depends a lot on security at the national level. This is particularly important in the IGAD region where for many decades many governments have, because of their repressive approaches to governance, caused considerable insecurity to the individual citizens and eventually to the country as a whole. Insecurity at the national level has also caused insecurity at the

---

NEPAD and Security in the IGAD Region

 regional level when the problems of insecurity at the national level spill over to the neighboring countries. This happens, for example, when large numbers of people flee their conflict torn countries to a neighboring country and are pursued by their government. This creates tension between the host country and the country from which the people are fleeing. This is a very common feature of the relations between a number of countries of the IGAD region. The challenge then is to ensure that state security is reinforced by individual security in its varied dimensions.

In order to better understand the security concerns and other issues about NEPAD raised in this chapter, it is important to situate NEPAD in its proper historical context. This is done by examining some of the development initiatives that preceded NEPAD. This is based on the conviction that NEPAD is the latest in a series of development initiatives that Africa has experimented with since independence in the 1960s.

NEPAD and Development

NEPAD was initially conceived as a development strategy aimed at helping Africa to address the problems of poverty and underdevelopment, thereby placing the continent on the path to self reliant and sustainable growth and development. In this way, it was hoped that Africa would enjoy a respectable position in the globalizing world. It is part of Africa’s effort to reclaim the 21st century. NEPAD emphasizes partnerships between governments of Africa on the one hand, and between governments and non-state actors at the national, regional and global levels.

As a development strategy NEPAD has generated considerable interest among leaders both in Africa and elsewhere. This is partly because NEPAD has some very interesting and innovative ideas that were not part of previous development experiments. These ideas include the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the requirement that a group of carefully selected eminent persons from Africa would audit the progress made by participating countries on matters of governance. However, since it is not the first development strategy that Africa has experienced since independence, it should best be understood in the context of the many previous development initiatives that Africa has undertaken. This may help to shed light on some of the potential problems that may hamper the viability and success of NEPAD.

At independence in the 1960s, African countries ranked among the least developed, the least industrialized, and the least secure places in which to be born. People were insecure because of rampant poverty, disease and ignorance, which made it difficult for people to meet their basic daily needs. Mkandawire’s observations are re-echoed by Nyong’o who, writing about NEPAD in 2002, notes that “forty years after independence, Africa is back to square one: poor and still looking for unity to salvage the continent from poverty”.


While African leaders of the 1960s had correctly viewed personal or individual insecurity as dangerous to the security of the state, it was unfortunately not given the priority and prominence that it deserved. Instead of dealing with the issue of state security by improving the welfare of the people, leaders emphasised on the capacity of the state's coercive apparatus to be used to suppress dissent and discontent among the socially and economically insecure citizens. This partly explains the prominence given to military build-ups in Africa at the expense of socio-economic development. Security became synonymous with regime security.

The first major efforts to develop the continent were informed by the modernization theory. This theory, which was developed in the west in the late 1950s, identified a number of ingredients required for development, which its proponents argued were lacking in Africa. The major ingredients that were lacking were identified as capital, human resources, modern technology and modern values. Consequently, the development of Africa was pegged on the infusion of these ingredients from foreign countries. These were imported to the continent in large doses. Despite the massive assistance given to the continent by its traditional development partners, the continent continues to be the least developed in the world. In addition, there does not seem to be any hope that the situation is being reversed. Instead the result has been deepening poverty, and underdevelopment; and Africa's dependence on foreign development assistance continues to characterize the continent.

Against this backdrop, some countries, notably Tanzania under Nyerere, rejected this approach to development and decided to adopt African socialism as a development strategy. This was a strategy based on the application of what were believed to be key philosophical ideas and elements of traditional African societies. Key among these was the idea of social and economic equality among the people. The other value was that of mutual social responsibility among members of the community. This required that every member of society or community assist the others when the need arose. The proponents of African socialism had as their major objective self reliant and sustainable development in which dependency on the west would be discouraged as much as possible.

Unfortunately, this strategy, influenced by the dependency theory, also did not achieve its intended objectives. By the 1980s the strategy had been severely criticized and discredited leading to its abandonment. The criticism was mainly from the donor community and the west, which among other things saw it as being aimed at embracing communal ideology and hence endearing Africa to the communist block. This was unacceptable to the west, which was at war with the east. The west wanted capitalism to prevail over communism. The collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s gave the west an opportunity to impose its liberal development ideology, and consequently its hegemony, over Africa and the rest of the world. This victory culminated in the imposition of neo-liberal economic policies in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This was followed by demands that Africa should adopt liberal democracy as a
political programme. The economic conditionalities that accompanied these demands saw the death of African socialism or indeed any homegrown development strategies and solutions to the African development crisis. The result was that even those countries that had hitherto attempted to avoid external dependence were once again forced to depend on the west for their development.

The other efforts at self-reliant and sustainable development in Africa were the establishment of new and in some cases strengthening of existing regional economic blocks. They included the Southern African Development Coordination (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The establishment of these sub-regional groupings was in line with the provisions in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980. It was also a product of a compromise by the pre-independent African nationalists following their failure to agree on a continent–wide union as demanded by leaders such as Nkrumah of Ghana and Nyerere of Tanzania prior to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Like African socialism, the objective of these regional economic blocks was to enhance the economic development of member states and to eventually realize self-reliant development and thereby avoid dependence on the developed world.

The reality today is that economic integration not only remains an unfinished agenda but has, on the whole, failed to realize the objective of propelling Africa generally, and the member states of the various sub–groupings in particular, to economic and political self reliant development. Other development initiatives by Africans included Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986–1990 (APER) which later became the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN–PAAERD) 1986, the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio–Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF–SAP) 1989, the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) and The United Nations Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN–NADF). Each of these development initiatives was received with mixed reactions. Each had supporters, while others dismissed the initiatives as inappropriate solutions to the continent’s problems. Reaction to NEPAD has not been different. What may be different are the reasons given either for supporting or dismissing the initiative.

This discussion is relevant to its relationship to security in the IGAD region. First this background shows that NEPAD is just but one of the many initiatives that Africa has experimented with since independence in its efforts to bring about sustainable and self–reliant development. Hence, Africa has not lacked ideas on how to bring about self–reliant development. Secondly like its predecessor initiatives, NEPAD seeks substantial assistance from external partners, an aspect that suggests that this particular initiative is not very different from its predecessors, the fact that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is considered to be new and innovative notwithstanding. This is

---

7 Sengor: 1990:18
8 Nyongo: 1990
important because like its predecessors, this external assistance is critical for its success. It would therefore be interesting to find out how this will affect the viability of NEPAD. The third reason why this background discussion is important is precisely that NEPAD is simply an experiment without any guarantees of success. It may very well suffer the same fate as its predecessors. It is against this background that one can begin meaningfully to interrogate the chances of NEPAD’s success or failure. In other words, the viability and security of NEPAD is dependent on several conditions being in place. Some of these conditions are historical and were responsible for the failure of previous experiments. It is thus useful to examine the extent to which these conditions have been eliminated, and whether there are new conditions that may have an impact on NEPAD. A number of the conditions are new and hence pose different challenges to NEPAD.

In the 1980s when Africa was threatened by major socio-economic crises, the World Bank and its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that the failure of Africa to develop despite assistance from the west was largely due to poor or undemocratic governance. The implication of this was that good or democratic governance is a precondition for development. Consequently NEPAD, will require an environment characterized by good or democratic governance. The challenge to the architects of NEPAD is how to make it create that environment, or, alternatively, how, with or without NEPAD, an environment could be created that may facilitate its operationalisation. The problematique is thus whether NEPAD as presently conceived and operationalized can create such an environment.

Security Concerns in the IGAD Region

The failure or success of NEPAD will depend on several factors. First, the success of any development strategy requires a democratic environment. While major changes have recently occurred in Africa aimed at democratizing the development space, democratic governance is far from being institutionalized. Indeed there are many disappointments in the form of reversals of gains already made in the endeavour to institute democratic governance in the continent. There are also cases where governments and leaders have simply resisted democratic governance. There are also countries in which some leaders have deliberately engaged in superficial or cosmetic democratic changes. Such countries, for example, conduct flawed elections and use that as a basis to claim recognition as democracies. The legitimacy of such governments continues to be suspect. Under such circumstances they can hardly expect to enjoy the support and confidence of the citizens. They are hence bound to be insecure.

The IGAD region is a region in which democracy continues to elude many of its countries. Although an extreme case, Somalia is a good illustration. Somalia is currently in chaos having been fragmented into several ungovernable units. Sudan is also another example of a non-democratic state in the region. The civil war in Sudan that has gone on for the last fifty years or so has not only undermined the possibility of democratic governance and therefore internal security, but it has also generated considerable
security concerns in the region. It has certainly caused tension with Uganda with which there have been mutual accusations of undermining each others security and stability. Uganda has also resisted the conduct of democratic elections under the multiparty system of government. While elections are not a sufficient condition for democratic governance, there is consensus among scholars that democratic elections are a necessary step towards democracy. A country that does not conduct democratic elections cannot be said to be democratic. But the internal conflict in the northern part of Uganda in which the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has engaged the Museveni government for decades remains a major source of insecurity in the country and region. Equally important, that war has made it very difficult for meaningful social and economic development activities to take place in the region. The people are thus subjected to poverty, fear and insecurity. The government itself has to use enormous public resources to sustain the war at the expense of development for the people. Wars, far from being productive, are disruptive and destructive. Civil wars are thus a major security issue in the IGAD region that could adversely affect the efforts by NEPAD to bring about good governance and development in the region and Africa as a whole.

There are also some countries, which even after having conducted democratic elections continue to view politics as a zero–sum game. Kenya, for example, disappointed many when after removing the authoritarian regime of president Moi in the 2002 elections, the leaders slipped back to the undemocratic politics associated with the former regime. Attempts to dismantle the coalition through which the regime came to power and to replace it with a single all–powerful political party attests to this. The recent attempts by some politicians to dissolve the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) affiliate parties in order to make NARC a political party with individuals as opposed to corporate membership illustrates this point. Equally disappointing in this regard is the determination by some leaders in this regime to either scuttle the constitutional review process or to retain some of the undemocratic features of the current constitution, such as an all–powerful presidency. Such approaches to governance can only lead to ethnic polarization, tension and conflict. State energies will consequently be directed at dealing with these at the expense of development. This may generate insecurity for the individual, and also discourages investors. It can be demonstrated that the IGAD region has a big democracy deficit. What is important is that the failure by many countries in the region to democratize has generated conditions of insecurity that have implications for the successful implementation of any development strategy, including NEPAD.

The other security concern in the IGAD region involves the large number of refugees. The IGAD region has the largest number of refugees in the continent. This is in addition to the internally displaced persons who live refugee-like lives in their own countries. This large number of internally displaced persons and refugees arises mainly from the numerous political conflicts in the countries of the region. These conflicts in turn arise from the undemocratic governance in many of these countries. Many are also victims of economic marginalization, which forces them into abject and unbearable poverty. The
endless conflicts in the IGAD region make it extremely difficult for the citizens of these countries to undertake meaningful development activities. Governments in the region also spend most of their resources to deal with non-productive activities. At the same time conflict in one country in the region very quickly becomes a regional conflict. Many of these conflicts also take too long to resolve. Under such circumstances, even the idea of building the capacities of the governments to improve governance and undertake meaningful socio-economic development becomes difficult.

The presence of refugees is both a cause and a manifestation of insecurity in the countries of origin. Refugees live in deplorable conditions in host countries. They rarely have access to basic needs, and if they do, they are of very low standards. In other words they live very insecure lives. But in the context of IGAD countries, the influx of refugees in the host countries has often been associated with, or at least been blamed on, the rising crime in the region. Refugees and insecurity in the region have also been blamed for the escalation of small arms in the region. These arms are used in violent crime thereby heightening insecurity. All these make it very difficult for governments in the region to maintain peace and to focus on development. In the context of NEPAD, it means that those countries will find it hard to operationalize NEPAD.

Apart from the insecurity brought about by refugees, insecurity in countries of the IGAD region has also to do with the unequal development in the individual countries and in the region as a whole. This differential development that in some countries has taken on ethno-regional dimensions is a major source of tension and conflict and therefore a potential source of insecurity.

The same is true at the regional level where huge differences in levels of socio-economic and to some extent, political development have been a source of tension. The cautious approach by Uganda and Tanzania to the signing of the East African Customs Union protocol is a good example of this. The two countries thought that Kenya would benefit more from the agreement. The significance of this is that it will be difficult to get all countries to agree to be judged by similar standards or criteria as provided for in NEPAD's APRM. Some countries in the region may require more time to meet these standards. In the meantime, they may not benefit from NEPAD while the rest are benefiting. This may be another source of tension in the region and may adversely affect the success of NEPAD.

The emergence of terrorism is yet another potential source of insecurity in the IGAD region, and hence a threat to the viability and success of NEPAD. The 1998 terrorist bombing of the USA embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam led the USA and the international community to consider the entire region to be unsafe. Somalia, Sudan and even Kenya have been categorized by the USA as terrorist prone countries. The USA has followed this by issuing travel advisories against Kenya. This is hurting not just tourism, which is a major foreign exchange earner for the country but more importantly it is
discouraging foreign investors who are considered even by NEPAD to be a major component of the partnership between the developed countries and Africa. The region has therefore to address the issue of terrorism, as a threat to regional development, which is a major component of security. This is not an easy task, since it requires enormous resources which none of the IGAD countries can afford.

Several counties in the IGAD region also experience dangerous levels of cattle rustling and banditry. The northern part of Kenya and especially Isiolo, Garisa, Wajir, Mandera and Marsabit, for example, are banditry prone areas. The menace also occurs in Uganda and between districts in Kenya and Uganda. They are a drain on human and other resources that would otherwise be used for development. These activities are a major source of insecurity in the region and must be addressed at the regional level.

In some countries in the region personal insecurity has taken the form of car jacking and robbery with violence. In Kenya this has assumed alarming proportions. It has become a daily occurrence. As a result, citizens are forced to invest heavily in personal security by hiring guards to watch their houses at night and erecting very expensive burglar proof metals on their residential and business premises. This kind of violence and insecurity has not only discouraged investors, but has also meant that individuals have to divert a substantial part of their meager resources from savings to their personal security.

**Challenges to NEPAD**

In view of the fact the NEPAD is a partnership between African governments and domestic non–state actors on the one hand and between African governments and their external development partners on the other, a major challenge is to sustain the interest of all actors and especially that of external partners in supporting the initiative. This is the case precisely because the assistance of external partners is critical for NEPAD. In any case, this is assistance over which the African countries have no control. Regarding the development partners, this interest may be affected by a number of considerations. To start with external partners are likely to lose interest if the recipient governments or countries do not properly use the support they get. This may be due to corruption and mismanagement of such support especially if it is in the form of funds. The whole concept of donor fatigue which had set in by the 1980s happened precisely because of this. Donor fatigue could also affect assistance to NEPAD. The challenge is therefore for African governments to ensure that donor support is well used. This requires among other things, strong political will and commitment to the objectives and conditions for external assistance and by extension, to the objectives and rules of NEPAD. It is doubtful that African countries will set these conditions because after all one does not set conditions for the benefactor. It would also be presumptuous to assume that the African countries and leaders will have the required political will and commitment to the ideals and objectives of NEPAD. This is because experience has shown that weak political will is one of the major problems affecting governance in the continent. These observations are made against the backdrop that neither the external partners nor the African member
states of NEPAD are under any legal obligation to respect their part of the agreement. Their contribution is based on good will, which they are at liberty to exercise or withhold. The problem of sustaining the interest of IGAD countries in NEPAD on the other hand, may be affected by changes in leadership. The experience in Africa has been that major initiatives associated with particular leaders tend to be abandoned or simply given lukewarm support by the successors of such leaders. In some cases such initiatives are simply discredited. This is especially the case when their successor, is not in the same political camp as the predecessor. Leaders seem to want to initiate projects with which they can be identified. The tendency by the current NARC government in Kenya to render the Eldoret airport non-operational or to phase out Moi’s portrait on the currency, and its replacement with Kenyatta’s portrait are good examples. The Eldoret project was the brainchild of former president Moi and appears to be a target of the current regime precisely because of that.

The other major consideration that NEPAD countries have to contend with is the fact that NEPAD is being implemented at a time when in geo-political and ideological terms, Africa is less valuable to the west than was the case before the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it, the communist ideology. This means that the west, which is Africa’s major development partner in NEPAD, may easily pull out of the project at the slightest excuse. Africa may therefore have to tread very carefully as it seeks continued western support for NEPAD.

More importantly a number of IGAD governments have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to honour their own agreements. The Sudan, for example, has broken several peace accords with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). They are certainly not very enthusiastic about putting in place democratic governance characterized by transparency, accountability and the rule of law. The experience in many countries undertaking democratization also attests to this. Some of these countries have surprised their citizens and the world at large by reneging on the promises they made prior to the democratic elections. In some cases, African countries have even reversed some of the democratic gains made by their predecessors. Chiluba of Zambia is a case in point. He tried to undo a law that barred a president from serving more than two terms. He even introduced a very barbaric law that barred Kaunda from contesting the presidential elections on the flimsy grounds that Kaunda was a foreigner in Zambia. He claimed but did not prove that Kaunda was born in Malawi.

In many instances, African leaders will promise to act mainly in response to pressure from development partners or when they think it is politically prudent to do so at that particular time. The way Kenya handled the implementation of SAPs is a case in point. President Moi implemented these programmes in a very disjointed and haphazard manner. Frequently, he also reversed several decisions made with regard to these programmes. The point is that he was simply playing games with donors. When he required their assistance he gave the impression that he was seriously implementing
NEDAD and Security in the IGAD Region

SAPs, only to go slow as soon as the assistance was received. The point is that some IGAD members may play similar games when implementing NEPAD.

The second major potential challenge to the success of NEPAD are the numerous conflicts in IGAD region and their impact on poverty, which NEPAD hopes to eradicate. There is no doubt that sustainable development such as the one NEPAD hopes to promote in Africa would require a conducive environment. More importantly it would require that conflicts be reduced so that attention and priority can be given to actual development.

Unfortunately conflict, which has been a dominant feature of the African political landscape, has not shown any signs of abating the peace efforts in the Sudan and Somalia notwithstanding. Many of these conflicts arise out of “rigged” development. This is a development approach that has been partisan in pandering to dominant interests and classes leading to a distorted development process that resulted in massive inequalities in society in ethno-regional and even gender terms. These kinds of problems must be addressed if NEPAD is to make the intended impact. However NEPAD cannot make the intended impact in isolation. A number of governance issues will have to be addressed concurrently as Africa and IGAD countries implement NEPAD. How to get these leaders to improve on their governance with or without NEPAD is perhaps the biggest challenge to the viability of NEPAD as a tool for development.

The other serious consideration is the relationship between NEPAD and other ongoing reforms and development initiatives in the IGAD region in particular, and Africa in general. NEPAD did not find a development void in Africa or in the IGAD region. As indicted earlier, there were already a number of development experiments going on in Africa. Some of these are new while other have been going on since the 1980s. The SAPs, for example, have been in place since the 1980s. While some countries in the IGAD region have embraced these programmes, others, have been indifferent to them. Attempts at regional integration have also been on and off since the 1960s. The peace process in Somalia and Sudan and between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also been going on. It is important to consider and spell out the way NEPAD will relate to the ongoing initiatives in the region. While the easy way is to perceive the relationship as complementary, it is also possible that the new initiative may create some confusion. Some countries may also decide to adopt the easier option in by sidelining NEPAD.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of NEPAD is the Peer Review Mechanism. This mechanism requires that a committee of experts drawn from participating countries conduct a technical assessment and evaluation of the policies that African governments design with a view to ensuring that the policies of the country conform to the principles and values of democratic governance in its political, economic and corporate dimensions. Non-performers will then be subjected to censure and criticism by this review mechanism. While this mechanism may be described as most innovative, it has
several potential problems. First, there is an assumption that those countries found to be under-performers according to the NEPAD criteria will be humble enough to respect the decisions and recommendations of the Peer Review team. This may prove to be a fallacy in view of the way African leaders react to sanctions. The case of Zimbabwe is a good example. It has on many occasions defied sanctions by the Commonwealth and is even ready to quit the club even if that means suffering the consequences. Many times African leaders and countries do this simply out of national pride. Were many countries to adopt this approach and attitude, the initiative will lose local support, a development that may even discourage external partners.

Secondly, there is no guarantee that the participating countries will contribute the required resources to facilitate the functioning of the Peer Review Secretariat. The possibility that some states may default or simply delay making their contributions cannot be ignored. This may disrupt the operations of the Secretariat or indeed discourage other members from making their contribution. This was a major problem in the OAU, where member states failed to contribute to its operations. There is no reason to believe that things will be different with respect to NEPAD.

The fact that participating in the peer review mechanism is optional is yet another source of concern to the success of NEPAD. Paragraph 30 of the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism states that member states of the African Union wishing to accede to the African Peer Review Mechanism shall sign the MoU and deposit the signed document at the NEPAD Secretariat. Paragraph 32 on the other hand says that a participating state may terminate its participation in the African Peer Review Mechanism by giving written notice to this effect to the NEPAD Secretariat which in turn will inform the participating states in writing. The effective date of termination will be six months after the receipt of the termination notice. It is clear from these provisions that participation in APRM is optional. While this in line with a country's sovereign right to choose whether or not to participate, it creates some major problems. First is that given the centrality of APRM to NEPAD as a whole, making participation in the APRM optional essentially means that participation in NEPAD itself is optional. Secondly, NEPAD and APRM will cease to operate the moment they lack the required five participating countries. While it might be argued that this is a very remote possibility, the fact is that in Kenya, business is often stopped on account of lack of quorum, which requires only 30 MPs out of 222. This happens even though MPs do not have to contribute to participate in parliamentary debates once they have been elected. Countries participating in APRM must on the other hand contribute to the mechanism. The possibility of defaulting is therefore high and so is the possibility that the required number may not be reached.

The provision that membership and participation in the African Peer Review Mechanism is voluntary raises another question that has implications for the viability of NEPAD. The problem is that since only those countries that have acceded to the Peer Review
Mechanism by signing the MoU will benefit from NEPAD, the question is how this will help the continent as a whole to reclaim the 21st century when most countries' are not benefiting from the initiative. To date for example, only sixteen (16) out of about fifty (50) African countries have acceded to the APRM. In the case of the IGAD region, only three out of a possible eight have acceded to it. This means that only these sixteen countries—three from IGAD region—can benefit from NEPAD. It is inconceivable that this small number of states can make a difference. This raises the question why only such a small number of countries have so far acceded to the APRM: whether it is due to the time factor or whether many are reluctant to be judged by fellow countries. One is also compelled to wonder if this means that other countries that do not accede to the MoU will be left to do business as usual and therefore continue to portray Africa in the same negative light, as has been the case in the past. These are key questions that have implications for the viability of NEPAD and its ability to achieve its objectives and the principles it espouses. These questions must be addressed. One way to go about these problems is to create strong and attractive incentives for participation in NEPAD. The incentives must be such that they can command compliance with the decisions made by the peer reviewers. Currently such an incentive does not seem to be in place and if it exits, it is not very attractive.

Another potential problem is the fact that NEPAD is usually presented as a continental programme that lacks local or national roots. Indeed there is no evidence that any of the IGAD countries were given an opportunity to discuss and internalize the concept before its proclamation as the development strategy for the continent. As one writer correctly observes “the process of ratifying NEPAD was poorly articulated. National legislatures and the electorate were not given any specific roles in the approval of a leadership initiative”\(^\text{10}\). The point is that some IGAD countries may as a result of this, have weak commitment to the initiative and see it as an imposition by a particular individual or country. Ratifying the MoU or even stating commitment to the initiative and its process is not a measure or indicator of total commitment. There are many cases in which African leaders are signatories to international conventions but either refuse to domesticate them or simply violate them with impunity. There is nothing to stop them from undermining NEPAD by simply not doing what they ostensibly committed themselves to. In this regard, it is important to remember that some leaders sign these documents of committal simply to appear to be in agreement with others and not to be seen as the odd one(s) out. This is especially the case when the architects and supporters of a project present the initiative as the solution to a common problem. No African leader wishes to be categorized or presented as being anti–development; indeed NEPAD has been presented as the solution to Africa's poverty and underdevelopment.

The recent decision to incorporate NEPAD as a project of the AU is another potential issue that may generate problems in the operationalization of the initiative. Initially NEPAD was a stand–alone project. External development partners may have agreed to be involved in the initiative precisely because it was a stand alone project devoid of...
unnecessary officialdom associated with organizations such as the AU. The relationship between the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the OAU provides cause for worry about making NEPAD part of AU. This step may make donors think twice about assisting NEPAD.

Conclusion

This chapter has critically examined the viability of NEPAD as a development initiative or strategy for Africa. In particular, the chapter has discussed the connection between NEPAD and the security concerns in the IGAD region. From the discussion it is clear that NEPAD has many potential and actual problems to contend with. A key challenge in this regard is security, which arises mainly from the nature of governance in the region. The viability of NEPAD depends on regional and national security, which is a function of the nature of governance. NEPAD needs democratic governance but cannot create it.

This chapter has argued that NEPAD is no more than an experiment in development and as such, its success is not guaranteed. The experimental nature of NEPAD is true whether it is viewed as homegrown as Anyang’ Nyong’o and Adebayo Adedeji believe, or an imposition from outside the continent. The better position is that whether NEPAD is homegrown or not is immaterial at this point. The more important issue is the fact that NEPAD is little understood by most people in the continent including those countries like Kenya that have acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism of NEPAD. This is more important precisely because it will affect the degree to which the initiative is accepted and supported hence its success. The public in IGAD states is generally ignorant of the NEPAD initiative. This is an unfortunate situation as it may adversely affect the success of the initiative. Nonetheless it is an initiative that should be supported. African countries should embark on an aggressive public education campaign to popularize NEPAD. This chapter argues that NEPAD is in a rather precarious position. The challenge for the supporters of the initiative is therefore to find innovative ways of dealing with these problems if they wish to use NEPAD to reclaim the 21st century.

All this notwithstanding, the success of NEPAD is further not guaranteed because it has to contend with several potential constraints. Some of these constraints are part of Africa’s development history and legacy while others are new. The continent and especially the IGAD region continue to be vulnerable to all types of insecurity. This insecurity places the viability of NEPAD in a dilemma, as there is neither a guarantee nor indication that NEPAD, as a development strategy will surmount these constraints. The other set of problems addressed in the chapter relate to the nature of NEPAD itself. As presently conceived, NEPAD appears to be too ambitious in its objectives given the fact that it lacks sufficient incentives to offer to participating countries and potential ones to meet its standards of governance. In addition, it lacks the authority to induce members to adhere to its standards of political, economic and corporate governance.

NEPAD and Security in the IGAD Region

This is significant because the viability and success of NEPAD will largely depend on the nature of governance in the continent and in the IGAD region. Unfortunately African governments have demonstrated very strong reluctance to agree to be told how to govern especially by a fellow African government. This means that for NEPAD to succeed, good governance must first prevail. It is difficult to see how NEPAD can ensure that African governments observe good governance as set by this initiative. Consequently to expect NEPAD through its African Peer Review Mechanism to institute good governance is to be too ambitious. There is therefore a catch 22 situation in the IGAD region and Africa in general. On the one hand it seeks to compel or influence African leaders and states to improve governance; on the other, its success requires the existence of the very good governance it seeks to encourage. In any case to date only Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have acceded to the APRM, an instrument through which NEPAD seeks to influence the improvement of governance in the region and in the continent as a whole. The constraints place NEPAD in a truly precarious position.

This critique is not an offhand dismissal of NEPAD altogether. Its aim is to caution that as an experiment there is a need to be cautious and to critically examine the forces, both potential and actual, local, regional and global that might pose a danger to the success of the initiative.

Chapter 7

Gender, Conflict and Regional Security

Patricia Kameri Mbote

Introduction

Security considerations have become prominent in the world today owing to the complexity of relations between states and between individuals in the states inter se. The perception of security as primarily a state concern limits the analysis of the interpersonal dynamics that security or lack of it generates for individuals. This chapter examines the gender dynamics in regional security. It argues that gender as a relational concept, contributes significantly to an understanding of the causes and impacts of insecurity, and is also a critical factor in the search for solutions to insecurity.

The first part of the chapter defines the concepts of gender and regional security, emphasizing the different conceptualizations of the terms in different contexts. It also maintains that as a public good, the power relations between individuals and entities in a given context will determine access to security. The second part addresses the interface between regional security and gender looking at the causes and impacts of insecurity and the place of gender in the search for solutions to insecurity. It addresses the concepts of formal and substantive equality as important organizing principles in the discourse on gender and security. The third and last part concludes the chapter and suggests possible ways of addressing the absence of gender in the security discourse. It posits that national, regional and international security, as a public good, cannot be addressed outside the purview of individual security. To that extent, it is critical that gender considerations be taken into consideration and inform the search for security at different levels.

Gender, Security and Public Good

‘Gender’ means the state of being either male or female. The male and female genders define and characterize all human beings in society. The two genders are distinguished from one another by physical, that is, biological sexual/reproductive differences. The term has however increasingly acquired a social meaning where the word gender defines how the male and the female gender relate in society. The social meaning refers to social characteristics of one's biological sex. These characteristics include gender-based division of labour whereby duties are allocated on the basis of one's sex. For example the female gender is allocated duties such as cooking, washing and other domestic chores, which belong to the private rather than the public sector. The male gender is allocated non–domestic duties such as decision–making, bread winning and others, which belong to the public sector.¹

Thus contemporary discourses on gender entail not merely reference to the physical difference that being biologically male/female entails, but also the social constructions of maleness and femaleness which often translate into power relations between men and women. Sex then is distinguished from gender by what one is born as, that is female or male, and therefore is a biological concept. Culturally determined patterns of behaviour such as rights, duties, obligations and status assigned to women and men in society (gender roles) are varied even within the same society. Women's studies are therefore a body of knowledge, which analyses the condition of women in society. When such studies are also directed to the changing of women's condition in society, then such a body of knowledge is identified as feminist studies. Feminism is a political movement, which aims at transforming gender relations that are oppressive to women.

Feminist scholars use gender as an analytical variable. It denotes the manner in which women and men are differentiated and ordered in a given socio-cultural context. Sexuality is the interactive dynamic of gender as an inequality. As an attribute of a person, sex inequality takes the form of gender; as a relation between people, it takes the form of sexuality. Gender emerges as the congealed form of the sexualization of inequality between men and women. So long as this is socially the case, the feelings, acts or desires of particular individuals notwithstanding, gender inequality will divide their society into two communities of interest. The male centrally features in the hierarchy of control. For the female, subordination is sexualized, as is dominance for the male.

Gender is thus a relational concept, which describes how men and women by virtue of their socially constructed differences relate to phenomena around them. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles of men and women and to the interaction between them. It also includes the differentiation between men and women in terms of income, social status, literacy and other factors. It is an important analytical concept used to explain the different learned identities associated with masculinity and femininity. The difference between men and women is always emphasized, and sex roles and responsibilities are accepted and idealised as contrasting and complementary. In the realm of security, gender considerations can, for instance, be seen in terms of the roles played by men and women in ensuring security, and the impact of insecurity on men and women. In many instances the failure to accept the differences and the emphasis on equality tends to mask the differentiated roles and impacts of conflict. The situation is further compounded because gender considerations may be obscured by the more visible ethnic, racial and economic class differentiations. Hence the need to appreciate that even though gender considerations may not be universal, the dominance of men and masculinity is pervasive especially in patriarchal societies.

Regional Security

Generally speaking, security can be defined as the freedom from danger, fear or anxiety. Conflict situations are consequently a threat to security. Conflicts arise from human relations when individuals or groups have different values, needs and interests; or when
resources are not available in unlimited quantities and access to them must be controlled and fought for.

In the context of state relations, security connotes the immunity of a state from threats from outside territorial boundaries, or the preservation of minimum core values of a state, namely political independence and territorial integrity. Because of the interdependence of the international community, the lack of security in one state has implications for security in a region or even globally. To this extent therefore regional or international security is the collective interest of diverse regional or international actors respectively since the security of parts of the system is inextricably intertwined with the security of the whole.

Regional security is defined as an ideal type of order where members of a region attain a political nirvana by finding solutions to regional problems or sweeping them so firmly under the carpet that they do not re–emerge. A major assumption in this rendition of regional security is that states have succeeded in managing or eliminating problems that create ethnic, communal, sub–national and socio–economic antagonisms, which are often the cause(s) of conflict. There is also the assumption that there exist mechanisms within the community to deal with conflict when it occurs. The concept of regional security is more applicable in developed countries than in developing ones because the latter have more developed regional blocs. In developed parts of the world, there is also a greater linkage of individual states with system security unlike in developing countries where the sense of insecurity is internal. Indeed insecurity in developing countries is attributable to uneven economic development, glaring disparities in wealth and income and communal and ethnic tensions. The main actors in the security apparatus are men, while women only feature as peripheral support. The impacts of security or lack of it however, are felt by both men and women. Taking the argument that security in developing countries is influenced significantly by internal factors, it is immediately clear that gender relations are critical to an understanding of security in a given country or region.

Security and the Public Good

Security falls in the category of goods, which are public or collective consumption goods. All persons enjoy security in common and one individual’s consumption does not subtract from another’s. It is non–rivalrous in the sense that the consumption or enjoyment of protection or defence for a resident in a country does not detract from another resident’s consumption of the protection. The protection is indivisible and its enjoyment by an additional person involves no marginal or additional cost. It is also non–exclusionary to the extent that no one in the country can be excluded from benefiting from the protection regardless of whether they contribute directly to the defence budget. It therefore attracts free riders.

---

3 Ibid.
**Gender, Conflict and Regional Security**

The public good aspect of security is normally discussed in the national context, but it is equally applicable to regional and international contexts. In the context of globalisation, security responsibilities are best carried out on a global scale by the international and regional public sectors. The question that arises is whether security is a finite or an infinite good. The better view to take is that security is an infinite public good. The power relations in a given context will however determine the availability and enjoyment of security especially where the apparatus for ensuring it is within the control of a particular group, which does not take into account the interests of other groups.

**Interface of Gender and Regional Security**

Conflict and instability are driven by failures in governance, health issues and environmental degradation. Further, globalisation and technological change have increased interdependence and magnify security-related impacts of development challenges around the world. The lack of societal consensus on fundamental issues and unrepresentative and repressive states, coupled with the destabilizing impact of economic and social disparities results in conflicts between genders and within genders. These emerge in concert with other sources of tension. Inequalities among the genders are attributable to cultural perceptions of femininity and masculinity, which in turn may influence legal regimes. Women as a gender component of society have been systematically removed from fully participating in the development process despite their active participation in the production processes alongside men. This impinges on the capacity of women to impact on security in states and in regions. Women are therefore perceived as victims of insecurity rather than as actors with the capacity to contribute to the maintenance of security and its restoration when insecurity ensues. In an analysis of gender, armed conflict and political violence, Cockburn explains how in making war, men form the military groups and gangs of warlords for diverse reasons ranging from patriotism, honour, self-defence to liberation. She argues that male positioning in the patriarchal gender systems and masculine identities, underscore these reasons. Cleansing rituals may form part of the process of preparing for war or of political violence. In the ethnic clashes that occurred in Kenya in the 1990s, there was the call by some communities to return to cultural practices that they had discarded in an effort to ‘cleanse’ the community and eliminate factors that had brought about the destruction of the property of those communities. In certain areas, female genital mutilation was reintroduced. Militia groups that have terrorized Kenyans such as Mungiki also advocate female circumcision in an attempt to attain cultural purity.

Law to a great degree validates the exclusion of women from participation in the security apparatus and therefore denies them the chance to participate in the search for security at the national and international levels. Feminists’ perception of law is that it is male and espouses male values. They argue that the defining characteristics of the legal person are closely related to the world-view of the socially powerful. This assertion has been made in reference to both international and national law. At national levels the best exemplification of the masculinity of laws is the tenor and application of gender-neutral

---


---

Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation
laws. Thus while legal provisions are couched in gender–neutral language, the enjoyment of equal rights and privileges in practice is an elusive concept. Gender–neutral laws have, in many instances, resulted in de facto discrimination. As Dahl aptly points out,

“As long as we live in a society where women and men follow different paths in life and have different living conditions, with different needs and potentials, rules of law will necessarily affect men and women differently. The gender–neutral legal machinery ... meets the gender–specific reality...”

At the international level, the point is poignantly made in reference to international humanitarian law, which it is argued

Takes a particular male perspective on armed conflict, as a norm against which to measure equality. In a world where women are not equals of men, and armed conflict impacts upon men and women in a fundamentally different way, a general category of rules that is not inclusive of reality for women cannot respond to their situation.

In essence therefore, the notion of formal equality in the realm of the search for regional or national security and its suitability is questioned.

**Equality and Equity**

The legal regime on human rights is predicated on the notions of equality between women and men and equity. Equality between women and men relates to their dignity and worth, equality in their rights, opportunities to participate in political, economic, social and cultural development, and to benefit from the results. Equity on the other hand relates to fairness in the treatment of men and women. It refers to the possibility of inequality between men and women, which necessitates the application of differential treatment to get rid of inequality.

It is recognized that gender inequality exists. There are some realms where women are under-represented or totally absent. The questions is whether women and men have equal rights and opportunities to participate in, for instance, the maintenance of and search for security. If not, the hindrances to the participation of women need to be addressed. This latter question is one of equity. It raises the issues of formal and substantive equality.

Most theories of justice pursue the achievement of some form of equality as their ultimate goal. However, equality is an elusive concept since different versions of equality yield extremely different substantive outcomes. In industrial countries, the emphasis has historically been on “formal equality” where it is argued that all subjects of the law should be treated similarly. Rules are usually deemed to be just if they apply to all without discrimination. At both the individual and international level, formal equality seeks to give every member of the community equal opportunities.

---

9 Ibid.
The provision of formal equality as an ultimate policy goal may, under favorable conditions, produce an optimal aggregate outcome, such as a high rate of economic growth, but it does not take into account the welfare of disadvantaged individuals. Accordingly, even if national laws adopt a system built on the rule of law, in which women and men are treated equally, and where all have a chance to enjoy the rights provided for, the least favoured will continue to be relatively disadvantaged. More generally, equality of rights or opportunities will not necessarily bring about equality of outcomes, especially in a world characterized by disparities in resources and opportunities.

Legal systems are premised on the need to bring stability, coherence and foreseeability to human relations. One of the instruments used to regulate social conduct in large groups is the enactment of rules and standards. Different factors militate against a strict reliance on the principle of fixed rules applying uniformly to all. Firstly, the changing nature of society and human needs calls for progressive change in the legal system. Secondly, the application of a general rule to a particular case may often necessitate the consideration of special factors and the balancing of the various interests at stake. There is thus a border area where enforcement agencies need to supplement gaps in existing rules. Thirdly, the fact that rules emanate from competent organs and have been taken in regular forms does not guarantee that the rules are equitable.

The search for an alternative basis to the principle of fixed rules leads to the old principle that like cases should be treated alike and that dissimilarly situated people should be treated dissimilarly. In Aristotle's words,

"If they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints—when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be 'according to merit'; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense".

In other words, the fulfillment of formal equality may not bring about substantive equality. The realization of substantive equality requires that existing inequalities, such as inequalities in wealth or natural endowments be acknowledged. Further, discrepancies, which cannot be traced to individuals' choices, should be taken into account and may constitute grounds for redistributive claims. The limits of the traditional notion of equity in law call for new approaches to the realization of substantive equality. Differential treatment constitutes one of the ways in which the principles of distributive justice can be implemented to foster the realization of substantive equality between men and women. Article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) gives a basis for differential treatment. It requires that states adopt:

---

10 See, for example Eduardo Galeano, “Guerre aux pauvres!” 509 Monde Diplomatique 6 (1996).
12 See for example Oscar Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources (1977).
13 See, e.g., Hart.
15 On the contrary, as acknowledged by Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (1991), differences resulting from voluntary wagers cannot serve as a basis for redistributive claims.
temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.”

Inequalities, Stability and Conflict
This section explores three issues: the roles, experiences, needs and capabilities of women and men in conflict; gendered aspects of the causes of conflict at macro and micro levels; and the implications of a gender analysis for conflict management.

Both classical and behaviourist theorists of conflict have neglected the gender dimension in their analyses, thus excluding a very important paradigm in the analysis of causes and impacts of conflict and on the mechanisms used for managing conflict. The inequities between genders have implications for stability and conflict as they shape roles, expectations and interventions. Gender and gender roles are integral to socialization processes and are also influenced by myths/paradigmatic foci—assumptions, expectations, and obligations, connected to biological sex. These change, and are specific to a given culture, are affected by other different situations—race, ethnicity and class—and they help in the understanding the use and sharing of power and division of labour between women and men, and can define relationships between sexes. Further, they cut across public and private spheres and are institutionalised at different levels—society, family and the state.

The shaping of values and norms in society is influenced by the stronger position that men in many societies around the world have had. Male bias and gender roles diminish and constrain the socio-economic position of women in most societies. Equal treatment at that level is not feasible or effective unless discriminating provisions are reversed. Indeed formal equality may only serve to reinforce the lower status of women.

Gender initiatives tend to focus on women and their advancement in society, economics and positions. They propose positive discrimination in institutions to achieve gender balance, addressing the extent to which women and men can hold the full range of positions in governance and development. It includes incorporating women into decision-making bodies. To this extent therefore, gender mainstreaming is not just about numbers, but about making women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres so that women and men may benefit equally.

Gender mainstreaming demands that there be a gender equality perspective incorporated in all policies at all levels and stages. Indeed a gender analysis elicits different questions about the causes and effects of insecurity on different sectors society and the particular relationships and roles with each other. It provides a better understanding of unequal

16 This lays a firm legal basis for affirmative action.
17 Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War system and Vice Versa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Gender, Conflict and Regional Security

social hierarchies and inequality and oppression, which are in prevalent societies, experiencing conflict.

Gender equity and equality are therefore essential in building sustainable peace and reconstructing democratic processes since they capture gender-related issues in specific conflict situations. The use by international organizations of the gender related development index to adjust the human development index to reflect gender information (adjusting the human development index downwards for countries with a poor record in gender equality and making the average achievement of each country in life expectancy educational attainment and income in accordance with the degree of disparity in achievement between men and women) is a positive step towards ingraining gender considerations in human security issues.

A gender analysis of insecurity demands that the causes of expressed violence, frustration and demographic and behavioural change be analysed at an inter–personal level. This enables the isolation of the gender–based indications of violence within the economic, social and political domains. The inclusion of a gender perspective demands more than just adding and stirring gender into an initiative. It requires questioning the paradigmatic stances on femininity and masculinity and exploring how these create and maintain insecurity and how they can contribute to the cessation of such insecurity.

Causes of Insecurity

Causes of insecurity could be structural or systemic. Gender relations are structural and systemic because they form part of the general structure and deep–rooted background conditions. Although these have been in existence for a long time, they are dynamic. Cultures that limit women's access to resources and decision making power, and which characterise women as inferior to men, treat women as property and accept domestic violence as a norm have, for instance been said to be more prone to repression and violent conflict in the public arena. Exclusion and discrimination can however not be limited only to social and cultural structures. They can also occur in the economic sphere where the exclusion of groups that are low in status form important resources can result in insecurity. Gender sensitive root causes of insecurity include political equality, economic equality and social equality.

Recent research suggests that states with lower percentages of women in parliament are more likely to use military violence to settle disputes and that a 5 per cent decrease in the proportion of women in parliament renders a state nearly five times as likely to resolve international disputes using military force. With regard to economic equality, the level of women's participation in the labour force impacts on a state's likelihood to use military force to resolve international conflict.
Depriving women of access to resources can also cause insecurity especially in contexts where women are key economic actors and require the resources to perform their daily chores. In such circumstances, the potential development of an individual or group is held back by the uneven distribution of power and resources. Armed conflict can result from such deprivation or be sustained by it as increases in inequality weaken the inhibitions against aggression.

The role of women in environmental management has been widely documented, as has the degradation of the environment. Changes in the environment have implications for security at different levels. In places where environmental resources provide both a subsistence and economic lifeline, such changes impact directly on gender relations. In many parts of the world, there is a growing appreciation among conflict policy makers of the environmental origins of conflict. Conflicts in Africa for instance, though often linked to political and communal differences, are now understood to have potentially important linkages with environmental factors. The link between environment and security is accepted at high levels of government. In this respect former US Secretary of State Christopher noted that:

"The environment has a profound impact on our national interests in two ways: first, environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly the health and prosperity, and jobs of American citizens. Second, addressing natural resources issues is frequently critical to achieving political and economic stability, and to pursuing our strategic goals around the world." 23

Similarly, a former Rwandese Minister of Defence stated that:

"Environmental causes of major significance in this context [the Rwanda conflict] are natural resource linked and are due to population pressure, to decline of agricultural land per family land–holding... to soil degradation and to shortage of firewood." 24

The widening recognition that there are environmental underpinnings to conflict is strengthened, in part, by the ineffectiveness of many mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts. In many cases these do not promote the peaceful negotiation of competing interests.

At the regional level, the role of environmental resources in security is well illustrated by the shared waters of the River Nile. While there has been an international agreement regulating these waters, the question of equity has come into sharp focus as states that are deprived of the waters have began to question the fairness of the international agreement. The Nile Basin Initiative, an inter-governmental initiative seeks to ensure that Nile waters are used as a basis for cooperation rather than a basis for conflict. While the shared vision programme takes care of the interests of diverse states, it is critical that the interests of individuals in the Nile waters are taken into consideration since regional security cannot be achieved without national and individual security.

24 J. Gasana, 2000
Impact of Insecurity

At the onset of armed conflict, the increase in militarization and the quantity of weapons inflow may be accompanied by requirements on the part of both men and women to serve in compulsory military service. As armed conflict still tends to be largely masculine, men are at risk of being targeted as combatants, forcibly recruited or being either killed or imprisoned purely on the basis of their gender to preempt opponents from building a strong resistance force. During the build up to war, ‘gender-stereotypes and specific definitions of masculinity and femininity are often promoted’. Further, the rights of individual men and women will be subjected to censorship laws, limits on their freedom of expression and movement under the guise of national security. Depending on the gender relations in the particular state, women are likely to be more impacted on owing to their already lower status in society.

Militarization on account of perceived insecurity often takes place at the expense of spending on public services such as health and education, and this in turn impacts on women and men spending, and on the power relations in a particular state. The expenditure by most African states of their national resources on arms is done at the expense of other services that would improve overall human security based on human needs such as poverty alleviation, food security and shelter. The traditional focus on national security based on military issues relegates women’s concerns and interests to the margins and is untenable if lasting solutions to insecurity are to be found.

The build up of aggression in the period preceding open conflict fuels aggressive behaviour at all levels, from domestic violence, bar-fights and vandalism. Violence against groups that are low in status, or allegations of such violence at the hands of the enemy or out-group may become a deliberate way of achieving in-group cohesion. Violent acts against women, such as rape, may be committed in order to punish, demoralise and symbolically defeat men.

In situations of armed conflict, the role of women as producers and reproducers are highly politicised because women ensure survival and make it possible for the war to go on. The pressure on women to continue performing their traditional roles is increased as masculinity and femininity are reconstructed to fit into the prevailing situation. The situation of war even for men who do not go to war leads to humiliation that is translated into a greater exercise of authority in the private domain, which may be the only remaining bastion of authority for the male.

Women and girls are deliberate targets of contemporary civil wars. Rape and sexual assaults are often used as strategic weapons. Sexual violence is an act of humiliation against a woman and her male relatives. The frontlines of battle are often in the villages where women carry out their daily chores. The state of war can thus significantly impact on women’s access to resources. Another impact of insecurity is the increase in

---

25 Jones, 2000, p. 64.
female-headed households once men go to war. The catapulting of women into family headship without a concomitant investment in equipping them to perform those tasks leads to the further impoverisation of such women. The situation is worse where the women are forcibly displaced into refugee camps with more limited resources and further constrained in accessing basic resources including food, healthcare and education. Where the environment is degraded or natural resources are destroyed as a consequence of war, the capacity and ability of women to perform the tasks expected of them is further negatively impacted on.

**Conclusion**

The quest for national, regional and international security calls for the marshalling of all available resources. The principles that should guide conflict prevention and amelioration strategies include efficient democratic systems which take into account socio-cultural realities of each state; systems of government based on permanent social dialogue and the quest for political consensus; a judicial system that is accessible to all and perceived as independent of the state; respect for human rights; eradication of exclusion; and policies that address issues such as debt, regional integration, women, children and cultural identity.

Including a gender perspective in that process is critical if the causes and impacts of insecurity are to be holistically tackled. There is a need to move from region and state-centric security to individual security. This calls for the analysis of actors in states in order to reveal economic, social, political, and ethnic and gender nuances of security. It would also entail including a variety of causes, inequality, inequity, environmental degradation, environmental abundance, human rights violations and bad governance.

Gender considerations need to be integrated in conflict and peace management. The fourth world conference on women in Beijing in 1995 called for the increased access by women to conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, and raised the consciousness of international policymakers about women's role in peace and in creating conditions of trust and confidence among conflicting parties. The Platform for Action states that:

> "In a world of continuing instability and violence... the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security."  

Further, Resolution 1325 (2000) of the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed that a gender perspective in conflict and conflict prevention and resolution needs to include measures that support women's peace initiatives. At the implementation level, the resolution calls for the involvement of women in all implementation mechanisms of peace agreements and ensuring the human rights of women and girls particularly those related to constitutions, electoral systems and judiciaries. This is a watershed resolution that calls on states and all actors to ensure women's full participation in peace processes.

---

Gender, Conflict and Regional Security

The European Union and other regional and multilateral organizations have adopted similar policies and replicated the resolution. The challenge remains the actualization of the resolution through practical measures. The gender perspective should be an integral part of the basic effort of devising more effective policies and targeting aid more efficiently. It also points to the need to address the core causes of conflict taking into account the needs of different stakeholders, and assessing the potentials for interventions for different actors. In integrating the gender perspective in the search for security, it is critical that a determination be made on who has access to and control over the resources, actors and factors that are pivotal to conflict. The main challenge is to negotiate competing needs, claims, and rights. Local equitable ownership of tools and techniques for addressing of conflict is critical if these are to be effectively employed as part of conflict prevention and management. Central to these is the recognition and guarantee of the rights of diverse actors. A rights–based approach ensures the incorporation of the interests of all in dealing with conflicts, especially where these are inseparable from grievances rooted in the uneven distribution of resources.
Chapter 8

The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha
Samson Lukare Kwaje

Introduction
The basic problem of the Sudan is that its reality, historically and in its contemporary context conflicts fundamentally with the policies that have been pursued by the various governments that have come and gone in Khartoum since independence in 1956. What characterizes the Sudan is its rich diversity, history, geography, people, religion and culture. Unfortunately, this reality has been ignored. Instead of using its historical and contemporary diversity to evolve a Sudanese commonwealth to which all Sudanese pledge undivided loyalty and allegiance irrespective of religion, ethnicity and gender, all the governments of post-colonial Sudan have emphasized only Arabism and Islamism. It is this narrow definition that has not only made the modern Sudan unjust, repressive, oppressive, rapacious and extremely violent against a section of its citizens, but has made a section of the Sudanese people particularly from the South take up arms for the last fifty years, hence the characterization of these struggles as North/South conflicts.

During the fifty eight years of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium administration, both northern and southern Sudan were administered separately under the Governor General. This was similar to Rhodesia, where Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland although administered from Salisbury under one Prime Minister, were each granted the right to self determination, resulting in the emergence of the three independent states of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. This experience ushered in political stability in the region. In fact, the emerging political and economic realities indicate a movement towards unity in diversity.

In addition, the British introduced the concept of the "closed districts" which included Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan and the Funj areas of Southern Blue Nile. The British rule was intended to protect the indigenous African populations of these areas from the Arab slave traders and from Islamization and Arabization.

The Northern Sudan was ruled as a colonial territory along Islamic/Arab lines with its future and cultural orientation towards Egypt and the Arab world, while Southern Sudan was ruled as an African colonial territory where African languages, culture and Christianity were all encouraged to flourish to the exclusion of anything Arab or Islamic, and with its future and cultural orientation towards East Africa. Indeed pass permits
The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha

were required for travel between the North and the South (and other "closed districts"). On Independence in 1956, both the north and south were united and the independent Sudanese state since that time has been dominated by Arab and Islamic citizens of northern Sudan. It made no difference whether these governments were military and Islamic dictatorships or multi-party systems.

The Egyptians pressured the British to annex the two parts in the hope that a united Sudan under Arab domination would eventually become a province of Egypt, thus giving Egypt, a greater control of the Nile. This is why the Egyptian authorities have always opposed the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan and other marginalized areas. This led in the first Anyanya war that continued for seventeen years from 1955 to 1972.

Search for Peace

The search for peace in the Sudan is traceable to the 1930s when the British developed a policy for the south in the Closed Districts Ordinance. Indeed, the Southern Policy was a British design for the eventual political independence of the South from the North. In a nutshell, the Southern Policy entailed both the progressive separation of the South from the North and the fostering of particularism within it. By independence on 1st January, 1956, a number of problems concerning the coherence of the Sudanese polity were left unresolved. The history of the country reveals that several major conferences were convened in an attempt to resolve the conflict between the North and the south, in the hope of reconstituting a peaceful and inclusive modern state in the Sudan.

These attempts can be categorized into various phases. Phase One (1947-1972) included the Juba Conference of 1947, the Khartoum Round-Table Conference of 1965, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 that addressed the first conflict known as the Anyanya war that started from 1955 to 1972.

Phase Two 1985–1988 addressed attempts made by the SPLM/SPLA after the start of the present war in 1983 and before the National Islamic Front (NIF) government presently called the National Congress Party (NCP) of Omer el Beshir ascended to power through a military coup. These efforts for the peaceful resolution of the conflict includes the SPLM call for the holding of a National Constitutional Conference, which should have been organized by the SPLM and the Nimeiri regime before the latter was overthrown by a popular uprising of the Sudanese people in April 1985. However, Nimeiri backed out and the conference never took place. Soon after the overthrow of Nimeiri, the SPLM started to make contacts with political groups in the Sudan. This resulted in the Koka Dam Conference between the SPLM, trade unions in the country and various Sudanese political parties including the UMMA party, the Sudanese Communist Party and Southern Sudan Political Parties leading to the Koka Dam Declaration. Only the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) failed to attend the Koka Dam Conference. Because the DUP did not attend the Koka Dam Conference,
the SPLM and the DUP had a major conference that led to the signing of the Sudan Peace Initiative (SPI). The SPI called for a constitutional conference and both parties agreed that it should have been held on July 4th 1989. The SPI also endorsed the Koka Dam Declaration. However, this was pre-empted by the NIF military coup of June 30th 1989, only four days before the scheduled date of the conference.

Phase Three (1898–1993) started after the National Islamic Front (NIF) currently governing the Sudan under the National Congress Party (NCP) took over power\(^1\). Various negotiations were undertaken during this phase. These included direct talks between the SPLM and NIF Government in Addis Ababa without any external mediators. No progress was made at these talks. Later negotiations in Nairobi were initially direct talks between the SPLM and the NIF government without any external mediation. However, during the negotiations the mediation of former USA President Jimmy Carter, was subsequently secured. Nothing came out of these talks. The Abuja 1 Negotiations in May–June 1992 took place under the mediation of the then Nigerian President Ibrahim Babaginda, when he was Chairman of the OAU. A communiqué indicating some modest progress was issued at the end of the negotiations. The Abuja 2 Negotiations in April–May 1993 were a continuation of the Abuja 1 talks,\(^2\) There was no agreement reached and no communiqué issued. The Nigerian mediators issued a press statement adjourning the negotiations for one month. However, they were never resumed.

Phase Four (1994–2001) marks the beginning of IGAD as mediator in the Sudan conflict. The mediation by the countries of the Inter–Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started in 1993 when the Sub–Committee on peace in the Sudan was constituted. The IGAD Sub–Committee was entrusted with the responsibility of bringing the Sudanese conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement. In February 1994, in Addis Ababa, the President of Kenya was mandated to mediate as Chairman of the Sub–Committee for peace in Sudan. Thereafter, the Session of the Standing Committee was convened in Nairobi in March, 1994 to define the principles that have constituted the framework for negotiation known as the Declaration of Principles (DOP). In July 1994, the third session was convened in Nairobi to deliberate on the Draft Declaration of Principles, which identified the key issues of disagreement, namely, separation of state and religion and the right to Self-determination. In the same year, the fourth session of the Standing Committee was held September in Nairobi, and the positions of the parties to the conflict continued to harden and become further polarized. The hardening and polarization of positions led to the convening of the Second Summit of IGAD Heads of State Peace Committee in Nairobi in September 1994, which resolved that the IGAD peace process should continue and that the Declaration of Principles (DOP) should form the basis of negotiations.\(^3\) Unfortunately, the negotiations stalled for 33 months due to disagreements over the DOP. The GOS refused to accept some points in the DOP.

In 1997 an Extraordinary Summit of IGAD member States was convened in Nairobi which called for the revival of the negotiations. It was only then that the Government of

---

1 See SPLM Publication entitled Peace Through Development.
3 IGAD Heads of States Communiqué issued in State House, Nairobi, 19th September 1994
The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha

Sudan took a positive step by accepting the DOP as the basis for future negotiations. Therefore, in September 1997 the negotiations resumed under the IGAD Ministerial Sub–Committee on the Sudan Peace Process whose first session was held during the same time in Nairobi. The members of the IGAD Ministerial Sub–Committee meeting agreed on the establishment of a Permanent IGAD Secretariat, and appointment of a Special Envoy from Kenya while each of the member States provided an envoy.

The second session of the Ministerial Sub–Committee meeting was held in Nairobi in May, 1998 where it was agreed that self–determination would be exercised in the South during an interim period. The parties further agreed to facilitate free and unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance to areas affected by famine.

At the third session of negotiations convened in Addis Ababa in August, 1998, it was agreed that the south should be determined by the border of 1st January, 1956. However, Khartoum did not sign a communiqué re–affirming this. The fourth session of the IGAD Ministerial Sub–Committee was held in July, 1999 in Nairobi. This session agreed on the establishment of a permanent structure for conducting the negotiations. It was decided that negotiations under the secretariat were to be conducted under two technical committees namely the political and transitional committees. The Political committee met was held in January, 2000 where the common areas of understanding and points of difference were established. The points of differences were highlighted as state and religion; the issue of marginalized areas: Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile; the right to self–administration, wealth and power sharing, and the status of the two armies (the SPLA and the Sudan Armed forces). The second and third political committee meeting were convened in February and April 2000 respectively, which attempted to narrow down the differences but with no success. The parties reconvened from September–October, 2000. At the fourth political committee meeting, the envoys presented to the parties a proposal that attempted to derive a common ground position on state and religion, the issue of marginalized areas: Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Southern Blue Nile, self administration and wealth sharing. However, no Agreement was reached. It thus became clear that since the inception of the sub–committee in 1994, there was no breakthrough in the Peace Process. This necessitated the rejuvenation of the IGAD peace process that became the Machakos Phase.

Phase Five: The Machakos Process

Machakos I

An extraordinary summit of the IGAD Sub–Committee on the Sudan Peace Process was convened in June, 2001 to chart the way forward by establishing a new mechanism and an innovative approach to the negotiations. Apart from the heads of state of Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, the Chairman of the SPLM/A and the President of Sudan also attended the summit. The final communiqué of the summit also recognized the outstanding issues that constitute a stumbling block to the negotiations and recommended serious dialogue between the parties.


98 Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation
The Machakos peace process began in November 2001 when Lt. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo was appointed as a special envoy to the IGAD Peace Process on Sudan, replacing Ambassador Daniel Mboya. Given his position in Kenya as a senior man in the military with direct access to President Moi, Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo reconvened the process with the hope of trying to make a difference.

In May 2002, Sumbeiywo drew up an agenda and a programme of work for the negotiations. In July 2002, the parties succeeded for the first time in reaching an agreement on the issues of the right to self-determination, and the separation of state and religion. This agreement came to be widely known as the Machakos Protocol.

**Right to Self-Determination**

It was agreed in the Machakos Protocol that the people of southern Sudan shall have the right of self-determination, which will be exercised through an internationally monitored referendum. The referendum will be on two clear options namely, confirmation of the unity of Sudan as set out in the peace agreement, or cessation. The interim period will be in two phases namely a pre-transitional period of six months and the main transitional/transitional period of six years.

During the pre-transition period the parties shall work out a legal framework for the agreement, and establish institutions of governance as provided in the Peace agreement. During this period steps shall also be taken towards the implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire while assistance and resources shall be mobilized and secured for the peace process and reconstruction. The main transitional/transitional period will entail operationalization of the institutions of governance both in the centre and in the south and the implementation of all the arrangements and principles set out in the peace agreement.

**Separation of State and Religion**

The national/central constitution shall guarantee freedom of belief, worship and religious practice to all Sudanese. In regard to legislation, the national parliament, shall operate in two distinct ways. When it legislates for the northern states, it shall use Sharia and customs as the source of legislation. However, when it enacts national legislation applicable to southern Sudan it shall use non-Sharia sources, and may derive its legislation from popular consensus, values and customs of the people of southern Sudan. The central government and related institutions shall likewise do the same.

There shall in addition be a bi-cameral legislature consisting of an upper and lower house. The lower house shall consist of members directly elected by the people, while the upper house will consist of equal representation from the north and south. The function of the upper house shall be to protect states from national legislation of a religious nature which may adversely affect any of these states. If such a case arises, the Upper House may block it. As a corollary to this, the governance of southern Sudan during the
The interim period shall involve substantial devolution of powers (ministries and national institutions) from the centre to the south.

However, on these two issues the Protocol only provided a platform on which further negotiations could be undertaken for resolving the conflict. The Machakos Protocol is not a comprehensive agreement but a framework for negotiations.

After the signing of the Machakos Protocol, the SPLM convened a Consultative Conference on the IGAD Peace Process (CCIPP) in August 2002, in Kapoeta County where representatives from all the five regions of the New Sudan deliberated on the Protocol. The CCIPP came up with resolutions to be used by the SPLM/A delegation as guidelines for negotiations. The SPLM/A Delegation was fully mandated by the conference to negotiate with confidence.

Machakos II

The second session of the Machakos Process began in August, 2002. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the other envoys from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti were joined by observers from US, UK, Norway and Italy. The agenda that was finally adopted by the Parties to the conflict was structured as follows: the structures of government; power sharing; wealth sharing, human rights and judiciary and the rule of law; security arrangements, comprehensive cease–fire; modalities for implementing the peace agreement and regional and international guarantees.

In order to assist the parties in their discussions the mediators drew a two weeks programme of lectures and seminars. Experts and distinguished resource persons from the UK, Norway, USA, South Africa and Kenya, delivered lectures and shared their experiences with the parties. These were followed by comments, questions and discussions by the participants. The main focus of the lectures and seminars was on structures of government, and wealth sharing during the interim period.

After the lectures and seminars, the mediators and resource persons then used the proceedings to come up with a draft paper, the Draft Protocol on Power Sharing within the Framework of a Broad Based Transitional Government of National Unity between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). This document focused mainly on the organization of government and the creation of institutions at the national, state, and southern Sudan levels.

GOS Withdrawal from Machakos II

In September 2002 the IGAD mediators informed the SPLM/A delegation that the Government of Sudan had decided to recall its delegation from Machakos. The next day, the GOS delegation issued a press statement to explain their withdrawal. According to GOS, they could not continue with the negotiations based on the SPLM/A position.
regarding to power sharing, status of the national capital, and the issue of Nuba Mountains, Funj and Abyei. The SPLM proposed a structure of power sharing at three levels of government: national government, south Sudan government, and state governments. It also proposed a Sharia-free capital for the central government. On the question of the three areas of Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and Funj, the SPLM accepted the proposal of the mediators that the status of these areas be dealt with under IGAD mediation as part of an overall solution to the Sudanese conflict. The GOS demanded that IGAD limits the peace process to southern Sudan in accordance to the borders of January 1st, 1956.

The SPLM/A position paper on power sharing was a submission in response to the requirement of the mediators. The government also submitted its position that included proposals, which the SPLM/A could object to. The presentations made by both parties were intended to provide a basis for negotiations. Therefore, the GOS decision to withdraw from Machakos had little to do with the content of SPLM/A position paper on power sharing. The GOS withdrawal was a strategic design to avoid the discussion of the serious issues.

At the very start of Machakos II the GOS wanted the negotiations to deal with the question of cease–fire as the first item on the agenda, contrary to the agenda worked out by the mediators. This would enable them exploit the oil in southern Sudan while they dragged their feet on negotiations so as to earn revenue from the oil to prosecute the war and defeat the SPLA on the ground. The position of the SPLM/A was that the issue of cease–fire should be dealt under the agenda on security and military arrangements rather than putting it as a pre-condition for political negotiations. The SPLM/A clearly saw this as a pretext for the GOS to mount major military operations and aerial bombardments of Bahr el Ghazal, Western Upper Nile, Eastern Equatoria and Southern Blue Nile so as to create pressure on the SPLM/A.

Since 15th August 2002, barely three days after the start of the peace talk, Khartoum started carrying out aerial bombardment of the civilian infrastructure all over New Sudan particularly in northern Bahr el Ghazal, Southern Blue Nile, Eastern Equatoria, Western and Central Upper Nile areas killing civilians and livestock in big numbers. The government also ordered its troops during this period to attack SPLA positions in Malek in Upper Nile, Midil in Southern Blue Nile and around Torit in Eastern Equatoria. The GOS also attacked Idolu and Hiyala which forced the SPLA to pursue the attacking forces in these areas up to Torit leading to GOS subsequently withdrawing from Torit in September 2002.

The GOS returned for negotiations with the SPLM on 14th October 2002. The two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cessation of Hostilities on 15th October 2002, in order to create and maintain a conducive atmosphere throughout the negotiations until all the outstanding issues were resolved. In essence, the MoU

5 See Memorandum of Understanding between the GOS and the SPLM/A resumption of negotiations on peace in the Sudan dated 15th October 2002.
The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha

stipulated that the two parties must maintain a period of tranquility during the negotiations by ceasing hostilities in all areas of Sudan and ensuring a military stand down for their forces including allied forces and affiliated militia. In this case, cessation of hostilities means retaining current military positions, refraining from any offensive military action by all forces, ceasing the laying of land mines, refraining from occupation of new areas, cease supplying all areas with weapons and ammunition, refraining from any acts of violence or other abuse on the civilian population, and freezing media wars and propaganda against one another. The MoU was later reinforced by an addendum to it after repeated violations. The Addendum among other things allowed for the establishment of a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT). The VMT was empowered to travel to any area where a violation was reported and filed by any of the parties and made its findings public to IGAD and the international community. Both the MoU and the Addendum contributed to the maintenance of current cease fire and consequently created conducive atmosphere for negotiations.

From Machakos in 2002 a lot of progress was made in the Sudan peace process through negotiations that shifted from Machakos to Nakuru in July 2003 to Nanyuki in August 2003 and to Naivasha September 2003.

Naivasha Process

The Naivasha process was characterized by high level consultations and negotiations between the GOS and the SPLM/A leaderships. This process started in September 2003 when for the first time the negotiating parties were led by their major principals. The Government of Sudan delegation was led by the First Vice President of the Sudan, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, while the SPLM/A Delegation was led by the Chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, Dr. John Garang de Mabior. A lot of issues were resolved during the process, particularly on security arrangements and wealth sharing.

The salient feature of the security arrangements include the existence of two armies—the SPLA in southern Sudan and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in northern Sudan—which shall remain separate during the interim period. They shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan’s National Armed Forces. The two forces shall be disengaged and separated.

The agreement also requires the formation of joint integrated units consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) during the interim period. The joint/integrated units shall constitute a nucleus of a post-referendum army of Sudan should the result of the referendum confirm unity; otherwise they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces. Except for those deployed in the joint/integrated units, the rest of the forces of SAF currently deployed in the South shall be redeployed north of the

6 See Addendum to the MOU on Cessation of Hostilities between the GOS and the SPLM/A dated 4th February 2004.
South/North border of 1/1/1956 under international monitoring and assistance within and up to two and a half years from the beginning of the pre–interim period. Except for those deployed in the joint/integrated units, the rest of SPLA forces currently deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall be redeployed south of the south/north border of 1/1/1956 as soon as the joint/integrated units are formed and deployed under international monitoring and assistance.

The SPLM/A undertakes that the demobilized southern Sudanese from those currently serving in SAF in southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various institutions of the government of southern Sudan along with demobilized SPLA soldiers. Also, no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces and those who desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either party (army, police, prisons and wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions. In this regard, the parties agreed to address the status of other armed groups in the country with a view to achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.

The principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on both sides, at a suitable time, following the completion of comprehensive ceasefire arrangements, was agreed, and an internationally monitored ceasefire shall come into effect from the date of signature of a comprehensive peace agreement. The two parties together with the IGAD mediators and international experts shall work out details of the ceasefire agreement.

On wealth sharing during the interim period the two parties agreed that the wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties and that the national government shall also fulfil its obligation to provide transfers to the government of southern Sudan. Without prejudice to the position of the parties with respect to ownership of land and subterranean natural resources, including in southern Sudan, the ownership of those resources shall be addressed. The parties agreed on the principle of regulation, management, and the process of sharing wealth from subterranean natural resources.

On the issue of oil, it was agreed that after the payment to an oil revenue stabilization account and at least of 2 per cent of oil revenues allocated to the oil producing states, 50 per cent of the net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in southern Sudan shall be allocated to the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and 50% to the National Government (GOS). The parties also agreed that an independent National Petroleum Commission (NPC) shall be established during the pre–interim period and its decisions shall be by consensus. The composition of the NPC shall include the President of the Republic and President of the GOSS as co–chairs and permanent members, four permanent members representing the national government, four permanent members representing the GOSS, and not more than three representatives of an oil producing
The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha

state/region in which petroleum development is being considered, non–permanent members. The NPC shall formulate public policies and guidelines in relation to the development and management of the petroleum sector, monitor and assess the implementation of those policies to ensure that they work in the best interests of the people of Sudan, develop strategies and programs for the petroleum sector, negotiate and approve all oil contracts for the exploration and development of oil in the Sudan, and ensure they are consistent with the NPC’s principles, policies and guidelines.

The parties also agreed that there shall be a dual banking system in the Sudan. An Islamic banking system shall operate in the northern Sudan and a conventional banking system shall operate in southern Sudan. In this regard, there shall be one central bank with two windows to cater for the two banking systems and the two currencies that are presently operating in the two parts of the country.

In conforming with the principal of decentralization, it was agreed that the levels of government (the National Government, the Government of Southern Sudan and Regional/States Governments) are entitled to legislate, raise and collect taxes and revenues as shall be defined in the constitution.

Towards a Comprehensive Peace Agreement

It is now more than a year since the signing of the Machakos Protocol. A lot has happened since then particularly in the last three rounds of talks in Naivasha. It is now possible to make an objective assessment of the peace process. The remaining issues that need to be resolved are the political and administrative status of the three conflict areas in Central Sudan; namely the Nuba Mountains (Southern Kordofan), the Funj Region (Southern Blue Nile) and the Dinka Ngok of the District of Abyei. The second issue is the search for a mechanism for the fair sharing of power between the North and the South.

In principal the two parties agreed on the basis for political, administrative, economic and social solution to the conflict in the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile regions. These include agreement that human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed to all individuals in each region as shall be prescribed in the Interim National Constitution; that the diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the people in each region shall be protected and developed; that the development of human resources and infrastructure shall be the main goal of each region and shall be conducted to meet human needs in accordance with the best–known practices of sustainable development within a transparent and accountable framework.

It was also agreed that the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the two regions shall form part of the comprehensive peace agreement in the Sudan, and the parties affirmed the right of the peoples of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile regions to be popularly consulted to determine their constitutional, political and administrative status. The
The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha

parties agreed further that the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile Regions shall enjoy full autonomy, to redress the injustices suffered by the people of these areas and to meet their aspirations, and that during the interim period the autonomous self-governing regions of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall fall under the SPLM component of the presidency.

Conclusion

The Sudan Peace Process has made significant progress between the Machakos and Naivasha negotiating sessions. The remaining issues are few but difficult. However, the IGAD Peace Process represents the best chance for peace in the Sudan.
Chapter 9

The Somali Peace Process

Ochieng Kamudhayi

Introduction

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference is the fourteenth attempt to restore law and order in Somalia, thirteen earlier efforts having failed to bring peace. Under the auspices of IGAD, Kenya was mandated to host the fourteenth attempt. The conference began on 15th October, 2002 at Eldoret, Kenya. In February, 2003 the conference moved to Mbagathi, Nairobi.

Interest in this peace process is justified on a number of grounds. First, the conflict has been very costly in terms of human life, the destruction of property and infrastructure. Second, the peace process has cost the region, its governments and peoples a lot. The international community has also invested heavily in terms of humanitarian assistance and financial support for the peace process. Besides, the lack of peace in Somalia has other effects like disruption of trade and general insecurity in the region as a whole. Lastly, the peace process is generating diplomatic tensions between the frontline states as each of them tries to protect its interests in Somalia.

Structure of Decision–Making

The Somali National Reconciliation Process is structured in four levels of decision making. The first level is that of heads of IGAD states and governments. This level incorporates the various heads of states and government of the IGAD region. Below this is the IGAD ministerial council. This involves all the foreign ministers of the IGAD region and acts as an advisory organ to the summit. The facilitation committee comprising the special envoys of Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea and Uganda does the day to day running of the conference on behalf of the IGAD governments. To assist the facilitation committee is a secretariat. The facilitation committee works closely with the IGAD Partners Forum who are the key donors to the conference.

The conference has three levels of decision–making. The first is the leader's committee composed of Somali leaders. There is no consensus on who the Somali leaders are, and this has often led to a lot of debate. There are those who believe that the genuine Somali leaders are those who signed the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities on 27th October, 2002. That position restricts the leadership to a group of 24 faction leaders. Others would like a broader definition of leaders that includes a larger number than the 24 faction leaders.
The Somali Peace Process

The second level is that of the officially invited delegates who belong to different factions. The number of official delegates has remained a contentious issue right from the beginning of the conference. While the officially invited delegates were 361 there was an additional 5 from the civil society. However, there has been between 800–1000 delegates at the conference at all times. The question of which of them are genuine has remained elusive. The last level of decision making in the conference is the plenary. This comprises the delegates, the leaders committee, the IGAD facilitation committee and observers who include the IGAD Partners Forum among others. The plenary is the highest decision making organ of the conference; it ratifies all decisions taken by the other organs of the conference. The rationale behind this was to allow the widest participation in decision making for purposes of ownership and consensus building.

Three fundamental questions arise regarding the conference. One is whether the process can deliver a Somali government, and if it cannot, identifying the issues that are hindering progress in the process. Other concerns are based on the cost effectiveness of the process. Many donors have raised the issue whether it is worth continuing to invest in a process that has no tangible results.

This chapter examines the Somali National Reconciliation Conference as a process. It identifies the actors, interests and how these are impacting on the peace process itself. It suggests the way forward in the post–conflict period with or without a government in Somalia.

The chapter is organised in three parts. Part one is a historical perspective of the peace process and the conflict. Part two is an analysis of the actors and issues involved in the peace process and a critical examination of how the actors, issues and interests are affecting it. The last part is a conclusion and a road map for policy makers.

Over–View of the Peace Process

The overview examines certain landmarks in the 14th conference that have determined the direction and outcomes during the current peace initiative. The analysis begins by discussing the collapse of the state of Somalia as an entry point to the peace process. Siad Barre’s government remained unresponsive to the wishes of the people of Somalia and turned itself into an autocratic, authoritarian regime. The poor management of public affairs affected not only the allocation of political power but also resources. It is this situation that degenerated into conflict between the government and its citizenry. The collapse of the Somali state came after the deposition of Siad Barre in 1991 by a combination of rebel forces. However, once the common enemy was deposed, the rebel forces led by Gen. Mohamed Aideed, Ali Mahdi and others fragmented into clan–based groups that disagreed on everything except the deposition of the Somali dictatorship. The declaration of Ali Mahdi as president did not go well with other groups who began war afresh. The violence that ensued unleashed clan animosity and competition, massive destruction of property and internal and external displacement.

During the civil war, Somalis were divided between those who alleged that their clan or sub-clan was underrepresented, and those that believe that the previous governments had maintained clan and regional balance. Those who are aggrieved like the Hawiye, Dir, Digil Mirifle and the others are struggling to ensure that this time round they have a chance to participate in some real action that determines their destiny and ensures their representation in the future government. The struggle in the peace talks has been about who becomes the next president. Groups such as the Hawiye have vowed never to let another Darood take over power after the reconciliation process. The latter on their part insist that the Arta process rewarded the Hawiye and it is now their turn to lead in the new dispensation. However, continued military action has not brought a solution to the problem since no single group has managed to have a clear-cut military advantage over the others.

**Arta Conference**

The most crucial process was the thirteenth Conference held at Arta in Djibouti. Djibouti sponsored the Arta conference, which resulted in the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdikassim Salaad. This conference invited members of the civil society and the traditional elders together with representatives of professionals, economists, teachers, farmers, health care workers, jurists and writers among others. The other crucial group of actors, those who are armed, did not attend.

The results of the Arta Conference could not be implemented because the actors who were excluded, the armed factions, effectively blockaded and confined the activities of the new government to a section of Mogadishu. Although Arta took into consideration the clan balance in terms of numbers, it ignored the number issue in terms of the individual and corporate actors involved. Arta was an attempt to move away from the earlier agreements which focused on the parties as corporate entities, and which had led to the failure of earlier peace conferences. As a result an SRRC alliance emerged after Arta and effectively sabotaged the resolutions of the agreement. The show of strength by the armed faction leaders buried the hope of Djibouti and its allies to run a government in Somalia, and to earn itself a name as the saviour of the Somalis. Arta also ignored the interests of the regional stakeholders like Ethiopia and Kenya. As such, Ethiopia gave full support to the SRRC and rallied support for it in Somalia. Furthermore, the architects of Arta based their process on the 1960 constitution. They failed totally to take into consideration that the awareness level had radically changed and that the clans were more informed than they were then in terms of political representation. In its own assessment towards the end of its term in office, the TNG admitted this fact.

**Fourteenth Somalia Peace Conference**

The fourteenth peace initiative under the auspices of IGAD mandated the three frontline states of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia (as the Technical Committee) to run the
The Somali Peace Process

conference. The pre-negotiation phase of this conference involved the identification of the actors in the conflict. IGAD sent a team to Somalia for this purpose. However, the letters of invitation sent out did not reach all the identified leaders of the parties as arranged, and this caused a problem at the beginning.

The conference was conceptualised in three phases. The first phase was the pre-negotiation, phase two was the negotiation stage and phase three concerned power sharing. In the first phase the actors were identified through a visit to Somalia by IGAD representatives. The issues were also identified and all the parties agreed on the venue. Invitations were sent out and phase I was completed. The Conference originally progressed to phase II, which was declared officially closed by the IGAD Council of Ministers. The ministers also officially launched the preliminary part of phase III.

Phase One of the Conference

The pre-negotiation stage, though dogged by the issue of those who were left out managed to identify a venue, in Eldoret, Kenya. This phase ended with the signing of the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities on 27th October, 2002 at Eldoret. This document became the reference point of who is a leader and who is not. In the view of the SRRC, the G8 Alliance and the TNG, it is those who signed the Declaration that are authentic leaders of the Somali people. Those who did not sign the document and who mainly formed the TNG of Abdikassim and the National Salvation Council contend this view. The stalemate is now around the two groups. Without having any serious issue the two sides took to opposing any suggestion made by their opponents. The issue of numbers again featured strongly as each group tried to set the pace of the reconciliation process. While the numbers favoured the signatories, they pushed for the quick conclusion of the conference. Later, when the numbers fell in their disfavour, they called for a recess of the conference.

The conference also endorsed the Rules of Procedure that were meant to guide the conference. These Rules of procedure remained the backbone of the contentions all through. During the endorsement of the Transitional Charter on 15th September, 2003 the groups that were unhappy with the results complained that the rules of procedure were flawed. Again after the plenary session of 23rd February, 2004 the same complaint had been made by those who had lost in the game of numbers earlier. What was evident was that the dissatisfied groups used the rules as red herrings. None of them pinpointed the exact rule or rules that were not adhered to.

Another problem that faced the conference was the excess number of delegates who had come uninvited. The number of delegates invited stood at 366 on the higher side

5 Maulid Maane had invitations letters for the Jererwyn factions. He left out Hussein Bantu, Sheikh Jama. Those of the SRRC came through Hussein Aideed who failed to deliver invitations to Hilowle Imam, Dalha and Hassan Pilota among others.
8 There are two TNGs. That led by Hassan Abshir and that led by President Abdikassim Salaad. The group mentioned above is the former.
yet at the venue there were more than 1000. Attempts to reduce the number by sending away some of the excess numbers met with stiff opposition from the leaders themselves. The issue became even more complicated when the conference shifted to Nairobi where the numbers increased.

**Phase Two of the Conference**

Phase two of the Reconciliation process began with six committees dealing with different issues. Committee One examined issues to do with the Charter and the transitional government, while Committee Two looked at issues to do with disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration; Committee Three's mandate was to discuss land and property rights; Committee Four was on economic recovery and reconstruction; Committee, Five and Six dealt with issues of regional and international relations and conflict resolution and reconciliation respectively. The committees' work was not smooth because some of the delegates were unfamiliar with the issues involved. This was because some of them were too illiterate to participate effectively in the debates, while others had been away in self-exile and were unfamiliar with current realities that continued to change fast.

The beginning of 2003 brought in many changes for the conference that created disequilibrium among the Somalis and affected progress. Some of the factors that led to this situation were a result of political changes in Kenya. The elections of 2002 saw the exit of President Moi, and this impacted negatively on the conference. Moi was the architect of the conference. He knew every faction leader and maintained close links with them through which the delicate balance of power was maintained. After the departure of Moi, the new NARC government either through lack of interest or factual information failed to contain the situation. A window of opportunity presented itself and the SRRC used it to gain control and have an upper hand in the game of numbers. The TNG was slighted by this, and began to scheme to undo this new development. In the first scheme the TNG tried to scuttle the process by withdrawing its delegation. When this failed, it tried to sabotage the conference by organising a parallel one, which did not work either.

The committee work was also affected by other changes that happened in the same year. The committees were almost through with their work by the end of January 2003. However, two significant things occurred. Bethuel Kiplagat replaced Elijah Mwangale as the special envoy and Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee. This change affected the conference operations as the two leaders had different personalities and approach to things. Mwangale was a politician, and had direct access to State House. This was an important factor to the Somalis. Kiplagat on the other hand as a career diplomat, did not frequent the corridors of power and the Somali knew this, which affected his reputation amongst them. The diplomatic approach that Kiplagat took did not augur well with the Somalis who mistook it for weakness. Considering that these were people who had been used to a dictatorship and a police state, their psychology was that of authoritarianism. Diplomacy did not have room in their vocabulary.
The Somali Peace Process

Secondly, Mwangale’s departure was occasioned by accusations of corruption. This meant that the Somalis were distracted from the negotiations as they put up a spirited fight to oust him. Thirdly, Kiplagat came in without proper handing over and some people took advantage of this situation to confuse things. This impacted negatively on the peace process as the list of delegates made earlier\textsuperscript{11} led to a boycott by the Marehan who complained of inadequate representation in the conference. At that moment a decision to move the conference to Nairobi was also taken. This not only affected the momentum of the conference but also created other logistical problems. As the delegates arrived in Nairobi many Somalis from Eastleigh\textsuperscript{12} invaded the conference venue.

After a month the committees were able to continue with their work and by April all committee reports were ready for the plenary sessions. The plenary as the highest decision making organ of the conference was meant to adopt the committees’ reports. The presentation of the reports began with the least controversial to the most controversial. The plenary was able to adopt all the reports by May, except the two reports given by Committee One. One committee led by some Somalis aligned to the TNG of Mr. Abdkassim Salaad and Djibouti produced a report that was in favour of a centralised form of government. The other group aligned to the SRRC and the Ethiopian government came up with a pro–federalist structure. Efforts to merge these two documents at committee level were fruitless. Those who favoured a federal system for Somalia could not see eye to eye with those for a centralist system of government. The TNG president Mr. Abdkassim Salaad who belonged to the anti–federalist group twice left the conference with a number of his delegates.

The Technical Committee engaged a group of experts to help it harmonise the two documents. This committee led by Prof. Samatar drew a lot of animosity from the faction leaders, who on their part also set up their own team to do the same. Eventually the result was even further confusion as the Technical Committee ended up with seven different versions of the two harmonised documents. Divisions among the leaders and the various groups were along the lines of the document they favoured. After long periods of negotiations and lobbying by women at the conference the leaders came up with an agreed document on 5th July, 2003.

A stalemate on Article 11 ensued during July to September, 2003 over the form of government, issues of governance and the selection process as diplomatic efforts were stepped up to harmonize the positions taken by the two groups. The remaining groups of delegates of the TNG led by the Prime Minister Hassan Abshir and the speaker of parliament Mr. Abdallah Derrow, SRRC, and a section of the civil society struggled to write the Transitional Charter. The final version of the Transitional Charter was adopted by the plenary on 15th September, 2003.

Following this adoption many stakeholders were unhappy and subsequently left the conference. Apart from Mr. Abdkassim Salaad, Mr Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, Mr

\textsuperscript{11} Mr. Kiplagat entrusted Andre Lasage with the list of delegates. Andre made a list that favoured Ethiopia’s SRRC.

\textsuperscript{12} Eastleigh is the part of Nairobi occupied mostly by people of Somali origin.
Jamal Ali Jama and Omar Jess four signatories to the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities namely Musa Sudi, Bare Aden Shire, Osman Ali “Atto” and Abdirizak Bihi also left the conference. These leaders complained that the Rules of Procedure were not followed, non-delegates were allowed to participate in the plenary and the decisions of the arbitration committee on the composition of the delegates had not been effected. Djibouti also accused Kenya of foul play and questioned the credibility of the Charter and the ownership of the conference, and left the conference and withdrew from the Technical Committee too.

The withdrawal of Djibouti raised concern to all including the Somali leaders who wrote several appeals to president Ishmael Gele. Other IGAD member states including Kenya sent delegations to Djibouti to persuade them to return to the conference. The withdrawal of Djibouti was on the basis that the plenary lacked Somali ownership, the rules of procedure were not adhered to and that the process was no longer all-inclusive but favoured Ethiopia and its allies. The authenticity of these complaints against IGAD was not the issue; indeed the conference had to be halted before it went into the power-sharing phase with the numbers favouring the opponents.

The 10th IGAD summit of Heads of State and Government came in handy at Kampala on 20–25th October, 2003. The summit while reviewing the progress of the SNRC and the challenges faced made certain decisions. It expanded the technical committee to include all IGAD member states. This meant that Uganda, Eritrea and the Sudan joined it. In response to concerns over ownership of the process, the summit emphasised Somali ownership by renaming the technical committee the facilitation committee. Thirdly the summit directed that the facilitation committee should meet at the ministerial level to review the status of the peace process with a view to removing all obstacles towards the attainment of peace in Somalia.

The first ministerial facilitation meeting took place in Nairobi, Kenya on 28th October 2003. While appreciating the decision of an expanded facilitation committee and the return of Djibouti, Ethiopia blaming Abdikassim for insulting them at the Africa Union meeting in Maputo, Mozambique left the conference silently. The ministers decided that an exclusive Somali leaders consultative meeting be held for a period of ten days. The objective of the consultative meeting was to try and bring deeper reconciliation among the political leaders, create dialogue and remove the obstacles to the conference, and lastly to attain the much needed inclusivity. In principle the IFC agreed that no party could be allowed to give preconditions for attending the consultative talks and that the conference could not be taken back to renegotiate certain issues. However, those who joined would be allowed to raise concerns that would be taken into consideration. The second and the third ministerial meetings while reiterating the same position, urged the Somali leaders to attend the consultative talks and those who were away were asked to return to the conference. Indeed the ministers issued a warning that whoever did not participate at the consultative talks risked being named as an anti-peace crusader in Somalia.
The Somali Peace Process

The Retreat, as the consultative talks were originally referred to as, was to be attended by the Somali leaders. The groups identified to be represented included what had emerged from those who continued with the conference calling themselves the group of 20. This group was willing to meet with the four members of the newly created NSC who had been with them and who were signatories to the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities signed at Eldoret on the 27th October, 2002. In this case the numbers favoured Mr. Abdullai Yusuf who had led these leaders belonging to three factions into an alliance of power sharing with him on the presidential peddle. Mr. Hassan Abshir and Abdalla Derrow who were originally official delegates of the TNG but now considered rebels supported this course.

Severally, the consultative meeting could not take off because of various reasons among them who would be allowed to attend. Those leaders who remained in Mbagathi formed an alliance, the group of 20, which brought them together. They argued that they were unwilling to meet with any other leader at the consultative meeting except Abdikassim Salaad and the other four signatories to the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities signed in Eldoret. This gave rise to the famous formula of 24+1 for the consultative talks. On the other hand the leaders who had left for Somalia formed the Ballad group, which later called itself the National Salvation Council. This group insisted that it would not come back to the peace process unless they were all recognised as Somali leaders and accepted on equal terms at the talks. This meant that essentially the number that was to attend the talks was forty–two.

After visits to Mogadishu by members of the Facilitation Committee and the International Partners Forum the latter position was adopted on the grounds of inclusivity. After this visit the Mogadishu groups were willing to come to the consultations but the group of 20 were still unwilling to meet some of the individuals from Mogadishu accusing them of being fake or recently created leaders. Combined pressure from the international community and the IFC made the group of 20 relent and the consultations began on 8th January, 2004.

President Yoweri Museveni, Chairman of IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Governments met with all the groups, comprising the TNG led by President Abdikassim Salaad, the group of 20, the National Salvation Council and the Civil Society. On 9th January President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya and Chairman to IGAD Facilitation Committee on Somalia joined President Museveni for the launch of the consultative talks. The breakthrough attained by president Museveni came about in the context of bringing together Abdikassim Salaad and Abdullai Yusuf to a round table discussion. This dialogue opened a window for discussion on power sharing that gave hope to these contestants. Driven by their individual considerations, they hoped they could share the cake without resolving the jigsaw puzzle of numbers they had created alliances over.

13 The Troika of IFC, AU and the IPF made one of the visits. Amb Mohamed Ali Foum of AU led this delegation comprising of Amb. W.Birrigwa-Ugandas representative to Ethiopia and permanent representative to AU, ECA and IGAD, Col. P.Marwa of IGAD-Djibouti, Mr. David Bell of the British High Commission, Mr.PerLingarde of the Swedish Embassy, Mr. A. Ramatta and Mr. J. Kiboi of IFC.
14 The fear is based on the fact that the Mogadishu groups are direct opponents of the group of 20.
Progress was made through shuttle diplomacy. The positions of these parties that could not meet were identified. The TNG and a section of the Civil Society allied to them, the group of 20 and another section of the civil society and the National Salvation Council held divergent views. The sticky issues revolved around the title of the Charter, and the government, the duration of the transitional period, the mode of selection of the members of parliament as stated in Article 30 of the adopted Transitional Charter, the size of the Transitional Parliament, the composition of the delegates and the plenary that adopted the Charter. The TNG insisted that the Charter be replaced by the 1960 constitution, the size of parliament be reduced to 171, the title of the Charter and the transitional government be changed, the selection of MPs be left to the traditional elders, the delegates and the plenary be reconstituted. On the other hand the Group of 20 took the view that the Charter earlier adopted at Mbagathi remains, the size of parliament be 351, the selection of MPs be done by politicians in consultation with the traditional leaders and that the consultations could only be held between the 24 signatories and Abdikassim Salaad. In the view of the group of 20 the plenary was considered properly reconstituted since it had representatives of all the groups based on the 4.5 clan formula.

From these positions the IFC came up with a harmonized paper. It proposed that the title of the Charter remains the same, and the title of government be left as it is. The most significant change it proposed was on Article 30 of the adopted Charter. It called for the selection of MPs to be done by “sub–sub–clan politicians recognized by TNG, existing regional administrations, faction leaders recognised by the conference and endorsed by genuine sub sub clan traditional leaders.”

Secondly, Article 32 of the Charter proposed that transitional period should be five years and finally a proposal was given that the amendments be adopted by an extra ordinary plenary.

The harmonized document did not go well with National Salvation Council who insisted that their name had to be explicitly reflected in Article 30. In their opinion they read that their right to the selection of MPs was being denied. After another round of shuttle diplomacy that was done in unclear circumstances another version of the harmonised document that explicitly mentioned their name and the other groups emerged. A ceremony was arranged at State House, Nairobi, where president Kibaki witnessed a symbolic signing ceremony on 29th January, 2004.

In the post–signing period some key faction leaders denied having signed the document earlier. They complained of some problems especially in the text that had been signed at State House, Nairobi. They raised the following fundamental points on the signed document. Firstly, those who signed were not chosen according to the 4.5 clan formula that had earlier been agreed; secondly that Article 30 that was negotiated mentioned the term “sub clan” twice unlike the final document that did so three times, thirdly, the question of who were “political leaders” referred to and who was to participate in the

15 Abdikassim Salaad who had fallen off with his TNG delegation led by Hassan Abshir and Abdalla Derrow the Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament respectively questioned the authenticity of delegates.
The Somali Peace Process

selection of MPs remained contentious; fourthly, Abdiqasim Salaad only signed as a witness rather than a key party. The group of 20 was unhappy with the protocol that Abdiqasim was being accorded as the president of the Republic of Somalia when his term had already expired.

Actors, Interests and Issues

Attempts to resolve any conflicts are bound to fail if the actors are not identified. The term ‘actors’ refer to all the participants in the conflict be they mediators or the warring parties. Mediators are all those groups who help the conflicting parties by bringing them together, gaining trust, setting the agenda, clarifying issues and formulating agreements. All actors have certain interests in the conflict which is what makes them become involved in the first place. This part identifies the various actors and their interests in the conference and the conflict as a whole. It argues that achieving peace in the Somali peace process continues to be difficult not because of internal interests but due to those of external actors.

The linkage between the external and internal actors evidenced by the corporate organs and individuals. The SRRC is an organisation that was created by Ethiopia to protect and champion its interests in Somalia. In the same manner both the TNG of Abdiqasim Salaad and the newly created NSC are pro-Djibouti. The other parties in this conference support either of these two sides depending on which one seems to be winning. For instance, when the SRRRC had the upper hand it enjoyed the support of Hassan Abshir and the rebel TNG, that of the G8 alliance and a section of the civil society. This marriage of convenience lasted until the return of Djibouti and its new alliance. Following the signing of the Safari Park agreement, the G8 shifted camp and supported the position of the NSC and TNG’s Abdiqasim Salaad as the balance in the game of numbers tilted in favour of the two groups.

There is also linkage at the individual level. There are certain actors in this conflict who owe their allegiance to the regional powers. President Abdiqasim Salaad remains a follower of Djibouti while his rival Abdullah Yusuf of Puntland serves the same master. Those in the other camp also serve the interests of Djibouti. The two levels of linkages made the Somali conflict complex as regional interests were brought into play. In all cases when the conference stalled the explanation behind it was usually partly the lack of consideration of regional interests. Kenya and other IGAD countries like Uganda, Sudan, and Eritrea have yet to create such linkages.

For purposes of analysis, it is convenient to view the actors from the perspective of internal or external forces. This kind of analysis will help in understanding the kinds of pressures that were being applied to the conference. The external actors can be referred to as the invisible actors. Although they are not directly involved in the war they are part

of the conflict.\footnote{Ibid.} In conflict resolution it is important that the invisible actors are taken into consideration. If they are ignored any solution to the conflict will not succeed because the invisible actors will undermine it. The actors in the Somali conference have an interest in the outcome of the conflict. The visible actors in this conflict are the Somali groups, both in terms of individuals and the clans. The frontline states namely, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia and the two former colonial powers, Britain and Italy constitute the invisible actors.

**Role of Djibouti**

In the SNRC external actors were strongly involved in determining the outcome of the conference. Within the region the actors led to the failure to reach a conclusion to the conference. Djibouti, a neighbouring state was involved in the talks for various reasons. It came in as a member of the Technical Committee, later renamed the IFC. What emerged clearly indicates that Djibouti had all along tried to safeguard the results of Arta. Also Ethiopia created the SRRC to circumvent the results of Arta that did not favour them.

In the interest of Djibouti, it was important to influence the results from Nairobi in order to keep Abdikassim in office. A friendly Somali government is useful for economic purposes to Djibouti, which lacks resources and whose population of 300,000, cannot sustain a viable market to its business oriented economy. Djibouti pulled out of the conference just at the time the TNG was ending its term of office. Encouraged by Djibouti and invoking a section of the 1960 constitution, Abdikassim renewed his tenure in government and defied all appeals to return to the negotiations in Nairobi.

Additionally, Djibouti during its absence utilised the time to create a new alliance in Mogadishu, the National Salvation Council. This was an alliance of all the dissatisfied faction leaders who had withdrawn from the peace talks.\footnote{The alliance created brought together those who were opposed to the SRRC and anti-Ethiopia.} Apparently the TNG of Abdikassim Salaad has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Salvation Council. Following the agreement and the subsequent interventions by various groups, Djibouti returned to the negotiations with a formidable force to take on the Ethiopia backed SRRC.

**Role of Ethiopia**

Ethiopia’s interest in Somalia is traceable to the history of the two countries. Indeed both Menelik II and Emperor Haile Sellasie annexed portions of Somalia.\footnote{Martin Doornbos, "The Ogaden After 1991: What are the Options?" in *Mending Rips in the sky: Options for Somali Communities In the 21st Century*, edited by Hussein M. Adam and R. Ford (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1997), p.490.} Ethiopia shares a 2000 km border with Somalia, which explains its security concerns. Ethiopia’s interests lie in the strategic concern for security. It has been argued that internal wars have regional effects through a spill over effect.\footnote{See D. Lake and D.Rothchild eds., *The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).} Thus Ethiopia needs a neighbour that would be partner in its security arrangements. Further, Ethiopia fought the last war with Somalia...
over the Ogaden and is careful to create a friendly government that cannot revive the hostilities over Ogaden. However, the return of Djibouti with the National Salvation Council and the TNG has tilted the balance in favour of its rivals. Ethiopia went back to the drawing board to strategize and it is this perspective that explains the ensuing stalemate. On this basis, a solution to the Somali conflict will entail a satisfactory answer to the concerns of Djibouti and Ethiopia. The last but not least of these considerations is the fact that the Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, had taken refuge in Somalia for a long time. During this period he made friends with some of the current faction leaders in Somalia whom he would like to ensure become leaders like he did.

Role of Kenya

Kenya also shares a 700–1000 km borderline with Somalia. Kenya has suffered highly through the huge numbers of refugees who are a financial burden and a threat to its environment. Further, the war in Somalia has led to an increase in insecurity through the infiltration of small arms into Kenya. Apart from these, Kenya's interest was explained by its concern especially during the Moi era to remain as a leading peacemaker in the region. President Moi, towards the end of his tenure, engaged in many peace–making missions as a way of maintaining his statesmanship and diverting attention from domestic problems. In the post–Moi era, one reason that contributed to the loss of momentum in the peace process was the change of government. President Kibaki concentrated on economic recovery and ignored regional issues. This meant that pressure on the parties from Kenya was reduced and the negotiations went into a recess.

Kenya's role is weakened by the fact that it has not formulated any foreign policy for Somalia. This means that Kenya tried to tread the path of an impartial mediator. Because Ethiopia and Djibouti are clear in their vision, Kenya was forced to ally itself with either one of the two at one stage or the other because of the way they couched their interests in good propaganda. At the beginning of the negotiations their perfect ally was Ethiopia, and in its absence, Djibouti. As the two states battled for supremacy in the outcome of the Somalia conflict, Kenya stood watching the battle of these giants without knowing who was right and who was lying. The withdrawal of Ethiopia left Kenya vulnerable to the machinations of Djibouti which influenced the Safari Park Agreement a great deal. On their recommendation the ministers took over the running of the peace process thus sacrificing professionalism at the altar of politics. The ensuing stalemate was the result of a badly negotiated agreement. The failure to use shuttle diplomacy to make the various Somali factions meet at a round table meant that the core issues remained buried deep in their hearts. Lack of skills is reflected in the short-cut that was taken of using the leaders only and assuming that they had no audience that also needed to be engaged. The hurry with which an agreement was supposedly obtained is another indicator of lack of skills on the part of those who hijacked the process from the people who were supposed to facilitate the negotiations. This situation created the difficulties experienced at the negotiations.
For personal reasons, Moi also got involved in the Somali conflict. Thinking ahead he proposed to create the Moi Foundation, an organisation to be involved in conflict resolution as a future retirement occupation for him. Not surprisingly, he accepted to host the Somali peace talks in his home turf and to create economic benefits for his people as a way of gaining political mileage in the subsequent elections. Although Kenya is occupied by people of Somali origin, it is no longer a priority to safeguard them especially in the current political dispensation.

The regional countries are concerned about the economic development of the whole region as a whole. Following the emergence of REAPAS as the means to economic development it was necessary to have some sort of regional organisation. Kenya for instance, is not a beneficiary of the LDC plan of the poorest countries. It was therefore important for Kenya to find regional partners in order to correct this anomaly. Furthermore Kenya, as regional state has the greatest industrial capacity. From this perspective the conflict is seen as impacting negatively on its economy in terms of trade. As for Djibouti and Ethiopia the closure of Somali airports and seaports directly affects their economic activities and this necessitates intervention to end the Somali conflict. The black market that is thriving in Somalia promotes tax evasion and thus denies the regional governments of revenue that would have accrued from legitimate trade. Seen from this angle all the frontline states were willing to cooperate to end this conflict.

**Ugandan Interests**

The interests of Uganda are naturally influenced by the fact that once Moi left power, President Museveni considered himself his successor as the regional leader. This, was strengthened by the fact that Museveni took over as the Chairman of the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government, which provided an opportunity for leadership in the region. The Kampala summit was not very favourable to Kenya. Djibouti and Abdikassim Salaad, the TNG president, criticised openly Kenya’s Special envoy who was Chair of the Facilitation Committee. Uganda’s friendship with Libya was bound help Djibouti’s cause. Uganda’s entry was intended to tame Kenya’s ambitions in the region.

**Eritrean Interests**

Eritrea on its part saw this as perfect opportunity to settle scores with Ethiopia. The two countries have had a long-standing border dispute. Eritrea sought an alliance to counter Ethiopia’s interests and ambitions in the region. While struggling to settle scores it found perfect allies in Djibouti, which bears a personal grudge against Ethiopia, and Uganda whose aim is to scuttle Kenya’s ambitions to retain regional supremacy. For these reasons, peace remains elusive in Somalia because at any one time there must be one side that the solution favours while the opposite side makes a deliberate effort to scuttle the progress.
The Somali Peace Process

Egypt, Libya and the Arab League

Egypt, Libya and the Arab League followed the proceedings at Mbagathi keenly on the ground that they are Muslim states like Somalia. However, Egyptian interests go beyond Islam. Egypt was keen to safeguard its Nile designs through the conflict in Somalia. The Nile question affects all the riparian states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and the Sudan. Through colonial agreements Britain granted exclusive rights to Egypt over the use of Nile waters at the expense of the others. Egypt would like this protracted conflict in Somalia to continue to ensure Ethiopia's distraction from developments at home. In this case there would be no danger that Ethiopia will divert the waters of the Nile for irrigation purposes.

International Partners Forum

The international community formed the International Partners Forum (IPF). This group was responsible apart from the IGAD countries, for financial assistance to the negotiations. The key members included Italy, Britain, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, the USA, Arab League, Egypt, the African Union and the European Union. During the consultation meetings at Safari Park, the IPF and the IFC began to hold joint meetings. The joint meetings were encouraged on the basis of coordinated decision-making. However, this aspect was seen in the light of mediating as a team. While this was a good idea which helped to reach more objective decisions, it also highlighted lot of other weaknesses. Some members of the team brought with them the interests of their countries. Meetings became acrimonious as two approaches emerged. The first level pitted the members of the IPF against those of the IFC. The second was between the members of both the IPF and IFC protecting their national interest and that of the Somali faction aligned to them.

The other problem that emerged in this new arrangement of the IFC/IPF working together was the problem of confused roles. There is confusion of roles as some IPF members became engaged in a mediating role. Somalis were not comfortable with this approach because increasingly these members introduced western solutions to a problem that needed an African solution. After the consultations the Somalis increasingly accused this group of meddling in their affairs. Other members of the IPF also called on their colleagues to go back to their original role of remaining partners in the reconciliation process.

The interests of the partners were varied. Some like Britain and Italy shared a colonial history with Somalia. The Italian government controlled much of the southern parts of Somalia in what was then known as Italian Somaliland, while Britain controlled the north-western parts. The French controlled another part while the other two were under the control of Kenya and Ethiopia. It is this region and the northwestern parts that joined together to form the Republic of Somalia.

---

25 David Bell was involved in the drafting of the agreement signed at Safari Park. He is accused of dictating to the Somalis during the consultative talks. This issue raised has made the Somalis to continue calling for a Somali owned process.
Large banana plantations and farms still belong to Italians like the Mori family in the inter-riverine regions of southern Somalia. Other concerns emanate from the fact that Italy harbours a bulk of refugees it would wish to return home quickly. Above all for purposes of not losing face Italy wanted to be seen to be at the forefront in trying to restore law and order in its former colony. These interests were occasionally threatened. Italy for instance tried to derail the process in its initial stages because it wanted to claim credit for having resolved the conflict. For long it was also reluctant to give substantial financial contribution to the process, which undermined the peace process.

The British colony is situated in the northwestern regions of Somalia. This portion gained its independence from Britain and joined the southern parts in 1960. After the civil war the north western regions revoked the 1960 agreement with the south and declared its independence. Today the area is peaceful and has managed to restore law and order within its territory. At the beginning of the 14th initiative for peace Somaliland did not honour the invitations sent. However, some of its clans attended the conference in an unofficial capacity. This attitude threatened the chances of making peace, and the unity of Somalia as a whole. Britain as a former colonial master seemed to be encouraging the secession of Somaliland. The former colonial master lobbied for the recognition of this government in international circles, arguing that since the south had failed to organise itself there was no ground to continue refusing to do so. This aim of Britain was also to undermine the peace process by encouraging Somaliland to go on its own.

Sweden on its part was actively involved as one of the countries with the largest Somali refugee populations in the world. The registered number of Somalis is 40,000, of whom 30,000 are registered as Somalis, and 10,000 as Ogaden Somalis. The Ogadens are those who entered Sweden during the Siad Barre regime. Since they needed asylum they used this region of Ethiopia for their survival. This explains why Sweden provided critical financial and moral support at the IPF level. The ruling party in Sweden, the Social Democratic Party made an agreement with the Somalis that in return for their vote once the party formed the government it would help in the peace process and in the reconstruction of Somalia. Besides, Sweden is recognised as an advocate for peace in the world. It is motivated by this tradition to participate actively in the negotiations.

**Road Map for Somalia**

Taking into consideration the fact that thirteen other efforts to bring peace to Somalia failed, and realizing that the Nairobi initiative has been on since October 2002, it is necessary that policy makers do not continue hoping against hope that peace will be soon restored. The complexity of this conflict lies in the fact that apart from the internal forces there are other external actors that have an interest on the outcome of the conflict itself. Accusations of outside interference are the order of the day. Whatever the validity of these accusations a resolution will have to take into account the interests of all the parties.
The Somali Peace Process

There are some options open to Somalia. One is to have an international force sent to disarm the factions and militias. Once disarmament is accomplished the country would continue, as it had been earlier. As Mazrui observes, Africa had two categories of people in relations to issues of governance. There were those who depend on land and those who depend on animals. Those who keep animals largely had stateless societies as opposed to those who tilled land who had some semblance of a state. The stateless societies however, ordered anarchy through consensus rather than through coercion. The Somalis in this case belong to the category of lovers of animals who had a stateless society. The creation of the western type of state lacked the basis of nationhood and thus it collapsed. Somali mentality lacks an adequate commitment to nationhood. The question is whether Somali society without nationhood is capable of holding onto statehood. This lends credence to the argument for a non-stateless society in Somalia.

There are interesting things to note in Somalia. In many parts the traditional and religious leaders have been able to restore some semblance of law and order. Traditional and religious leaders are the only authentic leaders in the community, while all the others have to fight for their legitimacy. In this case Somalia will remain, as it has been, a stateless society. This is an interesting hypothesis to support and develop despite the fact that such thinking may not go down well with realists. History also supports such a system. The colonial masters utilised the existing traditional African systems to govern some parts of the continent. The question of how effective they were is however beyond this discussion.

The other option open to policy makers is for the international community to intervene on its own and restore law and order through some form of occupational force. In considering such an option the reaction of the Somalis must be carefully weighed. A decade ago the international community suffered terrible losses in human life while trying to restore order in Somalia. Intervention in this case will require not only collaboration with the local people but with the regional states as well. Awareness creation is necessary prior to such an action as a way of countering the propaganda that will develop from negative forces.

Conclusion

What comes out clearly is that there are no substantive issues in the Somali conflict. The contentions remain at the level of individual and clan interests on economics, property and political space. All these are tied to a complex web of regional interests. The objective of the movements that followed Siad Barre’s departure was the removal of the intolerable dictatorship and the re-establishment of unity and democracy. What emerged instead were gangsters randomly plundering and sabotaging all peace efforts more than anything else. The way forward requires tying together both interests, that of replacing the old regime and that of unifying the fragmenting groups.

The progress made at the negotiations at Mbagathi is an important step towards the resolution of this conflict. Just as the SNRC built on the Arta formula, subsequent peace talks could use some of its ideas. The Arta formula however, must be improved on, as it does not fully correspond to all the dimensions in the game of numbers. Additionally, clans like the Hawiye contest it on the grounds that it failed to take into account the reality on the ground. The Hawiye believe that as the clan controlling much of the ground, they should also have the largest share of the cake. This argument is justified if a resolution takes into account the numbers on the ground and rewards those who fought hard to depose Siad Barre. From this perspective, the Hawiye have the largest number of factions on the ground and claim to be the backbone of the second liberation. However, this cannot be the case because the peace talks at Mbagathi seek a resolution leading to a win–win situation. If this argument is developed on this basis, then the Somalis should negotiate a new formula for power sharing rather use the Arta formula. In the light of an inadequate or unsatisfactory resolution, it is necessary to look for alternatives that can help to alleviate the human suffering of the people of Somalia. The suggestions given need to be scrutinized thoroughly to come up with viable modes that do not inflame the delicate situation.
Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD

John Koech

Introduction

Regional Security is all about survival. It is the sum total of all issues that may threaten the security of a region. A decade ago regional security meant the presence of an internal or external threat within a region. Threat to regional security meant a declared or imagined emergency. This in turn implied a right to use whatever means was available to ward off the impending threat. Indeed, high politics and military strategy were high on the national agenda. This was a statist approach to responding to insecurity and has since then dramatically waned. The statist understanding of security as military might and strategies was the norm during the Cold War. In fact, most of the conflicts were territorial and ideologically based. The ideology of the Cold War corresponded with equating international security to a strategic relationship. As the conflict between the great powers de-escalated rapidly at the end of the 1980s, the space opened up for broadening the security agenda to include issues that had earlier not been taken into account.

Geo-Strategic Survey

Africa is endowed with vast natural resources, including the mineral rich Central and Southern Africa, and the oil rich Northern and Western Africa. However, Africa today is languishing in poverty commanding only 2 per cent of world trade with a GDP of US 2 billion, which is less than that of Belgium.

Most of the world’s conflicts are found in Africa and out of the 22 million refugees/displaced persons, 18 million are in Africa, the majority of whom are in the Horn and the Great Lakes region. Because of its strategic position, the Horn of Africa was the arena for superpower rivalry during the Cold War. In 1979, the Soviet and Cuban presence in the Horn resulted in a huge build-up of arsenals in the region. The number of tanks, artillery and aircrafts surpassed the legitimate needs of the states concerned.

Today, economic and information globalization and the weakening of state sovereignty are a reality that must be addressed. In the Horn of Africa, multiple borders delimit the Horn’s conflict system. Because of its peculiar linkage with other conflict systems in Africa, the IGAD region remains an area that is attractive for security studies and analysis. For instance; following the defeat of Siad Barre, Somali degenerated into a failed state. The result has been a flow of refugees into Kenya, with the accompanying...
proliferation of small arms. Somalia has no national government and is ruled by warlords. Its population being mono–ethnic is the most homogeneous: there is the same language and religion with clans composed of the Haawiye, Dawoods, Isaaks and Isaas.

In Ethiopia, following the overthrow of Mengistu, the succeeding regime conceded the cessation of Eritrea. Before long, the two were at war, largely for personality reasons. Sudan, the largest country in Africa with vast resources is still fighting a protracted civil war basically between the Islamic north and secular south. In Uganda, the government is still trying to suppress the internal strife perpetuated by the Lords Resistance Army. In Kenya, relative peace is being enjoyed despite incidents of ethnic strife, challenges of the overflow of refugees, and the proliferation of small arms. A successful transition in 2002 earned the government praise in this era of multiparty democracy. This notwithstanding, the proliferation of small arms has resulted in the increase of cattle rustling, poaching, highway robberies and car jacking. Cross border incursions by pastoralists bordering Kenya/Ethiopia and Kenya/Uganda borders have also been prevalent either due to traditional disputes over grass and water resources or for commercial reasons. Fishing rights in Lake Victoria provide an additional venue of conflicts.

The issue of weak state institutions and the distribution of power cannot be overlooked. This is coupled with the lack of infrastructure, and, inordinate and unsustainable expenditures on defence and security beyond legitimate needs. The economies are basically rural/subsistence with pastoralists at the mercy of the weather. Even where there are modern agro–based industries which are vulnerable to external competition from cheap or subsidized imports, poverty and unemployment have reached unacceptable limits and tend to give rise to crime.

**IGAD Sub–Region**

The Inter–Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986. It initially focused on the issues of drought, desertification and food security. In March 1996, sub–regional leaders transformed IGADD into the Inter–Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD’s mandate includes conflict management, prevention and resolution. It has a conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN) whose strategy is to pro–actively prevent and respond to conflict. The other mandates of IGAD include environmental protection, agricultural research, water resource management, communication, transport, and manpower development. The founding members of IGAD are Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Federal Republic of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Some key characteristics of the IGAD region can be isolated. First, the members of IGAD form what can be called the Greater Horn of Africa. This is a region that is prone to occasional drought and it therefore relies heavily on a pastoral economy and irrigation–fed agriculture.

Second, Ethiopia and Uganda are the catchment areas for the Nile. Indeed, the Nile has raised issues of water rights which are an issue of high politics regionally. The Nile is the
longest river in the world, and many African countries depend on it for their livelihood. Its sources are controlled by Ethiopia and Uganda. Environmental degradation of these catchment areas has far reaching consequences in the IGAD region and for the far north. Already, there is a political question on the validity of the treaty signed by the colonial governments of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania on the use and control of River Nile.

Third, the concept of failed states has been practically manifested in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, with its irredentist aspirations, is a failed state. It comprises five pseudo–states in which a sustainable peace seems remote. Somalia has been the source of the illegal flow of small arms and refugees which are directly related to insecurity in the region. It has also been claimed to be a sanctuary for terrorist groups that has greatly affected tourism in East Africa. Finally, the IGAD region comprises countries with marginal economic growth characterized by low industrialization, resource–based, political, religious and ethnic conflicts.

The End of Globalization

In the 1990s, phenomenal changes started to emerge in the international system through the process of globalization. It is important to capture the meaning of globalization since its implications for world security and politics has necessitated a re–definition of security. Indeed, there has been a fundamental paradigm shift in defining the scope of security.

At least five general usages of the word ‘globalization’ can be discerned. The word has often been taken to mean internationalization namely, intensification of cross-border interactions and inter-dependence among states. The second usage has been associated with liberalization, meaning the process of removing government–imposed restrictions on the movement between countries in order to create an integrated world economy. A third perspective sees globalization in terms of the degree of universalization of norms and practices. Fourth, many people especially critics of cultural imperialism have defined globalization as westernization, where western culture subordinates non–western culture. Today, it is largely conceded that globalization means deterritorialization of the spatial limits of states.

Globalization is thus a process where many social relations become relatively delinked from territorial geography. Globalization has become inevitable because of the complex interdependent relationships between states. Its main assumption is that no state can gain security unilaterally. Subsequently, states can contribute to regional security by enhancing the security of other countries. Conversely if a state acts to increase the insecurity of other countries, it ends up increasing its own insecurity. Hence, security issues must be reciprocal in order to benefit all actors in a security system.

Globalization has changed the old conception of security. Four ideas have been associated with the process of globalization. First, the world community has become interdependent in matters of commerce and communication. There has been a
tremendous growth of computer networks, telephone and electronic mass media. Such technologies enable people to have immediate contacts with each other, irrespective of their location and regardless of the borders that divide them. With borders becoming increasingly porous, it is not practically possible to have absolute sovereignty. In this sense, it is more accurate to refer to frontiers rather than distinct territorial state borders. In this context, technological advances are a manifestation of how security has become vulnerable to both internal and external threats.

Secondly, there has been an increased proliferation and growth of multi-national corporations, inter-governmental organisations and regulatory agencies that operate as inter-regional networks. The growth of these entities has interlinked regional contacts which governments cannot control. Thirdly, globalization has been taking place through planetary climate change, decline in the earth's biological diversity and depletion of the ozone layer as a result of environmental pollution. Again, none of these issues can be isolated in one state. Environmental issues are clearly matters of concern to the international community since the environment knows no borders. Lastly, conflicts have rapidly spread across borders through contagion, hence the notion of the internationalization of conflict, which means amongst other things, the introduction of external factors into internal conflict.

**Internationalization of Conflict**

The internationalization of conflict significantly changes the structure of conflict management. The notion of internationalization of conflict raises the issue of the relationship between borders and states. Frontiers in reality sweep away borders and make them largely irrelevant and blurred. Frontiers are zones of contact and therefore, policing security becomes problematic. It is in such frontiers that interstate conflicts take place. In a global setting, regional security can no longer be perceived purely in the context of military might; rather, security has expanded to encompass environmental, economic, political and social insecurity.

The preoccupation with cross-border conflicts and military power does not correspond with contemporary reality. Instead, a perspective from the south has emerged. In this perspective, military conflicts for example are rarely cross-border, but result from domestic challenges to the legitimacy of political regimes. Conflicts in the IGAD region have been associated with the failure to integrate diverse social groups into the political process. While military conflict has been a source of insecurity in the south, many scholars claim that security should not be defined solely in terms of military threats. Edward Azar defines insecurity more broadly as threats to values and identities, the nature of which will vary across time, space and issue area. An expanded definition of security includes not only the internal security of the state, but also secure systems of food production, health, trade, provision for basic human needs, environmental degradation, small arms, poverty illiteracy, ethnicity, refugee problems, uncontrolled population growth, drugs, terrorism and bad politics. Reducing security issues to these

---

1 For detailed analysis of Internationalization of Conflict, see Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000).
basic levels suggests the importance of the individual in defining security. In this view, regional security arrangements are ultimately intended to serve the individual. Contemporary definitions of security focus on common and comprehensive security arrangements. From this perspective, military–centred notions of regional security are fundamentally flawed in a highly interdependent region that faces multiple security threats that are not amenable to traditional solutions. Common regional security assumes that there are regional vulnerabilities which threaten the entire system, and which cannot be simply solved by protecting boundaries. By emphasizing common dangers, it bases its appeal on co–operative behaviour, not on altruism, but on a larger sense of collective self interest. The contemporary northern perspective on security acknowledges security in multi–dimensional terms. Subsequently, insecurity refers to those issues that do not address the well being of the individual.

Rationale for Regionalism

Interdependence stresses that intensified economic and political exchanges between regional actors imply the need for security cooperation. The high degree of economic and security interdependence which link the IGAD states implies that war has become an illegitimate policy instrument. The intermeshing of economies and shared interests in regional stability means that security has become a collective good. Hence, issues of security can only be effectively managed if there is a shared perception of insecurity and the mobilization of joint resources towards collective security management. In this sense, the lack of a comprehensive regional security arrangement in the IGAD region is glaring, although its involvement in the management of the conflicts in Somalia and Sudan and provides a useful beginning for a regional security initiative.

AU and Conflict Management

The shortcomings of the OAU in security and conflict management suggested that a continental arrangement for security management was impossible. This was thought to be so because Africa is a vast continent with diverse economic disparities. Hence a holistic security undertaking in the continent would not only be expensive but also difficult to manage. Further, ideological differences and perceptions about conflict vary from state to state. Besides this, security integration and management operates on the fundamental assumption of economic parity among the actors. Parity implies a more or less equal ability to fund security management. In the IGAD region, the economic disparity between member states is very clear.

The African Union has undergone a revolutionary change on the legal front. Its Constitutive Act provides for the right to intervene in a member state for reasons ranging from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It also provides for member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security. Finally, the Act provides for sanctions against member states failing to comply with the decisions and policies of the AU. Clearly, on a continental level, the Act gives the AU
Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD

overwhelming powers for security management, but these powers are checked by moral and political constraints. On a regional level, security within the IGAD region will most probably be faced with the same constraints as the AU.

Challenges for regional security are based on conflicts between international law, the UN Charter, morality and states’ interests. The basic objective of the AU and the UN is basically to maintain peace between states. Specifically, the UN Charter restrains members from the use of force against the territorial or political independence of any state. This upholds and respects the principle of the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty has been a constraint to security management. The reality today is that conflicts are internationalized and are rarely purely internal. However, developments such as the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the general acceptance of humanitarian intervention indicates that states are embracing the concept of pooling their sovereignty in exchange for regional security. What is needed for IGAD is a doctrine of intervention similar to that of ECOWAS.

Another challenge arises from international law. International law is a set of principles and values that states agree on for their mutual benefit. A successful regional security mechanism therefore requires the consensus of regional states to enforce security, and this includes intervention. Political challenges to regional security arrangements can also be a major setback. Here, the assumption is that states will not cooperate in any security arrangement as long as cooperation jeopardizes national interests. States are sometimes apprehensive about the outcome of cooperative behaviour. Thus, the limitations set by legal and political challenges suggest that regional security requires collective action and a unity of purpose.

Finally, the scope of security is challenging governments to agree on the best methods of managing it. Nationally, IGAD states have to contend with issues concerning small arms proliferation, poaching, banditry, drought, AIDS, refugees, environmental degradation, organized crime and terrorism. The wide scope of insecurity demands a new approach to security management. For instance the East African Community’s (EAC) development of the elements of collective security is the right way forward.

Regional security is relational. The normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic regional system is one of regionally based clusters. The IGAD region is a security complex marked by distinctive regional patterns, shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity. In a similar argument, the concept of conflict systems is useful in understanding security and conflict management. There exist conflict systems which have identifiable epicenters. In particular, conflicts in the IGAD region have wider linkages than previously thought. For example the Sudan conflict has hitherto been thought of as being purely an internal conflict. In reality however, the conflict in Sudan has linkages with Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia because of the existence of common ethnic groups across their borders. In terms

of regional security, the IGAD region cannot be studied in isolation. A regional security arrangement must take into account the linkages with others such as the Great Lakes and the North African conflict systems. A conflict system approach in the context of IGAD would ideally involve actors beyond the immediate membership of IGAD. Hence security management in the IGAD region must take into account the other regions surrounding it.

**IGAD and Regional Security**

Although IGAD is currently involved in conflict management in Somalia and Sudan, it is still too early to rate its performance in the management of regional security. So far, indications of a positive outcome in the Sudan conflict are good. However, IGAD’s conflict management approach in Sudan has been mainly track one. This may not sufficiently address the underlying causes of the conflict. A dual track 1 and track 2 approach would be more fruitful. Track one diplomacy is official diplomacy of the type practiced by states and creations of states. It is formal diplomacy, and is hence constrained by official foreign policies. Track two diplomacy on the other hand is unofficial. It is not the diplomacy of states, but rather of non-states actors. Although it goes by a variety of descriptions and names, its essence is that it does not involve states, although it is often conducted by people who were formerly officials.

The starting point for a regional security policy is the domestic security policy of regional actors. The quality of national security policy depends on its practical foundations, and on sound information. To be useful, information must be adequate, timely, accurate and well coordinated. National security should be integrated regionally so that an information and early warning network is established. Security issues in the IGAD region are complex and are increasingly becoming unconventional. In essence, national security is a multi–institutional enterprise, embracing inputs from the military, police, and civil society. Also, the role of the individual in matters of national and regional security is critical. Indeed, regional security reflects the level of awareness at the individual level. In this regard, governments have a responsibility to educate and sensitize their citizens on security matters. Most terrorist acts have been reported by individuals and not by organized institutions. Grave security issues can only be responded to through military intervention as the last resort. In this context, a regional peacekeeping force has been suggested. Subsequently, a research on an African Standby Force is currently being carried out. A regional standby force initially would mean drawing a representative number of troops from member states. This will however raise issues of the command structure. These and other issues need to be thoroughly debated before an effective regional security mechanism can be established.

Elsewhere, sanctions have been recommended as an alternative to military intervention. However African states are already over-vulnerable to poverty, ill–health, illiteracy and unemployment. The imposition of sanctions in Africa as a way of managing conflict and security is self–defeating in the long run, since sanctions target the entire country including the poor and the disadvantaged.

---

3 At the Peace Support Training Centre - Karen, Nairobi, Kenya.
Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD

The Emerging Reality

The scope of security has greatly expanded. Security issues can be managed by addressing issues like economic development programmes. This approach recognizes that African problems can only be solved through homegrown solutions. One such approach has been the launching of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The NEPAD programme is holistic and is an integrated sustainable development initiative for Africa’s revival. NEPAD is a strategic framework which among other things, addresses good governance, poverty eradication, regional integration and peaceful co–existence as basic ingredients in managing and dealing with security issues.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that in the Horn of Africa, there exists a conflict system which needs to be re–addressed from a broad perspective if peace is to be realized in the region. The challenge is not just about the management of conflict, but also the management of peace. The chapter has also noted the distinction between track one and track two diplomacy in conflict management. It also noted that responses to conflict in the Horn have changed since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, it was suggested that approaches to conflict management in the region be of a dual diplomatic approach.

The reality of outside interference in the conflicts of the Horn of Africa has substantially changed in the post Cold War period. But the reality of the conflicts themselves has not changed much especially in terms of their impact in the region. There are signs that both states and non-state actors in the region are serious in their quest for peace in the Horn of Africa. How to manage this quest is the hope and challenge for the twenty first century.
Chapter 11

Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

Makumi Mwagiru

Introduction

In recent years, questions of conflict and security have preoccupied the states and peoples of the IGAD region. This was prompted, in the beginning, by the understanding that none of the broader development programmes of the region could be secured in an environment where conflicts disturbed every part of the region. As part of this realization, the IGAD heads of state renamed the organization the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in order to capture this wider dimension. This renaming was not a mere sinecure; it changed entirely the thrust of the organisation’s thinking about issues of conflict and security.

This trend of thinking affected not only the programmatic thrust of IGAD, but also changed its philosophical outlook quite profoundly. Since 1996, IGAD has been more proactive in the ways in which it addressed issues of conflict in the region. One major result of this change was the establishment of the IGAD conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN). In the operations of that mechanism, it has been realized that states alone cannot establish security, and that the communities of the region also have an important role to play in maintaining an early warning and response network in the region. This was a change from past practices in which security was considered to be a purely state-based activity.

As all these developments have been taking place however, the outlook of the world about basic concepts such as security has also been changing profoundly. These changes have in turn required that the very concept of security in the region be revisited, so that the programmes established can better reflect a more holistic concept of security. In the current operating environment of the region, security needs to reflect a wider perspective, if nothing else so as to reflect the complex drama being played out in the contemporary political, economic and social arena.

The emergence of the concept of globalisation has prompted changes in thinking about security, both in the IGAD region and elsewhere. In general, the emerging reality of globalisation has changed the traditional configurations of the international political economy and has raised issues not just of economics, but also of the latitude that states have in dealing with emerging issues and problems. Also, international—and
Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

sub-regional—organizations have had to redefine themselves in order to more sharply map out their roles in the globalised and globalising world. In this context, issues of security have come to the fore, and states need to address these if they are to remain competitive in the new international framework.

In particular, globalisation and its processes have helped to dissolve the old borders; and it has opened up the international system in ways that were not earlier thought to be possible. Globalisation has opened up new frontiers for international relations and for the international political economy.\(^2\) It has, in particular, required a redefinition of the internal—and regional—arrangements for African political economy and regional and security relations. This chapter comes to terms with the debates and discourses about regional security that have been opened up. The chapter suggests the contours of the emerging issues and debates, and argues that it is necessary, in the beginning, to develop some conceptual consensus about regional security and its dimensions.

Definitions of Regional Security

As the debates about globalisation have taken shape in recent years, it has become evident that there is a need at the same time to come to grips with questions of regional security. This in turn has made it evident that it is imperative to debate the shape of a regional security strategy for the IGAD region. Such a debate about a regional security strategy has largely been absent in the discourses about globalisation and the effects it has in the IGAD region. What has become evident is that there are different competing ideas about what the content of a regional security strategy should be; and this has been the case because there has also been no consensus about the specific threats to security—broadly defined—in the region. And yet, not only is it necessary to debate security issues, but also there must be some agreement about the responses to those security issues. These responses can be conceptualized in the context of a regional security strategy that meets the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the region.

That such a regional security strategy is necessary is beyond question. Such a strategy, in the first place, can be seen as a response to the emerging globalisation. The emerging processes of globalisation have opened up states and their security in ways that were not earlier thought to be possible. Globalisation and its processes are not entirely new concepts, to the extent that they have been developing over some time.\(^3\) The processes of interdependence provided the early beginnings of globalisation. Interdependence entailed the thinking that states and other actors in the international system were networked together in complex ways, and that each relied on the others in diverse areas ranging from the economic, the political, and the social.

At the same time, interdependence operated in environments that were complex and unpredictable. In the IGAD region, the fact that the operating environment is

---


Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

unpredictable cannot be gainsaid. Indeed, it is this very unpredictability of the region that makes it imperative to debate issues of the context and content of a regional security strategy. Surrounding this is a political environment that is characterized by various conflicts and conflicting policies. In the IGAD region the complexity of the political environment is characterized, amongst others, by complex state identities, ranging from the failed—or collapsed4—state of Somalia, caught in the web of almost intractable internal conflicts, to the uneasy relationship between an ancient state (Ethiopia) and the region’s newest state of Eritrea. In other parts of the region, such as Kenya, and to some extent Uganda, the issues that have held attention are concerned with transitions broadly defined, and more particularly about rediscovering and even redefining the state and its role. The region also has a sub-regional organization that in recent times has seen one of its mandates as being to mediate in the major conflicts in the region. Hence IGAD’s responses to the Somalia and Sudanese5 conflicts have characterized its responses to major fractures in the international relations of the region.

Given the diversity of the problems and issues in the region, the challenge of defining what the regional security interests are becomes important. Without defining regional security interests, and reaching some consensus about them, it cannot be possible to shape a regional security strategy that is functional. And without such a security strategy there are doubts as to whether the region can effectively respond to the challenges of globalisation in all its dimensions.

Towards a Conceptual Consensus

A clear and functional regional security strategy cannot arise in the absence of some consensus at least on the architecture of security in the IGAD region. Such a consensus needs to be built around definitions of regional security interests, and of the best strategies through which to secure those interests. But it is precisely such a consensus that has been difficult to reach. The reasons for this failure include the fact that the notion of security itself has not been understood in its larger context. It seems that the understanding of security has remained hostage to traditional thinking, and hence a more modern understanding of security has not been able to gain wide currency and acceptance. In the region, perhaps because of the complex environments that have been in competition, security is still seen in terms of physical security, the response to which is traditionally military.

Because of this one-dimensional view of security, which is couched in thinking inside the box, there has not been any agreement either about the best strategies through which to promote the security interests of members of the region. This is not a problem that is restricted to the IGAD region, as the continental debates about an African army have shown. Without some consensus about the proper strategies, in turn, it has not been possible to even begin debating about the proper institutions for securing regional security. While it is true that within the different states and issue areas there have

4 The concept of collapsed states is examined in I. W. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

been debates about the shape and character of security, these debates have been disparate and have not been harmonized in a way that would have began developing a regional consensus about security interests and the strategies for securing them. Hence, while in Europe, for example, the security debate has been characterized as a locomotive without a train, in the IGAD region the debate, such as it is, can best be characterized a train without a locomotive. The difference in these two characterisations is that while in Europe there have been debates about the content of a foreign and security policy, there has been none in the IGAD region. And whereas in Europe there have been many engines contending about which of their views should drive the emerging foreign and security policy, in the IGAD region there have not been any such contending perspectives.

Security, in a modern context, is a much wider concept than was traditionally thought. In traditional thinking, security was contextualised within purely physical realities. In this thinking, threats to security were external, and external threats related to neighbouring states. Hence the emergence of traditional western notions about the security dilemma, to escape from which was the whole rationale for a security strategy. For the third world however, this traditional security dilemma did not help to security issues accurately, and hence the notion of an insecurity dilemma, in which threats are more internal than external.

This realization is pertinent to contemporary thinking about security in the IGAD region, and about the architecture of a regional security strategy. The new thinking, based on the understanding of an insecurity dilemma is relevant in the development of individual state grand strategies (i.e. national security strategies). However, these grand strategies of individual states need to be nested on a wider perception of security to include all its other dimensions such as environmental, health, gender and the like. And only on the basis of such informed and contemporary security strategies, can a debate emerge about the content and architecture of a regional grand strategy for the region. And indeed, the interaction between processes of globalisation and regional security must eventually point out to the development of a regional grand strategy, which is based on the realisation that the old borders have been dissolved, and that the challenges of the new realities require tools that the traditional perspectives did not possess.

The traditional perspective was shaped and honed by history, and especially so the history of the modern state, and hence state system. The Westphalian state was—and is—an imagined community, to the extent that it was constructed in order to gravitate peoples and loyalties towards it. But without effective control, some states could not

9 The problems of developing national grand strategy have been examined in the Kenyan context in M.Mwagiru, “Issues of Coordination in National Security Strategy: Towards a Metatheory for a Kenyan Grand Strategy” (Lecture of Opportunity, National Defence College, 22 October 2003).
survive as states; they ended up being mere juridical entities,11 without effective institutions for survival. It is entities such as these, which are evident in the IGAD region, that are now required to respond to globalisation. But because globalisation is a process rather than an end state,12 social institutions in the region need to design structures of integration—such as regional institutions—that while reflecting the needs of the imagined communities they represent (since globalisation does not entail a uniform response), at the same time capture at least some elements of the emerging global perspective.

Conceptualising Borders and Borderlessness

One beginning point in coming to terms with a new regional security architecture is the role that borders have played in the region. This will change as the understanding of the roles of the borders, or their diminishing role comes to be appreciated. The interaction between territorial borders and the character of regional relations needs to be reconceptualised if a regional security strategy is to emerge. Traditional thinking about the effect of territorial borders on international relations argued for geographical determinism, namely, that a state's policies are determined amongst others by its location, resources and climate.13 Building on this sort of notion refinements to theorizing about the relationship between borders, geography and policies ranged from the Sprouts’ environmental possibilism14 to Boulding's loss of strength gradient, in which the further a state moves away from its home base, the weaker it gets.15

This line of reasoning culminated in a more complex understanding of the relationship between borders, conflict and international (or regional) relations. In particular, Westing explored the ways in which natural resources, especially those in short supply affect interstate relations and generate conflict.16 Later, Choucri and North constructed their lateral pressure theory, in which conflict is shaped by the interaction between human population, technology and access to natural resources.17 All this thinking was developing towards a conceptualization of the relationship between territorial borders and relations amongst neighbouring states, including their conflict relations. In this understanding, borders create the opportunity for conflicts between states; but it is not the borders that cause conflict since:

“[A] border does not necessarily cause either conflicts or cooperative international interaction. The argument is...that a border creates a certain structure of risks and opportunities in which various interactions appear more or less likely to occur.”18

It is from this perspective that Touval was later to argue that the borders that divided communities in Africa facilitated the spillover of domestic conflict by the addition of an

Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

international dimension; and that this reality also led to people fleeing their homes to become refugees in neighbouring countries. While these early perspectives did not provide a complete picture of the interaction between globalisation and security relations, they nevertheless provided early intimations of interdependence, and the ways in which it interacts with regional and security relations. As such, they were useful precursors of the globalisation perspective, and especially the ways in which it affects regional security and other relations. In the IGAD region as it is presently constituted, the reality of territorial borders cannot be disputed; and that the interactions around these borders have influenced the tenor of regional security and international relations can also not be contested. These perspectives also stress the reality and supremacy of the territorial state in this region. And this reality must first of all be deconstructed before a regional security architecture can begin to emerge.

The post-modern discourse on these kinds of relationships provides an avenue for the re-evaluation of traditional thinking about the role and effect of borders on regional relations and security arrangements. In this discourse, the traditional division of sovereignties by territorial borders is being rejected. Instead, the state, as understood in its Westphalian context is being de-territorialised, among others by the merging economic, information and other globalizations. And at the same time, the state, as understood traditionally, is being challenged and weakened by global and regional forms of organization. The meaning of state boundaries has thus become de-territorialised significantly, and this has happened amongst other reasons because of the general globalisation process, including the pervasiveness of information, trade and other flows across the traditional borders. The net effect of these processes has been to challenge, and diminish traditional conceptions of sovereignty, and even of territorality itself as the organizing domain for the analysis of international relations. It is in this sense that territorialism is seen to be all about dividing space into territory; and space can be divided by other social categories such as time, race, gender, and the like.

Fixity of borders to the Regulatory Landscape

On the basis of this kind of reasoning, the conceptual tool of a regulatory landscape, that is, a borderless world (region) in which economic, political and other activities are not constrained by traditional territorial borders has emerged. The notion of the regulatory landscape has been illustrated well by van Nieuwkerk:

“The international political economy...resembles the physical landscape. It is a landscape of places and actors; a landscape which is reshaped by actors within it,

Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

at the same time as the actors' behaviour is shaped by the existing landscape; a landscape made up of individual places and actors and the connections between them; a landscape which is uneven; a landscape in which there are flows of people, goods, money and other types of assets and information; and, finally, a landscape which is reproduced and transformed by the flows of these goods and assets. Most importantly, regulatory landscapes are socially constructed and constituted, and scaled in particular ways. The concept of scale is important; geographical scale is the focal setting at which spatial boundaries are defined for a specific social claim, activity or behaviour. Scale is about boundaries, and boundaries are about power. The location, function and understanding of boundaries that separate different regulatory environments are part of a social process involving contests for power and authority.

In this sense therefore, the various conflicts in the region can be seen as contests for power, and specifically about whose rules—and which rules—should prevail over the activities in the region's regulatory landscape. These contests happen internally, for example in the current conflicts in Somalia and Sudan; but they also happen regionally in the contests about whose leadership regionally will prevail. They also happen institutionally; for example the movement towards a customs union in the East African Community is in one way an attempt to shape the character of the region's regulatory landscape. Hence, the definition of a security architecture for the region is about essentially refereeing these various contexts and contests in ways that can lead to the political and economic construction and reconfiguration of relationships that are mediated by the globalisation process. The issue is also about the institutions which can provide the engine for this security reconstruction of the region.

Institutional Mechanisms for a Regional Security Strategy

Given this understanding of the regulatory landscape as a framework for the analysis of regional relationships, the issue that arises is one about how the institutions of the region can be reshaped in order to reflect the emerging regulatory landscape of the region. Besides the character of the institutions themselves, there is the further issue of the kind of mechanisms that should be established within those institutions in order to enable them to respond more flexibly and relevantly to the demands of the regulatory landscape(s) that are emerging in the region. And ultimately, the issue becomes one about how the institutions themselves, and their mechanisms, can help to shape and define the regulatory landscape in the age of a globalised and globalising world.

In the IGAD region, there are many conflicts that in part help to define the shape and character of the regulatory landscapes. There are also various contests about the shape that the landscape should take, and indeed about whose rules and values should be reflected in that landscape. These contests—and contestations—are not new, but they nevertheless need to be addressed afresh taking into account the imperatives of the emerging globalisation that has coloured this and other regions. The contests have been

manifested in various ways. The Ethio–Eritrean war was, for example a sub regional contest about whose rules and values would prevail in that part of the Horn of Africa. The conflicts in the northern parts of Uganda are similarly about which rules shall prevail in a national context; and the constitutional conflicts in Kenya are all about the identity of the future regime on the basis of which a national regulatory landscape will emerge and be fashioned after.

All these contests are eventually about different dimensions of security in the IGAD region. In this context, security is more broadly defined, to encompass multiple relationships and issues. Unlike in the past where thinking about security was coloured by purely military conceptions, there is an emerging consensus now that security includes and involves diverse areas of concern. The landscape that has been shaped by globalisation is itself wide, and almost nebulous. It includes concerns with the political economy, political relationships, environmental concerns, matters to do with health and welfare, culture, and the like. In this setting, the role of regional institutions is to try and mediate and even resolve these various conflicts in the regulatory landscape.

In the IGAD region the most pressing starting point in the definition of a regional security strategy is to identify clearly the regional interests that should prevail in the midst of competing visions about the shape of regional security. The challenge here is to define the primary interests, not from the perspective of the individual actors in the region, but from a more holistic and inclusive perspective. Given that sovereignties, if not dead, are certainly dying, the challenge is to capture the regional picture in a globalised age of diminishing sovereignty. Apart from defining these interests however, it is also important to define the point at which individual state’s foreign and security policies should yield to, and even merge with, a regional strategy.

However, for the institutions and their mechanisms to do this effectively, they must be functional in the sense of seeing the definition of security strategies for the region as a major institutional concern. They must also be flexible, so that they can be able to capture the emerging dimensions of security without having first to re-engage debates about their mandates and competence. Whether an organization such as IGAD can be able to do this is a matter for debate. There is the view, on this issue, that IGAD has tended to be too programmatic in its orientation; and in this way it has not been able to provide the strategic thrust and guidance that it could have in matters of regional security policy. It is not entirely the organization’s fault that this is the case; but this does not reduce the fact that it needs to look at its mandate anew, so that it does not continue to address issues of the twenty first century with the tools of the twentieth.

Re-Inventing Security in IGAD

The challenges that globalisation and its processes have posed for the security of the region require that IGAD, being the premier sub-regional institution, re-invent itself. The

process of this re-invention will require a re-examination of the thrust of its mandates particularly in the security policy area. The idea of organizations re-inventing—and even re-discovering—themselves is not entirely new. The United Nations rose from the ashes of the League of Nations, while the current East African Community rose from the ashes of the old, collapsed one. More recently, the African Union has risen from the foundations of the old Organisation of African Unity. In the past, IGAD itself has found the need to re-invent itself, like it did in 1996 when it was transformed from IGADD to the current IGAD. This transformation responded to the need that was felt to give the organisation a wider mandate that would, inter alia, allow it to address more directly the conflicts in the region, which were affecting negatively the implementation of development programmes.

Given the pace that developments have taken, and especially the challenges that globalisation is posing for African—and regional—states, it is evident that IGAD needs to go through another process of re-invention. In this process, it needs to take in hand the need to provide strategic leadership in the area of foreign and security policy. In the current state of play regarding security issues in the region, the organization is well placed to become an active forum for the generation of ideas about regional foreign and security policy. Besides, in the region currently, there are not enough efforts being made to harmonise foreign and security policy, and this means that the region may be left behind by the fast moving globalisation process. What needs to be avoided, in the current climate, are the dangers of too many national, security and foreign policy trains, without the guiding light of a locomotive. As the experience of Europe has shown in recent times, the dangers of such a situation are self-evident.

IGAD is uniquely placed to play such a leadership role in the area of foreign and security policy in the region. Not only does it contain the core states of the Horn of Africa region, but also it operates in a region that is clearly calling for debate about the shape of the security policies in the region. IGAD membership also intersects two major conflict systems, that of the Horn of Africa and of the Great Lakes. Besides this, the IGAD region is a crucible in which all the strengths and weaknesses of sub-Sahara Africa are reflected. And at the same time, there are emerging important foreign policy and security issues that need to be addressed if peace is to be promoted in the region, and if conflicts that have proved devastating are to be avoided. One such issue concerns the Nile waters problem, which is a looming foreign policy and security issue, and which requires to be addressed early if confrontations are to be avoided. Many members of the Nile Valley are also member states of IGAD, and hence its involvement could be rationalized on this basis.

**Security Issues in the IGAD Region**

As was noted earlier in this chapter, there is currently no serious conceptual consensus about the security interests in the IGAD region. The reason for this gap has been that individual states have preferred to pursue their individual policies, and sometimes to insist that their own individual policies are regional policies. However, this state of affairs...
Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

has been found unworkable, and even inaccurate. Elsewhere, for example in the Great Lakes region, the pursuit of individual policies at the expense of regional perspectives led to an intractable war that touched on all members and parts of the region. A similar outcome could easily be conceptualized in the Horn of Africa region, with all its interconnected conflicts that define its conflict system.

But while no serious conceptual consensus exists about the content of a foreign and security policy for the region, it is nevertheless possible to suggest a menu that can serve as the beginning point in the definition of such security issues. One of the most pressing challenges is the question of refugee issues and their relationship to security in the region. It is widely recognized that the IGAD region is one of the most severely affected areas in terms of the generation of refugees, and the attendant problems of insecurity. The refugee problem is so inextricably a part of the security context of the region that it needs eventually to be seen as a foreign policy and diplomatic issue that needs to be addressed from those fronts. Unfortunately however, it has tended to be treated as a national, rather than a regional, security issue.

The issue of environmental protection has become one of the major dimensions of security, both in this region and in others. Environmental issues have become a security issue because amongst other things, of the acknowledgement that the environment knows no borders, and that the impacts of environmental degradation on security broadly defined are vast. The security dimensions of the environment have been noted for some time, from the early writings of the Sprouts to the more recent ones of Westing and company. Environmental protection has a further bearing on security in that it brings together the different strands of security issues such a the refugee problem, land degradation and the attendant tensions that can lead directly to conflict.

The problem of economic asymmetries in the region has a direct bearing on regional security, and it is hence a problem that needs to be addressed in this context. Economic asymmetries have a bearing on individual states directly and also on the regional level, at which point it becomes necessary to develop regional responses and policies. The economic condition of states of the region, and the way in which it has been affected by the process of globalisation is a major theme in the security and foreign policy fields and needs to be addressed more systematically in their formulation of foreign and security policies of the region. From the perspective of individual states, the economic dimension is crucial in the formulation of a grand strategy for states, since the economy is one of the major tools of a grand strategy.

The issue of conflicts, especially internal conflicts that become internationalized is a major foreign policy and security issue in the IGAD region. These issues are closely intertwined with the germane issues arising from the globalisation debate. The internal

conflicts in the IGAD region, indeed, pose probably the biggest security threat to the region. IGAD has tried to address these, especially through its conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN). The internal conflicts in the region pose problems and issues not just for security policy, but also for foreign policies of the region, and how they can fashion themselves to meet the challenges raised by these conflicts. Given their importance for regional security, these conflicts need to be approached from a systemic perspective. The conflict systems approach to the analysis of regional internal conflict permits them to be conceptualized on a region-wide basis.

The systems approach is itself socially constructed, to the extent that it is understood purely in the context of the needs of the peoples of the region and given that it is part of the regional regulatory landscape. More than anything else, this perspective requires that the regional imagined communities, created by the modern state system that Africa inherited, be deconstructed. The whole programme about making it easy for goods and people to move across territorial borders can be construed as precisely such a process. And the thinking is that through such a process of destroying traditional imagined communities of the modern state, conflict internally can be reduced, and the violent ones even eliminated. This is one perspective from which the traditional western security dilemma can be challenged in its application to the imagined African communities (as states). For, if it is possible to create a larger imagined community, then clearly the old traditional state boundaries will be dissolved, and in doing so, new understandings of security will arise.

**Enlarging the Insecurity Dilemma**

The notion of an insecurity—as opposed to a security—dilemma is at the heart of security relations in the IGAD region. It is also the cornerstone in the construction of a regional security and foreign policy strategy. The insecurity dilemma idea takes the view that threats to the security of third world states do not emanate externally, but internally. Hence in the third world context, it does not make much sense to talk of a security dilemma in the traditional, western sense of the concept. Until now, however, what was internal was seen purely from the context of individual states, and the internal threats that they faced. Given that the region and its conflicts and politics needs to be perceived from a systemic basis however, it is necessary to enlarge the concept of what constitutes an internal threat in order to capture this systemic perspective and its different dynamics.

In adopting a systemic perspective, the beginning point is that there are very few things that are purely internal, and that can be seen purely to be so. From the perspective of conflicts, this notion does not need to be laboured more. The same perspective can be adopted in examining threats to security in the region. The essence of this reasoning is that since the system is closely interwoven, what pose as security threats for one state in the system are equally threats to other members of the system. This idea has been demonstrated in the Great Lakes region, where specific threats to Zaire, (later Democratic Republic of Congo) also ended up being seen as threats to other members of...
Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region

the system, and hence the rapid internationalization of the conflict. The same is true also of the IGAD region, where issues, politics—and conflicts—are inextricably woven together.

The systemic perspective eventually means that it is no longer sufficient to have only national security strategies for each of the individual states. Such strategies, by themselves, lead to the awkward position of having engines without a train. Besides this national security strategies are normally very inward looking, in that they see only security issues, as they are perceived nationally without in-building a regional perspective. But in an age of the increasing salience of regional and sub-regional perspectives, it is very important that the regional organizations concerned become more engaged in rationalizing the various security strategies of member states, so that, on security and foreign issues at least, they begin to talk with one voice.

What has made this difficult to achieve in the past is that regional and sub-regional organizations have tended to see themselves and their roles within a very narrow perspective. In that approach, these organizations have not seen it as their role to shape debate in the system about important issues such as security and foreign policy. But without such debates, spearheaded by the regional organizations, regional security issues are likely to remain in the back burner, much to the detriment of a policy or policies that can help to enhance regional security. At the same time, regional organisations have tended to give too much deference to their states members, even where such members looked to the organizations for guidance on the way forward. This trend defeats the whole rationale for regional organizations. Earlier, when regional organizations were beginning to become a permanent feature of the international and regional landscape, it was believed by the functionalists that such organizations would be the vehicles through which international peace and security would be achieved. Mitrany's working peace system,29 for example, conceptualized a world in which international organizations would prompt growth and security. It is time for regional organizations to think carefully and creatively about how that original mandate can be rekindled, because, in the long run, they still provide the most suitable engines from which to drive an environment of peace regionally, and even internationally.

The beginning point for this reality, if it is to be achieved, is for the organizations to be more creative in terms of what they perceive to be their mandates. Only on that basis will it be possible to begin the process of creating a regional security and foreign policy architecture that can deliver the security goods. The organizations can also help in the process of building a consensus on the content of security concerns in the region. Without such a consensus there can be no way forward. And one such consensus that needs to emerge is that regional security issues, in a globalising environment, cannot be left mainly to the artificial constructs of the regional states in the IGAD region. In moving beyond the traditional state as the guarantor of security, movement will at the same time

have been made to beginning the construction of a new basis from which to view security issues and policies in the region.

**Conclusion**

At the turn of the twentieth century, Africa did not feature prominently in the international relations architecture. At that time Africa was a mere object, or was treated as such, and was also subject to colonial processes that arrested its development, and its renaissance. At the turn of the twenty first century, Africa has become an interlocutor in the pressing issues of the day. However, Africa's voice is still suppressed, in part because it has not been able to cope with economic, security and other burdens, which its condition imposed on it. This has meant that Africa has not been able to fully respond to the processes of globalisation that have swept the international political, economic, trading and other systems.

In security terms, Africa has not yet fashioned a security architecture that can guarantee its continued survival in an increasingly harsh international environment. Although there have been modest movements in that direction, these have sometimes seemed to chase the train long after it has been gone. Sub–regionally, the parts of the whole reflect the weaknesses of the whole, and have often tended to mirror it.

As all this has been happening, the global environment has become even harsher than it has ever been. From the perspective of Africa, life in this environment continues to be in Hobbesian terms, short, nasty and brutal. But Africa can shape the environment in which it can thrive, and become a major interlocutor in the debates that have been prompted by the emerging processes of globalisation. But the way forward now is to be a bit more inward looking, especially in matters to do with regional security, because it is in this arena that Africa can shape its destiny. It can do so, amongst other reasons, because issues of regional security are in the hands of peoples of the region. After all, the process of globalisation does not mean—or require—a uniformity of response to security issues. It is about manipulating space, and members of the region need to take up this cue. And above all, regional states need to begin taking the point of view that regional security and foreign policy are worthwhile undertakings, in which the best of Africa can participate, and do so on the basis of intellectual and human dignity. That, after all, is the meaning underlying the notion of an African renaissance.
Contributors

Lt. General John Koech is the Commandant of the National Defence College (NDC) Karen, Nairobi, Kenya. Prior to that appointment he was the Vice Chief of the General Staff of Kenya. Earlier, he served as the Commandant of the Defence Staff College (DSC), Karen, Nairobi.

Dr. Samson Lukare Kwaje is the Director of the Horn of Africa Centre for Democracy and Development (HAC DAD) based in Yei, New Sudan. He is also the spokesman of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), and has been intimately involved in the Sudan peace process.

Prof. P. Godfrey Okoth is Professor of History at the Department of History and Government, Maseno University, Kenya. He was previously Professor of History at Makerere University, Uganda. He has written extensively on diplomatic history and international relations.

Dr. Makumi Mwagiru is currently the Director of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, and of the Centre of Conflict Research, Nairobi. Previously he was Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, USIU, in Nairobi, Kenya. He also teaches International Conflict Management, Diplomacy and International Law at the National Defence College (Kenya) and Defence Staff College.

Prof. Eric Masinde Aseka is Professor of Political History in the Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies at Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya.

Dr. Ludeki Chweya is the Chairman of the Department of Government and History at the University of Nairobi. He also lectures in international relations at the National Defence College, and Strategic Planning at the Defence Staff College (DSC), Kenya, and is an adjunct lecturer at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.

Dr. Patricia Kameri Mbote is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi, a visiting lecturer at the National Defence College (NDC) Nairobi, Kenya, and an adjunct lecturer at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. Dr. Kameri Mbote has previously served as the Chairman of the Department of Private Law, and as the Dean ad interim, Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi.

Mr. Ochieng Kamudhayi gained his M.A. in International Studies from the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. He has been a consultant at the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference both its Eldoret and Mbagathi phases.

Prof. Peter Wanyande is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, and is also Dean of the Faculty of Arts. Prof. Wanyande is also a visiting lecturer, at the National Defence College and at the Defence Staff College in Karen, Nairobi. Formerly, Prof. Wanyande was the Chairman of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Nairobi.
Contributors

Prof. P. Anyang’ Nyong’o is the minister for Planning and National Development in the Government of Kenya. He is also a fellow of the African Academy of Sciences and has written widely on state, social classes, internal conflicts and peace.

Ms Asegedech Ghirmazion is the Director Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional office for East and the Horn of Africa.
Bibliography

Bibliography


Index

ACRI. See African Crisis Response Initiative
APRM. See African Peer Review Mechanism
AU. See African Union
Addis Ababa 41, 82, 96-98
African Crisis Response Initiative 16
   Peer Review Mechanism 70, 72, 79, 81-82
   security 31, 64
   Union 2-3, 15, 36-37, 79, 82, 120, 129, 141
welfare state system 47
Age of globalisation 1-150
Aggression 32, 43, 91-92
Agriculture 9, 61, 63, 126
Alqaeda 33, 35
Anglo–Egyptian Condominium 95
Angola 43, 45
Anyanya war 96
Architecture for security 5
Arms 8, 12, 14, 16, 26, 28, 40, 53, 60, 75, 92, 95, 118, 126-128, 130
Arta Conference 109
Asia 23, 51
August 7 attacks 33
   Nairobi bomb blast 33
Authoritarianism 111
Autonomy 10, 19, 27, 40, 105
Bad governance 51, 93
Balance of power 8, 33, 35, 111
Banditry 14, 32, 76, 130
Belgium 38, 42, 120, 125
Benin 45
Bosnia 15
Bretton Woods Institutions 53
Britain 19, 38, 42, 45, 117, 120-121
British army 44
CEWARN. See Conflict Early Warning and Response
CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States
COMESA. See Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Cattle rustling 14, 55, 60, 76, 126
Ceasefire 99, 103
Index

China 21, 42
   war 9, 14, 37, 41, 62, 73, 109, 121, 126
Class 20, 50, 84, 89
Cold War 2, 8, 11-13, 20, 31, 33-38, 42-45, 48-51, 57, 64, 125, 132, 142
Collective security 7, 129-130
Colonial governments 127
   state 10, 38, 42
Colonialism 10
Commerce 127
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 58
Commonwealth of Independent States 36
Communal perceptions 7
Communication 20-21, 57, 126-127
Comoros 45
Comparative foreign policy 5
Computer networks 128
Conceptual consensus 4, 134-135, 141-142
Conflict Early Warning and Response 34, 62, 126, 133, 143
   management 4, 15-16, 55, 89, 116, 126, 128-133, 147
   relations 5, 137
   resolution 12, 14, 36, 48, 111, 116-117, 119, 135
   system 56, 125, 131-132, 142
   systems 2, 125, 130-131, 141, 143
Confrontations 141
Congo 24, 43, 45, 58, 143
Constitutive Act 3, 36-37, 72, 129
Content of security 1, 144
Cooperation 2, 5, 8, 31, 34-37, 44-45, 49-51, 54-56, 59-60, 85, 91, 129-130, 150
Corporate governance 81
Crime 16, 40, 46, 54, 75, 126, 130
Criminal Investigations Department 13
Cross-border conflicts 11, 128
Cultural autonomy 10
Culture 24, 26, 49, 57, 89, 95, 127, 140
Customs Union 22, 60-61, 75, 139

Darfour 41
Defence 50, 54-57, 60, 85-86, 91, 126, 136-137, 147-148
Demobilisation 111
Democracy 25, 32, 36-37, 44, 51, 62, 71, 73-74, 122, 126, 147, 149
Democratic elections 74, 77
   Republic of Congo 24, 57, 143
Department of Homeland Security 33
Desertification 15, 39, 50, 62-63, 65, 126
Index

Deterrence theory 8
Deteritorialization 127
   strategy 55, 70-71, 73-74, 80-81
Diplomacy 7, 55-56, 111, 115, 118, 131-132, 134, 142, 147
Disarmament 111, 122
Disease 51, 69-70
Djibouti 7, 34, 37, 40, 50, 98, 100, 107, 109-110, 112-114, 116-119, 126
   Declaration 34
Drought 15, 34, 39-40, 50, 62-63, 126, 130

EAC. See East African Community
EASBRIG. See Eastern African Standby Brigade
ECA. See Economic Commission of Africa
ECOWAS. See Economic Cooperation of West African States
East African Community 2, 22, 50-51, 130, 139, 141
East African Court of Justice 53
East African Legislative Assembly 53
Eastern African Standby Brigade 37
   Europe 13, 22
Economic Commission for Africa 81
   Cooperation of West African States 36
      development 8, 12, 19, 26, 50, 58, 65, 71-72, 74-75, 85, 119, 132
      disparities 129
   globalization 20, 26
   marginalization 74
   policies 32, 71
Egypt 58-59, 95-96, 120
Eldoret 4, 77, 107, 110, 114, 148
Elections 41, 68, 73-74, 77, 111, 119
Elemi Triangle 38-39
   Emerging notions of security 2
Environmental degradation 39, 51, 58, 63, 86, 93, 127-128, 130, 142
   security 49, 58
Equality 36, 71, 83-84, 87-90
Estonia 36
Ethiopia 7, 9, 11-12, 14-16, 37-41, 43, 50, 55, 58, 62, 78, 82, 98, 100, 109, 112-114, 116-121, 126-127, 130, 135
   -Eritrea conflict 39
Ethio-Eritrean war 140
Ethnicity 10, 28, 38, 41, 89, 95, 128
Ethno-political conflicts 10
Europe 13, 17, 21-22, 38, 57, 136, 141
European capitalist powers 42
   Union 65, 94, 120
External intervention 11
Index

Failed states 24, 127
Feminism 84
Feminist scholars 84
   studies 84
Foreign policy 2-3, 5, 11, 26, 32, 50-51, 56-57, 118, 141-145
Fourteenth Somalia Peace Conference 109
Frameworks of analysis 7
France 38, 42
Freedom 23, 26, 32, 37, 44, 60, 69, 84, 92, 99
Frontiers 128, 134, 138-139
Fundamental concepts 4
   freedoms 23, 104

Gender 2-4, 36, 65, 78, 83-87, 89-95, 136, 138
   analysis 4, 89-90
Geography 20, 22, 95, 127, 137
Germany 38, 42
Ghana 43, 72
Global economy 21, 26
   power 19-20
   security 8, 56
   war 29
Globalisation 1-150
Governance 10, 19, 29, 51, 53, 66-70, 73-78, 81-82, 86, 89, 93, 99-100, 112, 122, 132, 149
Governments 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21, 24, 29, 33, 39, 43-44, 46-47, 60-61, 68-70, 73, 75-78, 82, 95-96, 101, 104, 107, 109, 114, 119, 127-128, 130-131
Grand strategy 136, 142
Great Lakes 2, 9, 13, 56, 125, 131, 141-143, 150

Horn of Africa 2, 7, 9-17, 22, 50, 55-56, 62-63, 125-127, 132-133, 140-142, 147
Human rights 23-24, 26, 37, 44, 69, 87, 93, 100, 104
   security 26, 29, 33, 36, 46-48, 51, 90, 92, 150

ICC. See International Criminal Court
ICT. See Information Communication Technology
IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGAD Partners Forum 107-108
IGAD region 2-5, 31, 40, 42, 48, 67-70, 72-76, 78, 80-82, 107, 125-131, 133-144
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Ideological conflict 44
Ideology 13, 19-20, 22, 24, 26-27, 43, 45, 57, 64, 71, 77, 125, 149
Impact of insecurity 9, 84, 92
Impacts of conflict 84, 89
Individual insecurity 68, 71
   security 68-70, 83, 91, 93
Industrialization 127
Index

Information communication technology 21
Insecurity dilemma 2, 136, 143
Institutional reforms 10
Integration 16, 19, 21-22, 26, 29, 36, 50, 52, 55, 57, 59, 61-62, 72, 78, 81, 93, 111, 129, 132, 137
Intellectuals 3, 19, 22-23, 27-28, 149
Inter-state conflicts 39, 62
defence and security committee 55
Interdependence 1, 5, 20, 50, 58, 62, 85-86, 129-130, 134, 138
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 15, 50
Internal affairs 36, 54
conflicts 9, 42, 56, 62, 67, 135, 142-143, 148
opposition 11
threats 2, 143
International capitalism 19
community 16, 75, 85, 102, 107, 114, 120, 122, 128
crime 8, 60, 90, 137, 147
Criminal Court 26, 130
Financial Institutions 53
framework 134
law 23, 25, 34, 87, 130, 147
Monetary Fund 53, 73
organizations 3, 34-35, 64, 90, 144
political economy 1, 133-134, 138
relations 1, 5, 7-8, 11, 22, 25-26, 31-35, 46, 49-51, 55, 68, 111, 134-135, 137, 138, 145, 147
Internationalization 1-2, 20, 32, 60, 127-128, 144, 149
of conflict 128
Iraq 13, 24
Irredentism 11, 37-38, 41-42
Islamic civilization 44
fundamentalism 9, 13
Israel 13
Italy 42, 100, 117, 120-121
Japan 21
Jinja Draft Protocol 37
Karamoja 40
Karamojong 14, 60
Kenya–Uganda frontier 40
Khartoum 14, 41-42, 62, 95-96, 98, 101
Koka Dam Conference 96-97
Declaration 96-97

LRA. See Lord's Resistance Army
Lake Victoria 58, 126
Index

Latin America 23
Legal system 88
Liberal marketism 19, 26
Liberalization 47, 127
Liberation movements 12, 42
Liberia 24, 43
Literacy 58, 84
Lithuania 36
Lord's Resistance Army 13, 41, 54, 74, 126

Machakos 95, 98-102, 104-105
Peace Process, The 98-100
Protocol 99-100, 104
Malawi 77, 95
Marginalization 19, 23, 26, 28, 74
Markets 21, 49, 52, 61
Mbagathi 4, 107, 114-115, 120, 122-123, 148
Mechanisms 15, 44, 54, 67, 85, 89, 91, 93, 139-140
Mediation 14, 36-37, 48, 97, 101
Mediators 97, 100-101, 103, 116
Mercenaries 44-45
Middle East 7, 9, 13
Militarization 12, 92
capability 8
threats 51, 128
Militia 86, 102
Minority groups 10
Modernization 27, 71
Mozambique 43, 113
Multinational corporations 32, 52

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD See New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs See Non-governmental organisations
Naivasha 4, 95, 102, 104-105
National affairs 1
boundaries 22, 39
identities 10
Natural resources 37-38, 40, 91, 93, 103, 125, 137
Negotiations 16, 59, 63, 65, 97-102, 112, 117-118, 120-123
Neo–liberal state system. See Structural Adjustment Program
realism 25
New Partnership for Africa's Development 3, 5, 64-67, 70, 72-82, 132
New world order 19-20, 50, 57, 150
Index

New York 7-9, 33, 49-51, 137, 149
Nigeria 43, 64-65, 69
Nile Basin Council of Ministers Meeting 59
  waters 59-60, 91, 120, 141
Non–governmental organizations 7, 14, 16, 63
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 36
  /South conflicts 95
Nuclear weapons 8

OAU. See Organisation of African Unity
October 28 Mombasa attack 33
Ogaden 11, 38, 40, 117-118, 121
Operating environment 1, 4, 133-134
Opposition 11, 43, 111
Organisation of African Unity 3, 14, 36, 72, 141
Oromo National Liberation 41

Palme Commission 8-9
  negotiations 63
  keeping 16, 37, 131
Pearl Harbour 33
Pluralism 10
Poland 36
Political legitimacy 8, 10, 17
  organization 17, 37
  security 49
Politics 1, 5, 7, 10-13, 21-22, 24, 27-28, 34-35, 38, 50-53, 55, 57, 74, 118, 125-128, 134, 137-138, 142-144
Portugal 38, 42
Post–colonial states 10
Poverty 8, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 25, 33, 46, 48, 51, 63-65, 67, 69-71, 74, 78, 80, 92, 125-126, 128, 131-132, 149
Power relations 10, 83-84, 86, 92
  sharing 10, 98, 100-101, 110, 114, 123
Practitioners 5, 8, 17
Public sector 83
Puntland 41-42, 116

Re–integration 111
Realist framework 3
Reconciliation 4, 107-111, 113, 115, 120, 148-149
Refugees 12, 40, 56, 74-75, 118, 121, 125-127, 130, 138, 142, 149
Regimes 1, 7, 11-12, 17, 19, 22, 24, 37, 44, 52, 55, 62, 86, 128
Index

Regional hegemony 7
  interests 116, 122, 140
  organizations 2, 31, 49, 64, 144
  security 1-146
Regulatory landscape 138-140, 143
Religion 24, 32, 49, 95, 97-99, 126, 149
Religious ideology 13
Re-invention 141
River Nile 58, 91, 127
Ruling elites 19
Rwanda 37, 56, 58, 69, 91, 120

SADC See Southern African Development Cooperation
SPLA. See Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
SPLM See Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement
Second World War 8, 35
Security 1-5, 7-9, 11-17, 19, 21-29, 31-34
  analysis 1-2, 4
  complex 7, 130
  Council 15, 36, 93
  dilemma 136, 143
  issues 1-3, 5, 14-15, 23, 28, 34, 36, 50-53, 56-60, 62-64, 66-67, 90, 127-128, 131-132,
    134, 136, 141-142, 144-145
  management 129-131
  policy 2, 4, 27, 131, 136, 140-143
  strategy 27, 134-137, 139-140
  studies 1, 5, 9, 31, 40, 49, 125
Self-determination 10, 19, 27, 96-99
Senegal 43, 64, 149
September 11 9, 33, 35
  11 terrorist attack 33
Sexual violence 92
Seychelles 37, 45
Shifta war 11, 38, 42
Sierra Leone 24
Small arms 16, 26, 28, 40, 75, 118, 126-128, 130
Social environment 23
Societal security 1, 49
Somali 9, 11, 14, 28, 38, 40, 42, 107-122, 125
  Peace Process 107, 116
Somalia 4, 7, 9, 11-13, 15-17, 24, 33, 36-38, 40-44, 50, 56, 62, 73, 75, 78, 107-110, 112-114,
  116-123, 126-127, 129, 131, 135, 139, 148
Somaliland 41-42, 120-121
Sources of insecurity 2, 31, 37, 48
South Africa 43, 45, 64-65, 100
South Africans 44
Index

Southern African Development Cooperation 36, 59, 64-66, 72
Sudan 14, 41, 95-96, 99-104
Sovereignty 10, 25, 32-33, 37, 40, 51, 53, 125, 128, 130, 138, 140
Soviet Union 11, 36, 38, 42, 45, 49-50, 77
Spatial limits 127
Stability 15-16, 24-25, 27, 28, 34, 37, 54, 74, 88-89, 91, 95, 103, 129
relations 10, 20, 35, 38, 56, 85
security 27, 32, 44, 51, 68-71
Strategy 8, 27, 42, 50, 55, 67, 70-71, 73-74, 80-81, 125-126, 134-137, 139-140, 142-143
Structural realism 35
Sub-regional organizations 2, 49
-Sahara Africa 9, 141
Sudan 4, 7, 9, 12-17, 24, 36-41, 50, 55, 58, 62-63, 69, 73, 75, 77-78, 95-105, 113, 116, 120, 126, 129-131, 135, 139, 147
Peace Process 4, 95, 98, 102, 105, 147
Peoples Liberation Army 41, 77
Peoples Liberation Movement 14, 41, 96-98, 100-103, 105, 147
Sustainable development 15, 67, 69
peace 13, 23-24, 90, 127
Tanzania 33, 37, 40, 43, 50, 55-56, 58, 60-62, 71-72, 75, 120, 127
Territorial integrity 32, 40, 85
Terrorism 7, 9, 16, 19, 24, 42-44, 48, 75-76, 128, 130
Theoretical approaches 4
Third world 1, 8, 10, 17, 20, 23-25, 47, 52, 85, 136, 143
Threats to humanity 9
Toposa 14
Totalitarianism 53
Traditional analyses 5
Trafficking of illegal arms 12
Transformation 22, 28, 50, 57, 61, 72, 116, 141, 149
Transitional Charter 110, 112, 115
Transnational links 25
Treaty of Westphalia 7
Turkana 14, 28, 40

Uganda 7, 9, 11-16, 37-41, 50, 54-55, 57-58, 60-64, 69, 74-76, 82, 98, 100, 107, 113, 116, 119-120, 126-127, 130, 135, 140, 147
Ugandan army 11
Unemployment 8, 20-21, 25, 46, 51, 68, 126, 131
United Nations General Assembly 42
Security Council 36
United States of America 16, 21, 49-50, 64
Universalization 127
Upper Nile 12, 58-59, 101
Index

Violence 15, 17, 20-21, 23, 25-26, 69, 76, 86, 90, 92-93, 102, 108, 137, 149

WTO. See World Trade Organisation
Warsaw Pact 36
Washington 8, 12, 23, 33, 49, 57, 150
Weapons 8, 11-12, 14, 24, 28, 92, 102
World Bank 47, 53, 68, 73
  economy 26, 52, 127
  recession 8
Trade Organisation 21, 53

Yugoslavia 13

Zambia 43, 77, 95
Zanzibar 42, 56
Zimbabwe 45, 79, 95